Travere Therapeutics (TVTX) Risk Factors

In September 2024, the FDA granted full approval of FILSPARI to slow kidney function decline in adults with primary IgAN who are at risk of disease progression. Any future regulatory approvals that sparsentan or any of our other product candidates receives may be subject to significant limitations on the approved indicated uses for which the product may be marketed or to the conditions of approval, or contain requirements for potentially costly post-marketing testing, including Phase 4 clinical trials, and surveillance to monitor the safety and efficacy of the product candidate. In addition, our products, including FILSPARI, and any of our product candidates that are approved by the FDA or a comparable foreign regulatory authority, are or will be subject to extensive and ongoing regulatory requirements, including for the manufacturing, labeling, packaging, distribution, adverse event reporting, storage, advertising, promotion, import, export, recordkeeping, conduct of potential post-marketing studies and post-market submission requirements. These requirements include submissions of safety and other post-marketing information and reports, registration, as well as continued compliance with current good manufacturing practices and good clinical practices, for any clinical trials that we conduct post-approval. Later discovery of previously unknown problems with a product, including adverse events of unanticipated severity or frequency, undesirable side effects caused by the product, problems encountered by our third-party manufacturers or manufacturing processes, or failure to comply with regulatory requirements, either before or after product approval, may result in, among other things: - restrictions on the marketing, manufacturing, or distribution of the product;- requirements to include additional warnings on the label;- requirements to create or enhance a medication guide outlining the risks to patients;- withdrawal of the product from the market;- voluntary or mandatory product recalls;- requirements to change the way the product is administered or for us to conduct additional clinical trials;- fines, warning or untitled letters or holds on clinical trials;- refusal by the FDA or comparable foreign regulatory authorities to approve pending applications or supplements to approved applications filed by us or our strategic partners, or suspension, variation or revocation of product license approvals;- product seizure or detention, or refusal to permit the import or export of products;- injunctions or the imposition of civil or criminal penalties; and - harm to our reputation. For example, we have certain post-marketing requirements and commitments associated with FILSPARI. Further, we face risks relating to those post-marketing obligations, as well as the commercial acceptance of FILSPARI. If the regulatory approval for FILSPARI and/or Thiola are withdrawn for any reason, it would have a material adverse impact on our sales and profitability. Furthermore, if the regulatory approval for Chenodal and/or Cholbam are withdrawn for any reason, it would reduce the chance that we will receive any or all of the milestone payments from the sale of our bile acid product portfolio in August 2023.

The business and financial condition of healthcare-related businesses will continue to be affected by efforts of governments and third-party payers to contain or reduce the cost of healthcare through various means. In the United States and some foreign jurisdictions, there have been a number of legislative and regulatory changes and proposed changes regarding the healthcare system that could prevent or delay marketing approval for our current product candidates or any future product candidate that we develop, restrict or regulate post-approval activities and affect our ability to profitably sell sparsentan, pegtibatinase, or any other product candidate for which we obtain marketing approval. Our products are sold to patients whose healthcare costs are met by third-party payers, such as government programs, private insurance plans and managed-care programs. These third-party payers are increasingly attempting to contain healthcare costs by limiting both coverage and the level of reimbursement for medical products and services. Levels of reimbursement, if any, may be decreased in the future, and future healthcare reform legislation, regulations or changes to reimbursement policies of third-party payers may otherwise adversely affect the demand for and price levels of our products, which could have a material adverse effect on our sales and profitability. Economic, social, and congressional pressure may result in individuals and government entities increasingly seeking to achieve cost savings through mechanisms that limit coverage or payment for our products. For example, state Medicaid programs are increasingly requesting manufacturers to pay supplemental rebates and are requiring prior authorization for use of drugs. Managed care organizations continue to seek price discounts and, in some cases, to impose restrictions on the coverage of particular drugs. Government efforts to reduce Medicaid expenses may lead to increased use of managed care organizations by Medicaid programs. This may result in managed care organizations influencing prescription decisions for a larger segment of the population and a corresponding constraint on prices and reimbursement for our products. In addition, patients' access to employer sponsored insurance coverage may be negatively impacted by economic factors that result in increased rates of unemployment. To the extent patients taking our approved therapies become unemployed and experience a reduction to, or increased costs associated with, their insurance coverage, demand for our products could decline, which could have a material adverse effect on our sales and profitability, either as a result of decreased sales of our products and/or increased provision by us of free product to uninsured or commercially insured patients. The extent and duration of this potential impact on our business is currently unknown.

