Public companies are required to disclose risks that can affect the business and impact the stock. These disclosures are known as “Risk Factors”. Companies disclose these risks in their yearly (Form 10-K), quarterly earnings (Form 10-Q), or “foreign private issuer” reports (Form 20-F). Risk factors show the challenges a company faces. Investors can consider the worst-case scenarios before making an investment. TipRanks’ Risk Analysis categorizes risks based on proprietary classification algorithms and machine learning.
Adecoagro SA disclosed 73 risk factors in its most recent earnings report. Adecoagro SA reported the most risks in the “Macro & Political” category.
Risk Overview Q4, 2020
Risk Distribution
36% Macro & Political
26% Legal & Regulatory
15% Finance & Corporate
14% Production
8% Ability to Sell
1% Tech & Innovation
Finance & Corporate - Financial and accounting risks. Risks related to the execution of corporate activity and strategy
This chart displays the stock's most recent risk distribution according to category. TipRanks has identified 6 major categories: Finance & corporate, legal & regulatory, macro & political, production, tech & innovation, and ability to sell.
Risk Change Over Time
S&P500 Average
Sector Average
Risks removed
Risks added
Risks changed
Adecoagro SA Risk Factors
New Risk (0)
Risk Changed (0)
Risk Removed (0)
No changes from previous report
The chart shows the number of risks a company has disclosed. You can compare this to the sector average or S&P 500 average.
The quarters shown in the chart are according to the calendar year (January to December). Businesses set their own financial calendar, known as a fiscal year. For example, Walmart ends their financial year at the end of January to accommodate the holiday season.
Risk Highlights Q4, 2020
Main Risk Category
Macro & Political
With 26 Risks
Macro & Political
With 26 Risks
Number of Disclosed Risks
73
-1
From last report
S&P 500 Average: 31
73
-1
From last report
S&P 500 Average: 31
Recent Changes
0Risks added
1Risks removed
1Risks changed
Since Dec 2020
0Risks added
1Risks removed
1Risks changed
Since Dec 2020
Number of Risk Changed
1
-12
From last report
S&P 500 Average: 2
1
-12
From last report
S&P 500 Average: 2
See the risk highlights of Adecoagro SA in the last period.
Risk Word Cloud
The most common phrases about risk factors from the most recent report. Larger texts indicate more widely used phrases.
Risk Factors Full Breakdown - Total Risks 73
Macro & Political
Total Risks: 26/73 (36%)Above Sector Average
Economy & Political Environment18 | 24.7%
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 1
Governments have a high degree of influence in the economies in which we operate, which could adversely affect our results of operations or financial condition.
Governments in many of the markets in which we currently operate, or that we may operate in the future, frequently intervene in their respective economies and occasionally make significant changes in monetary, credit, industry and other policies and regulations. Governmental actions to control inflation and other policies and regulations have often involved, among other measures, price controls, currency devaluations, capital controls and limitations on imports. We have no control over, and cannot predict what measures or policies governments may take in the future. Our results of operations and financial condition may be adversely affected by changes in governmental policy or regulations in the jurisdictions in which we operate that impact different factors such as:
- labor laws and wage increases;- economic growth;- abrupt currency fluctuations;- high levels of inflation;- exchange and capital control policies;- high interest rates;- liquidity of domestic capital and lending markets;- inconsistent fiscal and monetary policy;- liquidity and solvency of the financial system;- limitations on ownership of rural land by foreigners;- developments in trade negotiations through the World Trade Organization or other international organizations;- environmental regulations;- tax laws, including royalties and the effect of tax laws on distributions from our subsidiaries;- changes in governmental economic or tax policies;- restrictions on repatriation of investments and on the transfer of funds abroad;- expropriations or nationalizations;- import/export restrictions or other laws and policies affecting foreign trade and investment;- increase in public expenses affecting the economy and fiscal deficits;- price controls or price fixing regulations;- restrictions on land acquisition or use or agricultural commodity production; and - other political, social and economic developments, including political, social or economic instability, in or affecting the country where each business is based.
Uncertainty over whether governments will implement changes in policy or regulation affecting these or other factors in the future may contribute to economic uncertainty and heightened volatility in the securities markets, which may have a material and adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 2
The economies of the countries in which we operate may be adversely affected by the deterioration of other global markets.