Outside the United States, reimbursement and healthcare payment systems vary significantly by country, and many countries have instituted price ceilings on specific products and therapies. In some countries, particularly EU Member States and EFTA countries, the pricing of prescription pharmaceuticals is subject to governmental control. In these countries, pricing negotiations with governmental authorities can take considerable time (6 to 12 months or longer) after the receipt of marketing approval for a product. The EU provides options for EU Member States to restrict the range of medicinal products for which their national health insurance systems provide reimbursement and to control the prices of medicinal products for human use. An EU Member State may approve a specific price for the medicinal product, it may refuse to reimburse a product at the price set by the manufacturer or it may instead adopt a system of direct or indirect controls on the profitability of the company placing the medicinal product on the market. Many EU Member States also periodically review their reimbursement procedures for medicinal products, which could have an adverse impact on reimbursement status. Moreover, to obtain reimbursement or pricing approval in some countries, we may be required to conduct a clinical trial that compares the cost effectiveness of our product candidate to other available therapies. This Health Technology Assessment ("HTA") of medicinal products is becoming an increasingly common part of the pricing and reimbursement procedures in some EU Member States, including those representing the larger markets. The HTA process is the procedure to assess therapeutic, economic and societal impact of a given medicinal product in the national healthcare systems of the individual country. The outcome of an HTA will often influence the pricing and reimbursement status granted to these medicinal products by the competent authorities of individual EU Member States. The extent to which pricing and reimbursement decisions are influenced by the HTA of the specific medicinal product currently varies between EU Member States. In December 2021, Regulation No 2021/2282 on HTA amending Directive 2011/24/EU, was adopted in the EU. This Regulation, which entered into force in January 2022 and will apply as of January 2025, is intended to boost cooperation among EU Member States in assessing health technologies, including new medicinal products, and providing the basis for cooperation at EU level for joint clinical assessments in these areas. The Regulation foresees a three-year transitional period and will permit EU Member States to use common HTA tools, methodologies, and procedures across the EU, working together in four main areas, including joint clinical assessment of the innovative health technologies with the most potential impact for patients, joint scientific consultations whereby developers can seek advice from HTA authorities, identification of emerging health technologies to identify promising technologies early, and continuing voluntary cooperation in other areas. Individual EU Member States will continue to be responsible for assessing non-clinical (e.g., economic, social, ethical) aspects of health technologies, and making decisions on pricing and reimbursement. If we or our partners are unable to maintain favorable pricing and reimbursement status in EU Member States for product candidates that we or our partners may successfully develop and for which we or our partners may obtain regulatory approval, any anticipated revenue from and growth prospects for those products in the EU could be negatively affected. In addition, certain governmental authorities may conduct reviews of reimbursement previously provided and assert for various reasons that amounts need to be repaid. For example, in October 2021 our distributor/exploitant in France for our previously marketed product Kolbam (which has since been divested) informed us that they had received a notice that the price previously paid for Kolbam during its period on the market in France had been recalculated by the agency responsible for pharmaceutical pricing in France. Such notice was confirmed by a decision in October 2023, asserting percentages of our turnover owed for repayment. In April 2024, we filed an appeal with the Competent Administrative Court regarding this matter. In October 2024, we received an invoice from the government authority for approximately €5.6 million (approximately $6.3 million). We expect to pay this amount while we pursue an appeal of the decision and the amount owed. While we cannot predict the amount that we may ultimately need to repay following ongoing review and future potential appeal proceedings, from 2015 through 2020, the period during which we had sales of Kolbam in France, our aggregate revenues from sales of Kolbam in France attributable to all purchasers/payers were approximately $8 million. If reimbursement of our products is unavailable or limited in scope or amount, or if pricing is set at unsatisfactory levels or subject to re-assessment and recoupment procedures, our prospects for generating revenue outside of the United States, if any, could be adversely affected and our business may suffer.

Communications and/or feedback from regulatory authorities, including the FDA or EMA, related to our current or future clinical trials does not guarantee any particular outcome from or timeline for regulatory review for such clinical trials, and expedited regulatory review pathways may not actually lead to faster development or approval. In 2018 we initiated the Phase 3 DUPLEX Study and the Phase 3 PROTECT Study. We initiated the DUPLEX Study and the PROTECT Study under the Subpart H pathway for potential accelerated approval in the United States, and potential conditional marketing authorization in the EU, in both jurisdictions based on change in proteinuria. Recognition of change in proteinuria as a surrogate endpoint in kidney disease is a relatively new regulatory development, and, as the field continues to evolve, new learnings may impact regulatory viewpoints. In April 2024, we and CSL Vifor announced that the European Commission has granted conditional marketing authorization ("CMA") for FILSPARI (sparsentan) for the treatment of adults with primary IgAN with a urine protein excretion =1.0 g/day (or urine protein-to-creatinine ratio =0.75 g/g). The CMA is granted for all member states of the European Union, as well as in Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The European Commission's decision follows the positive opinion from the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use ("CHMP") in February 2024, based on results from the pivotal Phase 3 PROTECT Study of FILSPARI in IgAN. There is no guarantee that European regulators will grant full approval of sparsentan for IgAN, that our timelines will not be delayed notwithstanding the availability of an expedited regulatory review pathway, or that we will receive related milestone payments. In May 2023, we announced that the DUPLEX Study did not achieve its two-year primary endpoint with statistical significance over the active control irbesartan. Although we are encouraged by the results for the secondary endpoints on proteinuria and exploratory endpoints, including renal outcomes, which trended favorably for sparsentan, and we are continuing to analyze the data to further evaluate the potential for sparsentan as a treatment for FSGS and are engaging with the regulators to explore a potential path to a submission for sparsentan in FSGS, there is no guarantee that we or our collaborator CSL Vifor will be able to establish a pathway to a potential submission of sparsentan for FSGS based on the results from the DUPLEX Study, that the FDA and/or EMA will support an application for sparsentan in FSGS, or that sparsentan will be approved for FSGS. In December 2023, we initiated the pivotal Phase 3 HARMONY Study to support the potential approval of pegtibatinase for the treatment of classical HCU. The HARMONY Study is a global, randomized, multi-center, double-blind, placebo-controlled Phase 3 clinical trial designed to evaluate the efficacy and safety of pegtibatinase as a novel treatment to reduce total homocysteine (tHcy) levels. In September 2024, we announced a voluntary pause of enrollment in the HARMONY Study. The voluntary enrollment pause was enacted following our determination that the desired drug substance profile was not achieved in the recent scale-up process. We expect to further evaluate the necessary commercial process improvements to enable the continuation of the Phase 3 program. After we conclude our evaluation, we will need to engage with regulators, and there is no guarantee that they will agree with our assessment. Although the FDA has granted Fast Track and Breakthrough Therapy designations to pegtibatinase for the treatment of HCU, there is no guarantee that our pivotal Phase 3 HARMONY Study will be successful or that pegtibatinase will be approved for HCU in the future, on the anticipated timeline or at all. Obtaining access to an expedited program (such as Fast Track and Breakthrough Therapy designations) may not in fact lead to faster development timelines or achieve faster review or approval than conventional FDA procedures. We may experience delays in approval timelines attributable to, among other things, acquiring sufficient supply of our product to conduct clinical trials, identifying and resolving issues relating to chemistry, manufacturing and controls, or conducting additional nonclinical or clinical studies. In addition, the FDA may withdraw access to an expedited program if it believes the access or designation is no longer supported by the data from our program.

In March 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively, the "PPACA"), a sweeping law intended to broaden access to health insurance, reduce or constrain the growth of healthcare spending, enhance remedies against fraud and abuse, add new transparency requirements for healthcare and health insurance industries, impose new taxes and fees on the health industry and impose additional health policy reforms. The PPACA revised the definition of "average manufacturer price" for reporting purposes, which could increase the amount of Medicaid drug rebates to states. The PPACA also increased the mandated Medicaid rebate from 15.1% to 23.1% of the average manufacturer price, expanded the rebate to Medicaid managed care utilization and increased the types of entities eligible for the federal 340B drug discount program. Further, the law imposed a significant annual fee on companies that manufacture or import certain branded prescription drug products. There have been executive, judicial, Congressional, and political challenges to certain aspects of the PPACA. For example, on June 17, 2021 the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a challenge on procedural grounds that argued the PPACA is unconstitutional in its entirety because the "individual mandate" was repealed by Congress. Further, on August 16, 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 ("IRA") into law, which among other things, extends enhanced subsidies for individuals purchasing health insurance coverage in PPACA marketplaces through plan year 2025. The IRA also eliminates the "donut hole" under the Medicare Part D program beginning in 2025 by significantly lowering the beneficiary maximum out-of-pocket cost and through a newly established manufacturer discount program. It is possible that the PPACA will be subject to judicial or Congressional challenges in the future. It is unclear how any additional healthcare reform measures of the Biden administration will impact the PPACA and our business. In addition, other legislative changes have been proposed and adopted since the PPACA was enacted. For example, in August 2011, President Obama signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011, which, among other things, includes aggregate reductions to Medicare payments to providers of up to 2% per fiscal year, which went into effect beginning on April 1, 2013 and, due to subsequent legislative amendments, will stay in effect until 2032 unless additional Congressional action is taken. Additionally, in January 2013, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 was signed into law, which, among other things, reduced Medicare payments to several providers, including hospitals and imaging centers.