Financial and securities markets in the countries in which we operate are influenced, to different degrees, by the economic and market conditions in other countries, including other South American and emerging market countries and other global markets. Investors' reactions to developments in these other countries, such as the recent developments in the global financial markets, may substantially affect the capital flows into, and the market value of securities of issuers with operations in, the countries in which we operate.
A significant deterioration in the economic growth of any of the main trading partners of Brazil or Argentina could have a material impact on the trade balance of those countries and could adversely affect their economic growth and that of other countries in the region. Furthermore, adverse economic conditions in any of these countries could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
A crisis in global financial markets including other emerging country markets could dampen investor enthusiasm for securities of issuers with South American operations, including our common shares. The COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted global financial markets ushering significant risk and volatility. These effects could adversely affect the market price for our common shares, as well as make it difficult for us to access capital markets and obtain financing for our operations in the future, on acceptable terms or under any conditions.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 3
We operate our business in emerging markets. Our results of operations and financial condition are dependent upon economic conditions in those countries in which we operate, and any decline in economic conditions could harm our results of operations or financial condition.
All of our operations and/or development activities are in South America. As of December 31, 2020, based on total asset value, 44.8% of our assets were located in Argentina, 47.3% in Brazil and 4.0% in Uruguay. During the year ended December 31, 2020, 50.1% of our consolidated sales of goods and services rendered were attributable to our Brazilian operations, 47.3% were attributable to our Argentine operations and 2.6% were attributable to our Uruguayan operations. In the future we expect to have additional operations in the South American countries in which we now operate or in other countries with similar political, economic and social conditions. Many of these countries have a history of economic instability or crises (such as inflation or recession), government deadlock, political instability, civil strife, changes in laws and regulations, expropriation or nationalization of property, and exchange controls which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.
In particular, fluctuations in the economies of Argentina and Brazil and actions adopted by the governments of those countries have had and may continue to have a significant impact on companies operating in those countries, including us. Specifically, we have been affected and may continue to be affected by high levels of inflation, increased interest rates, fluctuations in the value of the Argentine Peso and Brazilian Real against foreign currencies, wage controls, price and foreign exchange controls, regulatory policies, business and tax regulations, political and social tension, and in general by the political, social and economic scenarios in Argentina and Brazil and in other countries that may affect Argentina and Brazil.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 4
A worldwide economic downturn could weaken demand for our products or lower prices.
The demand for the products we sell may be affected by international, national and local economic conditions that are beyond our control. Adverse changes in the perceived or actual economic climate, such as higher fuel prices, higher interest rates, stock and real estate market declines and/or volatility, more restrictive credit markets, higher taxes, and changes in governmental policies could reduce the level of demand or prices of the products we produce. We cannot predict the duration or magnitude of a downturn or the timing or strength of economic recovery. If a downturn were to continue for an extended period of time or worsen, we could experience a prolonged period of decreased demand and prices. In addition, economic downturns have and may adversely impact our suppliers, which can result in disruptions in goods and services and financial losses. Finally, the deterioration of global economic conditions, particularly in relevant economies such as the United States and China, as a result of the continuing COVID-19 pandemic or other events may ultimately decrease the customer demand for our products and have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations. (See "- We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and operating results."
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 5
Inflation in some of the countries in which we operate, along with governmental measures to curb inflation, may have a significant negative effect on the economies of those countries and, as a result, on our financial condition and results of operations.
In the past, some of the countries in which we operate, particularly Argentina and Brazil, have experienced, or are currently experiencing, high rates of inflation, adversely affecting their economies and financial markets, and limiting the ability of their governments to create conditions that stimulate or maintain economic growth. Although inflation rates in some of these countries (other than Argentina, as further explained in "-Risks Related to Argentina-Our results of operations may be adversely affected by high and possibly increasing inflation in Argentina") have been relatively low in the recent past, we cannot assure you that this trend will continue. The measures taken by the governments of these countries to control inflation have often included maintaining a tight monetary policy with high interest rates, thereby restricting the availability of credit and retarding economic growth. Measures to combat inflation and public speculation about possible additional actions have also contributed significantly to economic uncertainty in many of these countries and to heightened volatility in their securities markets. Periods of higher inflation may also slow the growth rate of local economies. Inflation is also likely to increase some of our costs and expenses, which we may not be able to fully pass on to our clients, which could adversely affect our operating margins and operating income.
A portion of our operating costs in Argentina are denominated in Argentine Pesos and most of our operating costs in Brazil are denominated in Brazilian Reais. Inflation in Argentina or Brazil, without a corresponding Peso or Real devaluation, could result in an increase in our operating costs without a commensurate increase in our revenues, which could adversely affect our financial condition and our ability to pay our foreign currency denominated obligations.