We are subject to significant ongoing regulatory obligations, such as safety reporting requirements and additional post-marketing obligations, including regulatory oversight of the promotion and marketing of our products. In addition, the manufacture, quality control, labeling, packaging, safety surveillance, adverse event reporting, storage and recordkeeping for our products are subject to extensive and ongoing regulatory requirements. If we become aware of previously unknown problems with any of our products, a regulatory authority may impose restrictions on our products, our contract manufacturers or us. If we, our products and product candidates, or the manufacturing facilities for our products and product candidates fail to comply with applicable regulatory requirements, a regulatory authority, including the FDA, may send enforcement letters, mandate labeling changes, suspend, vary or withdraw regulatory approval, suspend, vary or terminate any ongoing clinical trials, refuse to approve pending applications or supplements filed by us, suspend or impose restrictions on manufacturing operations, request a recall of, seize or detain a product, seek criminal prosecution or an injunction, or impose civil or criminal penalties or monetary fines. In such instances, we could experience a significant drop in the sales of the affected products, our product revenues and reputation in the marketplace may suffer, and we could become the target of lawsuits. We are also subject to regulation by supranational, national, regional, state and local agencies and regulatory authorities, including but not limited to the FDA, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS"), Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the HHS Office of Inspector General and other regulatory bodies. The FDC Act, Social Security Act, Public Health Service Act and other federal and state statutes and regulations, and comparable foreign regulatory acts, govern to varying degrees the research, development, manufacturing and commercial activities relating to prescription pharmaceutical products, including nonclinical testing, clinical research, approval, production, labeling, sale, distribution, post-market surveillance, advertising, dissemination of information, promotion, marketing, and pricing to government purchasers and government health care programs. Our manufacturing partners are subject to many of the same requirements. Companies may not promote drugs for "off-label" uses-that is, uses that are not described in the product's labeling and that differ from those approved by the FDA or other applicable regulatory authorities. However, a company may share truthful and not misleading information that is otherwise consistent with the product's labeling. A company that is found to have improperly promoted off-label uses may be subject to significant liability, including civil and administrative remedies as well as criminal sanctions. In addition, management's attention could be diverted from our business operations and our reputation could be damaged. The federal health care program Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits, among other things, knowingly and willfully offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving remuneration to induce or in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering or arranging for the purchase, lease or order of any health care item or service reimbursable under Medicare, Medicaid or other federally financed healthcare programs. This statute has been interpreted broadly to apply to arrangements that pharmaceutical companies have with prescribers, purchasers and formulary managers, among others. Further, the PPACA, among other things, amends the intent requirement of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute so that a person or entity no longer needs to have actual knowledge of this statute or specific intent to violate it. In addition, the PPACA provides that the government may assert that a claim including items or services resulting from a violation of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of the civil False Claims Act. Although there are a number of statutory exceptions and regulatory safe harbors under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute protecting certain common manufacturer business arrangements and activities from prosecution, the exceptions and safe harbors are drawn narrowly and an arrangement must meet all of the conditions specified in order to be fully protected from scrutiny under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. We seek to comply with the exceptions and safe harbors whenever possible, but our practices, such as our patient assistance programs and discounts with certain customers, may not in all cases meet all of the criteria for protection from Anti-Kickback liability and may be subject to scrutiny. The federal false claims laws, including the federal False Claims Act, prohibit any person or entity from knowingly presenting, or causing to be presented, a false claim for payment to the federal government, or knowingly making, or causing to be made, a false statement to get a false claim paid. Additionally, the civil monetary penalties statute imposes penalties against any person or entity that, among other things, is determined to have presented or caused to be presented a claim to a federal health program that the person knows or should know is for an item or service that was not provided as claimed or is false or fraudulent. Many pharmaceutical and other health care companies have been investigated and have reached substantial financial settlements with the federal government under the federal False Claims Act for a variety of alleged marketing activities, including providing free product to customers with the expectation that the customers would bill federal programs for the product; providing consulting fees, grants, free travel, and other benefits to physicians to induce them to prescribe the company's products; and inflating prices reported to private price publication services, which may be used by states to set drug payment rates under government health care programs. Companies have been prosecuted for causing false claims to be submitted because of the marketing of their products for unapproved uses. Pharmaceutical and other health care companies have also been prosecuted on other legal theories of Medicare and Medicaid fraud. Legislative and regulatory proposals have been made to expand post-approval requirements and restrict sales and promotional activities for pharmaceutical products. It is not clear whether additional legislative changes will be enacted, or whether the FDA regulations, guidance or interpretations will be changed, or what the impact of such changes on the marketing approvals of any Travere products, if any, may be. In addition, increased scrutiny by the U.S. Congress of the FDA's approval process may significantly delay or prevent marketing approval, as well as subject us to more stringent product labeling and post-marketing testing and other requirements. We also could become subject to government investigations and related subpoenas. Such subpoenas are often associated with previously filed qui tam actions, or lawsuits filed under seal under the federal False Claims Act. Qui tam actions are brought by private plaintiffs suing on behalf of the federal government for alleged violations of the federal False Claims Act. The time and expense associated with responding to such subpoenas, and any related qui tam or other actions, may be extensive, and we cannot predict the results of our review of the responsive documents and underlying facts or the results of such actions. Responding to government investigations, defending any claims raised, and any resulting fines, restitution, damages and penalties, settlement payments or administrative actions, as well as any related actions brought by stockholders or other third parties, could have a material impact on our reputation, business and financial condition and divert the attention of our management from operating our business. The number and complexity of both federal and state laws continues to increase, and additional governmental resources are being added to enforce these laws and to prosecute companies and individuals who are believed to be violating them. In particular, the PPACA includes a number of provisions aimed at strengthening the government's ability to pursue Anti-Kickback and False Claims Act cases against pharmaceutical manufacturers and other healthcare entities, including substantially increased funding for healthcare fraud enforcement activities, enhanced investigative powers, amendments to the federal False Claims Act that make it easier for the government and whistleblowers to pursue cases for alleged kickback and false claim violations and public reporting of certain payments and transfers of value by certain pharmaceutical manufacturers to physicians and teaching hospitals nationwide. We anticipate that government scrutiny of pharmaceutical sales and marketing practices will continue for the foreseeable future and subject us to the risk of further government investigations and enforcement actions. Responding to a government investigation or enforcement action would be expensive and time-consuming, and could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations and growth prospects. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and similar worldwide anti-bribery laws generally prohibit companies and their intermediaries from making improper payments to government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. Our policies mandate compliance with these anti-bribery laws. We operate in parts of the world that have experienced governmental corruption to some degree and in certain circumstances, strict compliance with anti-bribery laws may conflict with local customs and practices or may require us to interact with doctors and hospitals, some of which may be state controlled, in a manner that is different than in the United States. We cannot assure that our internal control policies and procedures will protect us from reckless or criminal acts committed by our employees or agents. Violations of these laws, or allegations of such violations, could disrupt our business and result in criminal or civil penalties or remedial measures, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations and could cause the market value of our common stock to decline. The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), created new federal criminal statutes that prohibit, among other actions, knowingly and willfully executing, or attempting to execute, a scheme to defraud any healthcare benefit program, including private third-party payers, and knowingly and willfully falsifying, concealing or covering up a material fact or making any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement in connection with the delivery of or payment for healthcare benefits, items or services. Like the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, the PPACA amended the intent standard for certain healthcare fraud provisions under HIPAA such that a person or entity no longer needs to have actual knowledge of the statute or specific intent to violate it in order to have committed a violation. Additionally, the federal Physician Payments Sunshine Act within the PPACA, and its implementing regulations, require that certain manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologicals and medical supplies to report annually information related to certain payments or other transfers of value made or distributed to physicians (defined to include doctors, dentists, optometrists, podiatrists, and chiropractors), other healthcare professionals (such as physician assistants and nurse practitioners), and teaching hospitals, or to entities or individuals at the request of, or designated on behalf of, physicians and teaching hospitals and to report annually certain ownership and investment interests held by physicians and their immediate family members. Moreover, the Drug Supply Chain Security Act imposes obligations on manufacturers of pharmaceutical products related to product tracking and tracing. We are not sure whether additional legislative changes will be enacted, or whether the current regulations, guidance or interpretations will be changed, or what the impact of such changes on our business, if any, may be. Also, many states have similar fraud and abuse statutes or regulations, including state anti-kickback and false claims laws, that apply to items and services reimbursed under Medicaid and other state programs, or, in several states, apply regardless of the payer. Further, certain states require implementation of commercial compliance programs and marketing codes, compliance with the pharmaceutical industry's voluntary compliance guidelines, and compliance with the applicable compliance guidance promulgated by the federal government. Other various state level requirements include restricting payments or the provision of other items of value that may be made to healthcare providers and other potential referral sources; restricting various marketing practices; requiring prescription drug companies to report expenses relating to the marketing and promotion of drug products; requiring the posting of information relating to clinical studies and their outcomes; requiring the registration of sales representatives; requiring the reporting of certain information related to drug pricing; and requiring drug manufacturers to track and report information related to payments, gifts, compensation, and other items of value to physicians and other healthcare providers. If our operations are found to be in violation of any of the health regulatory laws described above or any other laws that apply to us, we may be subject to significant penalties, including imprisonment, criminal fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative penalties, disgorgement, exclusion from participation in federal healthcare programs, contractual damages, injunctions, recall or seizure of products, total or partial suspension of production, reputational harm, administrative burdens, additional oversight and reporting obligations if we become subject to a corporate integrity agreement or similar agreement to resolve allegation of non-compliance with these laws, diminished profits and future earnings, and the curtailment or restructuring of our operations, any of which could adversely affect our ability to operate our business and our results of operations. We are also subject to foreign requirements comparable to those established above. Outside the United States, interactions between pharmaceutical companies and health care professionals are also governed by strict laws, such as national anti-bribery laws of European countries, national sunshine rules, regulations, industry self-regulation codes of conduct and physicians' codes of professional conduct. Failure to comply with these requirements could result in reputational risk, public reprimands, administrative penalties, fines or imprisonment.