On January 7, 2016, the Argentine Statistics and Census Agency (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos - "INDEC") ceased publishing certain statistical data and, after implementing methodological reforms, resumed publications of the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") on June 16, 2016, which reached annual rates of 40.9% at the end of the fiscal year 2016, 24,8% at the end of the fiscal year 2017, 47.6% at the end of fiscal year 2018, 53.8% at the end of fiscal year 2019 and 36.1% at the end of fiscal year 2020 (see "- Risks Related to Argentina-The credibility of several Argentine economic indices have been called into question, which may lead to a lack of confidence in the Argentine economy and may in turn limit our ability to access the credit and capital markets" and "-Risks Related to Argentina- Our results of operations may be adversely affected by high and possibly increasing inflation in Argentina").
Brazil has historically experienced high rates of inflation. Inflation, as well as government efforts to curb inflation, has had significant negative effects on the Brazilian economy, particularly prior to 1995. The inflation rate was 7.2% in 2016, as measured by the General Market Price Index (Indice Geral de Preços - Mercado), compiled by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (Fundação Getúlio Vargas). However, in 2017 Brazil registered a deflation of 0.53% due to a decrease in the price of food products. In 2018 Brazil registered an inflation of 7.5%, 7.3% in 2019 due to the depreciation of the Brazilian Real against the U.S. dollar and the increase of the prices of primary products and 23.14% in 2020 due to COVID-19, the depreciation of the Brazilian Real against the U.S. dollar and the increase of the prices of primary products. A significant proportion of our cash costs and our operating expenses are denominated in Brazilian Reais and tend to increase with Brazilian inflation.
The Brazilian government's measures to control inflation have in the past included maintaining a tight monetary policy with high interest rates, thereby restricting the availability of credit and reducing economic growth. This policy has changed in the last two years, when the Brazilian government decreased the interest rate by 775 basis points. Subsequently, the high inflation, arising from the lower interest rate, and the intention to maintain this rate at low levels, led the Brazilian government to adopt other measures to control inflation, such as tax relief for several sectors of the economy and tax cuts for the products included in the basic food basket. These measures were not sufficient to control the inflation, which led the Brazilian government to reinstate a tighter monetary policy. As a result, interest rates have fluctuated significantly. The Special System for Settlement and Custody (Sistema Especial de Liquidação e Custódia, or "SELIC") interest rate in Brazil at year-end was 13.75% in 2016, 7% in 2017, 6.5% in 2018, 4.5% in 2019 and 2.00% in 2020 as determined by the Comitê de Política Monetária, or COPOM.
Argentina and/or Brazil may experience high levels of inflation in the future, which may impact domestic demand for our products. Inflationary pressures may also weaken investor confidence in Argentina and/or Brazil, curtail our ability to access foreign financial markets and lead to further government intervention in the economy, including interest rate increases, restrictions on tariff adjustments to offset inflation, intervention in foreign exchange markets and actions to adjust or fix currency values, which may trigger or exacerbate increases in inflation, and consequently have an adverse impact on us. In an inflationary environment, the value of uncollected accounts receivable, as well as of unpaid accounts payable, declines rapidly. If the countries in which we operate experience high levels of inflation in the future and price controls are imposed, we may not be able to adjust the rates we charge our customers to fully offset the impact of inflation on our cost structures, which could adversely affect our results of operations or financial condition.
Depreciation of the Peso or the Real relative to the U.S. Dollar or the Euro may also create additional inflationary pressures in Argentina or Brazil that may negatively affect us. Depreciation generally curtails access to foreign financial markets and may prompt government intervention, including recessionary governmental policies. Depreciation also reduces the U.S. Dollar or Euro value of dividends and other distributions on our common shares and the U.S. Dollar or Euro equivalent of the market price of our common shares. Any of the foregoing might adversely affect our business, operating results, and cash flow, as well as the market price of our common shares.
Conversely, in the short term, a significant increase in the value of the Peso or the Real against the U.S. Dollar would adversely affect the respective Argentine and/or Brazilian government's income from exports. This could have a negative effect on gross domestic product ("GDP") growth and employment and could also reduce the public sector's revenues in those countries by reducing tax collection in real terms, as a portion of public sector revenues are derived from the collection of export taxes.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 6
The economy of Argentina may be affected by its government's limited access to financing from international markets and the result of failure to pay its debt obligations and the current debt restructuring process.
The Argentine economy has been experiencing significant instability in the past decades, including devaluations, high inflation, and prolonged periods of reduced economic growth, which have led to payment defaults on Argentina's foreign debt and multiple downgrades in Argentina's foreign debt rating with attendant restrictions on Argentina's ability to obtain financing in the international markets.
Argentina's 2001 sovereign default and its failure to fully restructure its sovereign debt and negotiate with the holdout creditors has limited and may continue to limit Argentina's ability to access international financing. In 2005, Argentina completed the restructuring of a substantial portion of its indebtedness and settled all of its debt with the IMF. Additionally, in June 2010, Argentina completed the restructuring of a significant portion of the defaulted bonds that were not exchanged in the 2005 restructuring. Holdout bondholders that declined to participate in the restructuring, filed lawsuits against Argentina in several countries, including the United States. Since late 2012, rulings from courts in the United States favorable to holdout bondholders aggravated investors' concerns regarding investment in the country.
In February 2016, the Macri administration entered into settlement agreements with certain holdout bondholders to settle these claims, which were subject to the approval of the Argentine Congress. The Argentine government reached settlement agreements with holders of a significant portion of the defaulted bonds and has repaid the majority of the holdout creditors with the proceeds of a US$16.5 billion international offering of 3-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year bonds on April 22, 2016 -which bonds, among other sovereign bonds, were then restructured by the Fernández administration in August, 2020 -as explained below. Although the size of the outstanding claims has decreased significantly, litigation initiated by bondholders that have not accepted Argentina's settlement offer of 2016 continues in several jurisdictions.
Additionally, foreign shareholders of several Argentine companies have filed claims with the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) alleging that the emergency measures adopted by the Argentine government since the crisis in 2001 and 2002 differ from the just and equal treatment standards set forth in several bilateral investment treaties to which Argentina is a party. The ICSID has ruled against Argentina with respect to many of these claims.
Litigation involving holdout creditors, claims with ICSID and other claims against the Argentine national government, resulted and may result in material judgments against the government, lead to attachments of or injunctions relating to Argentina's assets, or could cause Argentina to default under its other obligations, and such events may prevent Argentina from obtaining favorable terms or interest rates when accessing international capital markets or from accessing international financing at all. Our ability to obtain U.S. dollar-denominated financing has been adversely impacted by these factors.
In May 2018, the Macri administration requested the IMF the granting of a Stand-By Arrangement for up to US$57.1 billion with the purpose of supporting the Argentine government's economic plan.
As of the date of this report, the IMF disbursed an aggregate of US$44.70 billion. The Fernández administration is currently negotiating the restructuring of the terms of the Stand-By Arrangement, which payments become due as from 2021.
The Argentine government announced that it will also engage in negotiations with the Paris Club for the restructuring of the debt incurred with such institution given that there are also payments becoming due on the following months.
As of the date of this annual report, we cannot guarantee that the Argentine government and the IMF will reach an agreement on the restructuring of the Stand-By Arrangement, nor are we able to predict the future consequences for the Argentine economy in general or our business in particular if such agreement fails.
Pursuant to a report issued by the Secretary of Finance of the Argentine government, as of December 2019, Argentina's foreign debt amounted to US$311.25 billion, which represented 91.6% of Argentina's GDP. During 2020 the Argentine government carried out the restructuring of its public debt instrumented in bonds denominated in foreign currency governed by foreign law as well as bonds denominated in foreign currency governed by Argentine law, by means of debt restructuring procedures implemented internationally and locally, respectively, within each groups of creditors according to the type of sovereign debt.
On February 12, 2020, the Argentine Congress enacted Law No. 27,544 for the Restoration of the Sustainability of the Public Debt issued under Foreign Law, which provided for the restructuring of the Argentine external public debt. Through Decree No. 250/2020, published in the Official Gazette on March 10, 2020, the Argentine Executive Branch authorized negotiations for the restructuring of US$68.85 billion of sovereign bonds issued in foreign currency and governed by foreign law. On April 17, 2020, Argentina announced an invitation to exchange its sovereign bonds governed by foreign law that were eligible for the restructuring for new bonds. The universe of eligible bonds that were subject to the exchange offer was comprised by bonds governed by the laws of New York (United States) and by the laws of the United Kingdom, denominated in several currencies (US Dollars, Euros and Swiss Francs). Within the universe of the bonds they were the instruments issued within the framework of the prior restructuring, carried out by the exchanges of years 2005 and 2010.