From time to time we may become involved in certain litigation matters, including those described in Note 13 of the Consolidated Financial Statements included in this report. Although we intend to vigorously defend our interests in each matter, there is no guarantee that we will be successful and we may have to pay damages awards or otherwise may enter into settlement arrangements in connection with such matters. Any such payments or settlement arrangements could have material adverse effects on our business, operating results or financial condition. Even if we are successful in defending our interests in each matter, litigation with respect to such matters could result in substantial costs and significant adverse impact on our reputation and divert management's attention and resources, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, operating results or financial condition.

Regulatory authorities in some jurisdictions, including the United States and the EU, may designate drugs for relatively small patient populations as orphan drugs, providing eligibility for orphan drug exclusivity upon regulatory approval if certain jurisdictional-specific conditions are met. For example, FILSPARI has been granted orphan drug designation for the treatment of IgAN and has been awarded seven years of orphan drug exclusivity in the United States (running from the date of accelerated approval) to reduce proteinuria in adults with primary IgAN at risk of rapid disease progression, and has been granted a separate seven years of Orphan Drug Exclusivity in the U.S. (running from the date of full approval) to slow kidney function decline in adults with primary IgAN who are at risk for disease progression, excluding the use provided for in the aforementioned Orphan Drug Exclusivity granted in connection with the accelerated approval. Generally, if a product with an orphan drug designation subsequently receives the first marketing approval for the indication for which it has such designation, that product is entitled to a period of marketing exclusivity, which precludes the applicable regulatory authority from approving another marketing application for the same drug for the same indication for that time period. The applicable period is seven years in the United States and ten years in the EU or, in the case of orphan drugs for which a pediatric investigation plan has been completed, 12 years. Even though we have been awarded orphan drug designation in the United States and the EU for sparsentan for the treatment of IgAN and FSGS and for pegtibatinase for the treatment of HCU, we may not be able to maintain it in the EU and the orphan drug designation may not result in orphan drug exclusivity in the United States for FSGS or the EU if approved. For example, if a competitive product that contains the same active moiety and treats the same disease as our product is shown to be clinically superior to our product, any orphan drug exclusivity we have obtained will not block the approval of such competitive product and we may effectively lose orphan drug exclusivity. Similarly, if a competitive product that contains the same active moiety and treats the same disease as our product candidate is approved for orphan drug exclusivity before our product candidate, we may not be able to obtain approval for our product candidate until the expiration of the competitive product's orphan drug exclusivity unless our product candidate is shown to be clinically superior to the competitive product.

We have no manufacturing capabilities and rely on third-party manufacturers who are currently sole source suppliers for manufacturing of FILSPARI and Thiola. The facilities used by our third-party manufacturers must be approved by the FDA and comparable foreign regulatory authorities. Our dependence on third parties for the manufacture of our products may harm our profit margin on the sale of products and our ability to deliver products on a timely and competitive basis. Because we are ultimately responsible for ensuring that our API and finished products are manufactured in accordance with cGMP regulations and similar regulatory requirements outside the United States, it is critical that we maintain effective management practices and oversight with respect to our third-party manufacturers, including routine auditing. If our third-party manufacturers are unable to manufacture to specifications or in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements, our ability to commercialize our products will be adversely impacted and could affect our ability to gain market acceptance for our products and negatively impact our revenues. We currently have no in-house distribution channels for FILSPARI or Thiola and we are dependent on third-party distributors to distribute such products. The outsourcing of our distribution function is complex, and we may experience difficulties that could reduce, delay or stop shipments of such products. If we encounter such distribution problems, and we are unable to quickly enter into a similar agreement with another distributor on substantially similar terms, distribution of FILSPARI and/or Thiola could become disrupted, resulting in lost revenues, provider dissatisfaction, and/or patient dissatisfaction.

We depend on third-party clinical investigators and contract research organizations ("CROs") to conduct our clinical trials under agreements with us. The CROs play a significant role in the conduct of our clinical trials. Failure of the CROs to meet their obligations could adversely affect clinical development of our product candidates. The third-party clinical investigators are not our employees and we cannot control the timing or amount of resources they devote to our studies. If their performance is substandard, it could delay or prevent approval of our FDA applications. Moreover, these third-party investigators and CROs may also have relationships with other commercial entities, some of which may compete with us. If third-party investigators and CROs allocate their resources to assist our competitors at our expense, it could harm our competitive position. The introduction of new third parties into our ongoing clinical trials increases the risks associated with our dependence on third parties, including the risk that substandard performance by, or competing interests of, such third parties could have a negative impact on our clinical trials.