After several extensions and improvements made within the initial offer, on August 31, 2020, Argentina announced the results of the invitation to exchange. Argentina obtained the majorities required under the collective action clauses to exchange 99.01% of the eligible bonds, as a result of obtaining a level of acceptance of 93.55% of the bondholders to its exchange proposal launched in April and improved in July and in August, after the agreement with three groups of bondholders.
Within the context of the agreement with the groups of bondholders for the restructuring of sovereign debt governed by foreign law, Argentina also conducted a local exchange. Argentina launched an offer to exchange sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars and ‘dollar-linked' issued under local law. The instruments subject to the local debt restructuring were affected by the deferral of payments of principal and interest until December 31, 2020, provided by Presidential Decree No. 346/20 published in the Official Gazette on April 6, 2020.
In August 2020, Argentina launched an offer to exchange this universe of sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars and ‘dollar-linked' issued under Argentine law. As a result of this transaction, and as informed in Ministry of Economy press release on September 15, 2020, 99.41% of the bondholders of eligible instruments under this local exchange had accepted the offer.
The local debt exchange was then reopened and is ongoing as of the date of this report. On November 4, 2020, Resolution No. 540/2020 of the Ministry of Economy was published in the Official Gazette, which provided for the reopening of the local exchange and, for this purpose, set forth a procedure to allow eligible instruments which did not enter into the debt restructuring under Argentine law carried out on August and September 2020 to be tendered. The resolution provided that holders who were unable to enter the exchange within the prior invitation term may do so in successive acceptance terms which will be extended until July 28, 2021 in the conditions set forth therein.
In addition, in January 26, 2020 the Province of Buenos Aires, the largest estate in Argentina, also had a maturity of provincial sovereign debt for US$277 million in principal amount and interests that, after the failure of the negotiations for an extension, cancelled within the curing period in February 5, 2020. The Province of Buenos Aires had additional payments under its sovereign debt for US$110 million maturing in May 2020 and US$750 million maturing in June 2020. In May 2020 the Province of Buenos Aires, did not fulfill the payment of its international sub-sovereign bonds and since then is seeking to restructure them through an exchange offer. After several extensions without success, the Province of Buenos Aires has recently extended again the offer expiration date until March 26, 2021. There are other Argentine provinces which are also carrying out the restructuring of their bonds governed by foreign law and denominated in foreign currency.
As of the date of this annual report, the Argentine government and the IMF did not reach an agreement on the restructuring of the Stand-By Arrangement and there are no assurances that such agreement would be reached during 2021, nor are we able to predict the future consequences for the Argentine economy in general or our business in particular if such agreement is not reached.
Argentina is also aiming at obtaining a deferral of the payments which are due in the upcoming months of 2021 with the Paris Club and other international financial institutions, for which purposes the Government would have engaged in conversations but there is still uncertainty on the deferral of such payments.
If the negotiations with the IMF and the other international financial institutions fail or the Province of Buenos Aires or other provinces of Argentina fail to restructure their debt, the Argentine government defaults again in the payment of its sovereign debt or the measures adopted and to be adopted by the Argentine government to reduce the fiscal deficit, control inflation and stabilize the foreign exchange market are not effective, Argentina's ability to obtain international or multilateral private financing or direct foreign investment may be limited, which may in turn impair its ability to implement reforms and public policies to foster economic growth, impair the ability of private sector entities to access the international capital markets or make the terms of such financing much less favorable that those accessible by companies in other countries in the region and may accelerate the depreciation of the Argentine peso, foster inflation and deepen the economic crisis and recession.
Lack of access to international or domestic financial markets could affect the projected capital expenditures for our operations in Argentina, which, in turn, may have an adverse effect on our financial condition or the results of our operations.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 7
The Argentine economy has been adversely affected by economic developments in other markets and by other general "contagion" effects.
Financial and securities markets in Argentina, and also the Argentine economy, are influenced by economic and market conditions in other markets worldwide, including those relating to the recent trade dispute between China and the United States. Although economic conditions vary from country to country, investor's reactions to events occurring in one country sometimes demonstrate a "contagion" effect in which an entire region or class of investment is disfavored by international investors.
Furthermore, weak, flat or negative economic growth in any of Argentina's major trading partners, such as Brazil, could adversely affect Argentina's balance of payments and, consequently, its economic growth.