Our prospects for generating revenue and achieving profitability will depend heavily upon the availability of coverage and adequate reimbursement for the use of our approved product candidates from governmental and other third-party payers, both in the United States and in other markets. Reimbursement by a third-party payer may depend upon a number of factors, including the third-party payer's determination that use of a product is: - a covered benefit under its health plan;- safe, effective and medically necessary;- appropriate for the specific patient;- cost-effective; and - neither experimental nor investigational. Obtaining reimbursement approval for a product from each government or other third-party payer is a time consuming and costly process that could require us to provide supporting scientific, clinical and cost effectiveness data for the use of our products to each payer. We may not be able to provide data sufficient to gain acceptance with respect to reimbursement. Additionally, we might need to conduct post-marketing studies in order to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of any future products to such payers' satisfaction. Such studies might require us to commit a significant amount of management time and financial and other resources. Even when a payer determines that a product is eligible for reimbursement, the payer may impose coverage limitations that preclude payment for some uses that are approved by the FDA or non-United States regulatory authorities. Also, prior authorization for a product may be required. In addition, there is a risk that full reimbursement may not be available for high-priced products. Moreover, eligibility for coverage does not imply that any product will be reimbursed in all cases or at a rate that allows us to make a profit or even cover our costs. Interim payments for new products, if applicable, may also not be sufficient to cover our costs and may not be made permanent. Further, coverage policies and third-party payer reimbursement rates may change at any time. Even if favorable coverage and reimbursement status is attained, less favorable coverage policies and reimbursement rates may be implemented in the future. A primary trend in the United States healthcare industry and elsewhere is toward cost containment. We expect the changes made by PPACA, other legislation impacting the Medicare program and the 340B program, and the increasing emphasis on managed care to continue to put pressure on pharmaceutical product pricing. As these concerns continue to grow over the need for tighter oversight, there remains the possibility that the Heath Resources and Services Administration or another agency under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") will propose regulations or that Congress will explore changes to the 340B program through legislation. There have also been a number of initiatives pending at the state and federal level that could negatively impact the reimbursement for products approved under the accelerated approval pathway in the United States by restricting patient access or establishing differential payment models. Certain states are also in the process of establishing Patient Drug Affordability Boards with the authority in some cases to set upper payment limits. Further, there has been increasing legislative and enforcement interest in the United States with respect to drug pricing practices, including several recent U.S. congressional inquiries and federal and state legislation designed to, among other things, increase drug pricing transparency, expedite generic competition, review relationships between pricing and manufacturer patient assistance programs, and reform government program drug reimbursement methodologies. At the federal level, in July 2021, the Biden administration released an executive order that included multiple provisions aimed at prescription drugs. In response to Biden's executive order, on September 9, 2021, HHS released a Comprehensive Plan for Addressing High Drug Prices that outlines principles for drug pricing reform. The plan sets out a variety of potential legislative policies that Congress could pursue as well as potential administrative actions HHS can take to advance these principles. In addition, the IRA, among other things (i) directs HHS to negotiate the price of certain high-expenditure, single-source drugs and biologics covered under Medicare and (ii) imposes rebates under Medicare Part B and Medicare Part D to penalize price increases that outpace inflation. These provisions take effect progressively starting in fiscal year 2023. On August 15, 2024, HHS announced the agreed-upon price of the first ten drugs that will be subject to price negotiations, although the Medicare drug price negotiation program is currently subject to legal challenges. HHS will select up to fifteen additional drugs covered under Part D for negotiation in 2025. HHS has and will continue to issue and update guidance as these programs are implemented. In addition, in response to the Biden administration's October 2022 executive order, on February 14, 2023, HHS released a report outlining three new models for testing by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation which will be evaluated on their ability to lower the cost of drugs, promote accessibility, and improve quality of care. It is unclear whether the models will be utilized in any health reform measures in the future. Further, on December 7, 2023, the Biden administration announced an initiative to control the price of prescription drugs through the use of march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. On December 8, 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology published for comment a Draft Interagency Guidance Framework for Considering the Exercise of March-In Rights which for the first time includes the price of a product as one factor an agency can use when deciding to exercise march-in rights. While march-in rights have not previously been exercised, it is uncertain if that will continue under the new framework. At the state level, legislatures are increasingly passing legislation and implementing regulations designed to control pharmaceutical and biological product pricing, including price or patient reimbursement constraints, discounts, restrictions on certain product access and marketing cost disclosure and transparency measures, and, in some cases, designed to encourage importation from other countries and bulk purchasing. For example, on January 5, 2024, the FDA approved Florida's Section 804 Importation Program (SIP) proposal to import certain drugs from Canada for specific state healthcare programs. It is unclear how this program will be implemented, including which drugs will be chosen, and whether it will be subject to legal challenges in the United States or Canada. Other states have also submitted SIP proposals that are pending review by the FDA. Any such approved importation plans, when implemented, may result in lower drug prices for products covered by those programs. Any reduction in reimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid or other government-funded programs may result in a similar reduction in payments from private payers. The implementation of cost containment measures or other healthcare reforms may prevent us from being able to generate revenue, attain profitability or commercialize our therapies. Additionally, we are currently unable to predict what additional legislation or regulation, if any, relating to the healthcare industry may be enacted in the future or what effect recently enacted federal legislation or any such additional legislation or regulation would have on our business, particularly in light of the upcoming U.S. Presidential and Congressional elections.

The commercial success of our products FILSPARI and Thiola, and, if approved, sparsentan for the treatment of FSGS, depends on them being considered to be effective drugs with advantages over other therapies. A number of factors, as discussed in greater detail below, may adversely impact the degree of acceptance of these products, including their efficacy, safety, price and benefits over competing therapies, as well as the coverage and reimbursement policies of third-party payers, such as government and private insurance plans. If unexpected adverse events are reported in connection with the use of any of these products, physician and patient acceptance of the product could deteriorate and the commercial success of such product could be adversely affected. We are required to report to the FDA events associated with our products relating to death or injury. Adverse events could result in additional regulatory controls, such as a requirement for costly post-approval clinical studies or revisions to our approved labeling which could limit the indications or patient population for a product or could even lead to the withdrawal of a product from the market.

From time to time, we may publicly disclose preliminary or topline or interim data from our clinical studies, which is based on a preliminary analysis of then-available data, and the results and related findings and conclusions are subject to change following a more comprehensive review of the data related to the particular study. We also make assumptions, estimations, calculations and conclusions as part of our analyses of data, and we may not have received or had the opportunity to fully and carefully evaluate all data. As a result, the topline results that we report may differ from future results of the same studies, or different conclusions or considerations may qualify such results, once additional data have been received and fully evaluated. Topline data also remain subject to audit and verification procedures that may result in the final data being materially different from the preliminary data we previously published. As a result, topline data should be viewed with caution. From time to time, we may also disclose interim data from our clinical trials. Interim data from clinical trials that we may complete are subject to the risk that one or more of the clinical outcomes may materially change as patient enrollment and dosing continues and more patient data become available. Adverse differences between preliminary or interim data and final or confirmatory data could significantly harm our business prospects. Further, others, including regulatory authorities, may not accept or agree with our assumptions, estimates, calculations, conclusions or analyses or may interpret or weigh the importance of data differently, which could impact the value of the particular program, the approvability or commercialization of the particular product candidate or product and our company in general. In addition, the information we choose to publicly disclose regarding a particular study or clinical trial is based on what is typically extensive information, and you or others may not agree with what we determine is the material or otherwise appropriate information to include in our disclosure, and any information we determine not to disclose may ultimately be deemed significant with respect to future decisions, conclusions, views, activities or otherwise regarding a particular therapy, therapeutic candidate or our business. If the topline data that we report differ from actual results, or if others, including regulatory authorities, disagree with the conclusions reached, our ability to obtain approval for, and commercialize, our product candidates may be harmed, which could harm our business, operating results, prospects or financial condition.

Before obtaining regulatory approval for the sale of any of our current or future product candidates, we must subject these product candidates to extensive nonclinical and clinical testing to demonstrate their safety and efficacy for humans. Clinical trials are expensive, time-consuming and may take years to complete. We may experience numerous unforeseen events during, or as a result of, preclinical or nonclinical testing and the clinical trial process that could delay or prevent our ability to obtain, or impact our willingness to pursue, regulatory approval or commercialize our product candidates, including: - our preclinical or nonclinical tests or clinical trials may produce negative or inconclusive results, and we may decide, or regulators may require us, to conduct additional nonclinical testing or clinical trials or we may abandon projects that we expect to be clinically promising in light of cost or strategic considerations;- regulators may require us to conduct studies of the long-term effects associated with the use of our product candidates;- regulators, institutional review boards or ethics committees may not authorize us to commence a clinical trial or conduct a clinical trial at a prospective trial site;- the FDA or any non-United States regulatory authority may impose conditions on us regarding the scope or design of our clinical trials or may require us to resubmit our clinical trial protocols to institutional review boards or ethics committees for re-inspection due to changes in the regulatory environment;- the number of patients required for our clinical trials may be larger than we anticipate or participants may drop out of our clinical trials at a higher rate than we anticipate;- our third-party contractors or clinical investigators may fail to comply with regulatory requirements or fail to meet their contractual obligations to us in a timely manner;- we might have to suspend, vary or terminate one or more of our clinical trials if we, regulators or institutional review boards or ethics committees determine that the participants are being exposed to unacceptable health risks;- regulators, institutional review boards or ethics committees may require that we hold, suspend, vary or terminate clinical research for various reasons, including noncompliance with regulatory requirements;- the cost of our clinical trials or the anticipated commercialization costs may be greater than we anticipate;- the supply or quality of our product candidates or other materials necessary to conduct our clinical trials may be insufficient or inadequate, or more expensive than we originally anticipated, or we may not be able to reach agreements on acceptable terms with prospective suppliers or clinical research organizations; and - the effects of our product candidates may not be the desired effects or may include undesirable side effects or the product candidates may have other unexpected characteristics. We will only obtain regulatory approval to commercialize a product candidate if we can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the FDA, and in the case of foreign commercialization, to the applicable foreign regulatory authorities, in well-designed and conducted clinical trials, that our product candidates are safe and effective and otherwise meet the appropriate standards required for approval for a particular indication. Conducting clinical trials effectively in pursuit of regulatory approval requires significant resources, and the costs of conducting clinical trials varies depending on a number of factors, including the dosage of the study therapy, trial size and duration. These costs may prove greater than we originally anticipated, which may result in us choosing to abandon or forgo clinical trials that we deem clinically promising as we actively strategize over time with respect to the allocation of our resources. Our product development costs will also increase if we experience delays in testing or approvals. We do not know whether any nonclinical tests or clinical trials will be initiated as planned, will need to be restructured or will be completed on schedule, if at all. Significant nonclinical or clinical trial delays also could shorten the patent protection period during which we may have the exclusive right to commercialize our product candidates. In addition, such delays could allow our competitors to bring products to market before we do and impair our ability to commercialize our products or product candidates. If we are required to conduct additional clinical trials or other testing of our product candidates beyond those that we currently contemplate, if we are unable to successfully complete our clinical trials or other testing, if the results of these trials or tests are not positive or are only modestly positive or if there are safety concerns, we may: - be delayed in obtaining, or may not be able to obtain, marketing approval for one or more of our product candidates;- obtain approval for indications that are not as broad as intended or entirely different than those indications for which we sought approval; and - have the product removed from the market after obtaining marketing approval. For example, in our pivotal Phase 3 DUPLEX Study of sparsentan in FSGS, although we achieved the pre-specified interim FSGS partial remission of proteinuria endpoint after 36 weeks of treatment, the study did not achieve the primary efficacy eGFR slope endpoint over 108 weeks of treatment. While we plan to continue to engage with the FDA to explore a potential path forward for a supplemental New Drug Application (sNDA) in the U.S. and work with our collaborator CSL Vifor to engage with the European Medicines Agency ("EMA") to also explore a potential regulatory path forward in FSGS in the EU based on the DUPLEX data, there is no guarantee that we will be successful in doing so. In addition, a collaborative international effort referred to as the PARASOL project was initiated in late 2023 with a goal to define the quantitative relationships between short-term changes in biomarkers (proteinuria and GFR) and long-term outcomes in order to support the use of alternative proteinuria-based endpoints as a basis for accelerated and traditional approval. Even though representatives of regulatory agencies have been participating in the discussions, there is no guarantee that the outcome of those discussions will be reflected in any future formal determination by such regulatory agencies. There is no guarantee that the PARASOL group will achieve its intended goal, or that, even if it does, that we will be able to establish a pathway to a potential submission of sparsentan for FSGS based on the results from the DUPLEX Study, that the FDA and/or EMA will support an application for sparsentan in FSGS, or that sparsentan will be approved for FSGS. We may not be able to initiate or continue clinical trials in the rare diseases on which we are focused if we are unable to locate a sufficient number of eligible patients willing and able to participate in the clinical trials required by the FDA or foreign regulatory authorities. In addition, as other companies and researchers may be concurrently developing therapies for the same or similar indications that we are focused on, we could face competition for a limited number of patients, investigators and clinical trial sites willing to participate in clinical trials. Our inability to enroll and maintain a sufficient number of patients for any of our current or future clinical trials would result in significant delays or may require us to abandon one or more clinical trials altogether.