The Argentine economy may also be affected by conditions in developed economies, such as the United States, that are significant trading partners of Argentina or have influence over global economic cycles and over short-term evolution of commodity prices. If interest rates increase significantly in developed economies, including the United States, Argentina and its developing economy trading partners, such as Brazil, could find it more difficult and expensive to borrow capital and refinance existing debt, which could adversely affect economic growth in those countries. Decreased growth from Argentina's trading partners could have a material adverse effect on the markets for Argentina's exports and, in turn, adversely affect economic growth. Any of these potential risks to the Argentine economy could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and result of operations.
The COVID-19 pandemic outbreak has also destabilized global financial markets, which has had a negative impact on global trade and the global economy, including the Argentine economy, which in turn could have a negative impact on our business, results of operations and financial condition (See " - Risks Related to Our Business and Industries -The COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operating results").
In addition, Argentina is highly dependent on the export of certain commodities, such as soy, what has made the Argentine economy more vulnerable to fluctuations in the commodity prices. If international commodity prices decline, the Argentine economy could be adversely affected. In addition, adverse weather conditions can affect the production of commodities by the agricultural sector, which account for a significant portion of Argentina's export revenues.
All these circumstances could have a negative impact on the levels of government revenues, available foreign exchange and the government's ability to service its sovereign debt, and could either generate recessionary or inflationary pressures, depending on the government's reaction. Either of these results would adversely impact Argentina's economic growth and, therefore, our financial condition and results of operations.
Consequently, there can be no assurance that the Argentine financial system and securities markets will not continue to be adversely affected by events in developed countries' economies or events in other emerging markets, which could in turn, adversely affect the Argentine economy and, indirectly, our business, financial condition and results of operations, and the market value of our securities.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 8
The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain.
Since taking office in December 10, 2019, the Alberto Fernández administration (the "Fernández Administration") announced and implemented the following measures:
- Law of Social Solidarity and Productive Reactivation: On December 23, 2019, Law No. 27,541 Social Solidarity and Productive Reactivation was published in the Official Gazette (the "Solidarity Law"). The Solidarity Law declared a public emergency in economic, financial, fiscal, administrative, social security, tariff, energy, health and social matters and granted the Executive Branch with broad powers in many aspects related to the public emergency. The Solidarity Law and related regulations adopted on on December 27, 2019 by Decree No. 99/2019, introduced important foreign exchange restrictions and tax modifications, among other provisions related to sovereign debt, energy and social security. Decree No. 99/2019 provided measures regarding employer contributions, applicable rates for foreign goods and provided that, digital services will be taxed at a 8%, and the acquisition services abroad and passenger transport services destined outside the country at 30%. The Solidarity Law delegated in the Executive powers from Congress to determine the export duty rates of exports of all goods and determines different caps for different products. Most agricultural goods have a cap of 15% export duties rate or less (currently, most of them are set between 5%-12%) except for soybean products which are mostly set at a 33% export duty rate.
- Price Control Program: On January 7, 2020, the government relaunched the so-called Programa Precios Cuidados, a voluntary price control program, whose goal is to foster consumption and establish reference prices for households products with the highest consumption. Initially, 310 products were included within Programa Precios Cuidados and public officials stated that the prices of the products included within the program were to be reduced by 8% on the average. Two of the milk products commercialized by the Company are covered by the Programa Precios Cuidados.
- Maximum prices and supply obligations: See "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations - Maximum Prices and Supply Obligations".
- Law of Sustainability of Public Debt issued under Foreign Law: See " - The economy of Argentina may be affected by its government's limited access to financing from international markets and the result of failure to pay its debt obligations and the current debt restructuring process".
- Tax Reform Law: See "- Changes in the Argentine tax laws may adversely affect the results of our operations, financial condition and cash flows".
- Supermarket Shelves Law: See "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations - Supermarket Shelves Law".
- Coronavirus measures: See "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations".
- Teleworking Law. See "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations - Remote Work".
We have no control over the implementation of the reforms to the regulatory framework that governs our operations and cannot guarantee that these reforms will be implemented or, if implemented, that such implementation will benefit our business. The failure of these measures to achieve their intended goals could adversely affect the Argentine economy, which, in turn, may have an adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
On October 24, 2021 the congressional elections will be held, by means of which part of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate will be elected. Primary elections that will define candidates of each political party are scheduled for August 8, 2021. The results of the elections and their impact on the Fernández Administration as mid-term elections are still uncertain.