Success in nonclinical testing and early clinical trials does not ensure that later clinical trials will be successful. For example, while we saw trends in favor of sparsentan in the two-year confirmatory endpoint analysis in the DUPLEX Study in FSGS, the positive eGFR results from the open-label portion of the DUET study of sparsentan in FSGS were not replicated in the Phase 3 clinical trial with statistical significance. Similarly, the positive nonclinical data we have seen from pegtibatinase being tested in a mouse model of homocystinuria and the positive topline results we reported in December 2021 and May 2023 from the ongoing Phase 1/2 clinical trial of pegtibatinase may not be replicated in future studies. We cannot assure that any current or future clinical trials of sparsentan or pegtibatinase will ultimately be successful. Before obtaining regulatory approval to conduct clinical trials of our product candidates, we must conduct extensive nonclinical tests to demonstrate the safety of our product candidates in animals. Nonclinical testing is expensive, difficult to design and implement, and can take many years to complete. In addition, during the clinical development process, additional nonclinical toxicology studies are routinely conducted concurrently with the clinical development of a product candidate. If any of our product candidates show unexpected findings in concurrent toxicology studies, we could experience potentially significant delays in, or be required to abandon, development of that product candidate. A failure of one or more of our nonclinical studies can occur at any stage of testing.

Undesirable side effects caused by our product candidates could interrupt, delay or halt clinical trials and could result in the denial of regulatory approval by the FDA or other regulatory authorities for any or all targeted indications, and in turn prevent us from commercializing our product candidates and generating revenues from their sale. In addition, if any of our product candidates receive marketing approval and we or others later identify undesirable side effects caused by the product: - regulatory authorities may require the addition of restrictive labeling statements;- regulatory authorities may withdraw, suspend or vary their approval of the product; and - we may be required to change the way the product is administered or conduct additional clinical trials. Any of these events could prevent us from achieving or maintaining market acceptance of the affected product or could substantially increase the costs and expenses of commercializing the product candidate, which in turn could delay or prevent us from generating significant revenues from its sale or adversely affect our reputation.

Certain of the diseases that our current and future product candidates are being developed to address, such as IgAN, FSGS and HCU, are relatively rare. Our projections of both the number of people who have these diseases, as well as the subset of people with these diseases who have the potential to benefit from treatment with our product candidates, may not be accurate. Currently, most reported estimates of the prevalence of IgAN, FSGS and HCU are based on studies of small subsets of the population of specific geographic areas, which are then extrapolated to estimate the prevalence of the diseases in the broader world population. As new studies are performed the estimated prevalence of these diseases may change. There can be no assurance that the prevalence of IgAN, FSGS or HCU in the study populations accurately reflect the prevalence of these diseases in the broader world population. If our estimates of the prevalence of IgAN, FSGS or HCU or of the number of patients who may benefit from treatment with sparsentan or pegtibatinase prove to be incorrect or if regulatory approval is conditioned on label restrictions that limit the approved patient population, the market opportunities for our product candidates may be smaller than we believe they are, our prospects for generating revenue may be adversely affected and our business may suffer.