This political uncertainty in respect of economic measures could lead to volatility in the market prices of securities of Argentine companies and our common shares, and could have a negative impact in our domestic consumer markets, which, in turn, could have a negative effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 9
Argentine economic and political conditions and perceptions of these conditions in the international market may have a direct impact on our business and our access to international capital and debt markets, and could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.
A significant portion of our operations, property and customers are located in Argentina. Consequently, the value of our assets and properties and the results of our operations depend on the macroeconomics, regulatory, social and political conditions of Argentina and on the exchange rates between the Argentine peso and foreign currency. These conditions include growth rates, inflation rates, exchange rates, taxes, foreign exchange controls, changes in the interest rates, changes of the state policies, social instability and other domestic and international political and economic events affecting Argentina.
The Argentine economy has experienced extreme volatility in the recent decades, with uneven periods of economic growth, periods of high inflation and devaluation of the Argentine Peso against the U.S. dollar. Our business and operations may be affected by the economic and political events that may affect the Argentine economy, such as: price controls, foreign exchange controls, currency devaluations, high interest rates, increase in public expenses, tax increase or other regulatory initiatives.
The credibility of several Argentine economic indices during the Fernández de Kirchner administration (years 2004 through 2015) has been called into question. By previously understating inflation, the INDEC had overstated economic growth in real terms. The adjustments made by the Macri administration to INDEC lead to a determination of real GDP growth of 48.6% for the period of 2004 to 2015, as opposed to 65% growth in real terms for the same period resulting from the information used prior to June 2016. Because of these reforms, on November 9, 2016, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (the "IMF") lifted its censure on Argentina, noting that Argentina had resumed the publication of data in a manner consistent with its obligations under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. On June 29, 2017, INDEC also published revised GDP data for the years 2004 through 2015. According to the INDEC, Argentina's GDP grew by 2.9% in 2017, compared to the same period in 2016. Additionally, according to the INDEC, Argentina's GDP decreased by 2.5% in 2018, and 2.2% in 2019. In addition, in 2020 the general macroeconomic conditions worsened as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to INDEC, during the second quarter of 2020, GDP declined by 19.1% year over year (which represented the most significant decline of the GDP in Argentine history) with a peak of 16.2% in the second quarter compared to the first quarter of 2020, and during the third quarter of 2020, economic activity declined by 10.2% year over year.
Since the beginning of 2015, international commodity prices for Argentina's primary commodity exports have declined, which has had an adverse effect on Argentina's economic growth. A continued decline in the international prices for
Argentina's main commodity exports could have a direct negative effect on our business, results of operation and financial condition, as well as on Argentina's economy.
On August 11, 2019, presidential and legis+lative primary elections were held in Argentina, in which Alberto Fernandez and former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner from the "Frente de Todos" (a coalition formed to participate in the general elections) received 47.65% of the votes while president Mauricio Macri's party obtained 32.08%. On October 27, 2019, Alberto Fernández and Cristina Kirchner, as vice-president, won the presidential elections and took office on December 10, 2019.
After the primary elections, the markets reacted negatively, and the economic conditions continued to deteriorate. Due to, among other things, the rise of inflation, the continued demand for salary increases, the growth of the fiscal deficit, the required payments to be made on public debt, the reduction of industrial growth, the recession and the increase of the capital outflows from Argentina, the Government of former President Macri re-introduced rigid restrictions and foreign exchange controls in September 1, 2019, which among other things, significantly curtailed access to the official foreign exchange market (the "FX Market"or Mercado Libre de Cambios) by individuals and entities (see "Additional Information-Exchange Controls").
During the end of 2019 and early 2020, social and political tension and high levels of poverty and unemployment persisted industrial activity and consumption diminished considerably. The deterioration of the economy significantly increased the social and political turmoil, including civil unrest, riots, looting, nationwide protests, strikes and street demonstrations. Due to the high levels of inflation and devaluation, employers both in the public and private sectors are experiencing significant pressure from organized labor unions and their employees to further increase salaries (see "- The Argentine government may order salary increases to be paid to employees in the private sector, which would increase our operating costs").
On December 23, 2019, the Social Solidarity and Productive Reactivation Law No. 27,541 was published in the Official Gazette, which declared the public emergency in economic, financial, fiscal, administrative, social security, tariff, energy, health and social matters. As a result of this measure, the Argentine president and the National Congress have gained considerable powers to alter governmental policies and measures related to the Argentine economy (See "- The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain").
Since December 2019, upon the outbreak of the COVID-19, the global economy has been negatively impacted, causing the disruption of the financial markets and international trade, resulting in increasing unemployment levels and significantly impacting global supply chains, all of which has had and continues to have an adverse impact in Argentina's economy and may negatively materially impact our industry and our business (See " – The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations). The decline in the GDP in Argentina, the deepening recession and the increase of the unemployment also led to an increase in poverty, which, according to INDEC, as of June 30, 2020 affected more than 40.9% of the population.
Regarding the foreign exchange market and restrictions, in an effort to contain the escalation of the currency exchange rate, the Argentine Central Bank has been selling its reserves of U.S. dollars, which has resulted in a decrease in the Argentine Central Bank's international reserves from US$65.7 billion as of December 31, 2018 to US$39.4 billion as of December 31, 2020. However, the actual net liquid international reserves of the Argentine Central Bank would be substantially lower, as informed by private sources. Moreover, the Argentine government has been financing all economic assistance related to the COVID-19 pandemic with a significant issuance of currency, which has also contributed to increase inflation, the demand for U.S. dollars and the devaluation of the peso.
The Argentine government also adopted measures regarding sovereign debt, including a "re-profiling" or restructuring of certain public debt bonds subject to Argentine law and also conducted a debt restructuring process of sovereign bonds subject to foreign law which was closed during August 2020 (See " -The economy of Argentina may be affected by its government's limited access to financing from international markets and the result of failure to pay its debt obligations and the current debt restructuring process").
The failure of the Argentine Government to restructure its current debt with the IMF and to address the Argentine macroeconomic problems is worsening the economic conditions. In this regard, the country risk index published by J.P. Morgan as of March 4, 2021 reached a peak of 1547 basis points since the successful restructuring of the Argentine international sovereign bonds in August 2020. If the Argentine government does not restructure its outstanding debt with the IMF and other international financial institutions and continues failing to urgently address the necessary measures to improve the macroeconomic condition of the country, the current economic conditions, including inflation, unemployment, decline in GDP, Peso depreciation, and/or other economic factors over which we do not have control may continue to worsen, eventually provoking a general economic collapse, which could have an adverse effect on our financial condition, results and costs of operations.
We cannot now fully estimate the impact that the measures currently adopted by the government, or those that it may implement in the future, will have on the Argentine economy as a whole and on the business, equity and results of our operations.
Continuing inflation, increase of unemployment, decline in GDP, peso depreciation, and/or other future economic, social and political developments in Argentina, over which we have no control, may adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 10
Government intervention in Argentina may have a direct impact on our prices and sales.
The Argentine government has in the past exercised substantial control over the Argentine economy by setting certain industry market conditions and prices. In March 2002, the Argentine government fixed the price for milk after a conflict among producers and the government. In 2005, the Argentine government adopted measures in order to increase the domestic availability of beef and reduce domestic prices. The export tax rate was increased and a minimum weight requirement for animals to be slaughtered was established. In March 2006, sales of beef products to foreign markets were temporarily suspended until prices decreased. Furthermore, in 2007 the Argentine government significantly increased export tax rates on exports of crops. Several restrictions were also imposed on the grain and oilseed markets that essentially limited the access of traders to exports, resulting in a disparity between domestic and world prices. In March 2012, the Undersecretary of Transport created an "indicative price" for the transportation of grains by road fixed on a quarterly basis. The actual price paid for the road transportation of grains was set to be no lower than 5% or higher than 15% of the "indicative price" fixed for the applicable period. In some cases, the imposition of this "indicative price" produced increases in our transportation costs. In addition, on April 9, 2013, the Secretary of Commerce issued a resolution that established a fixed price for selling liquid hydrocarbons for a six months period. The fixed price would be the highest selling price on the date of issuance of the resolution, in certain regions of the country. Notwithstanding the April 9 resolution, YPF (the Argentine government-controlled oil and gas company) implemented gas price increases that were matched by other oil companies. Due to the increase in the price of the wheat, on July 4, 2013, the Secretary of Commerce issued a resolution mandating wheat producers and distributors to sell their stocks to satisfy the domestic demand, seeking to reduce the wheat price. On January 2014, the Secretary of Commerce launched a new program of price controls called Precios Cuidados. Producers and suppliers committed to fixed prices for more than 300 basic products subject to review on a quarterly basis. As of the date hereof, two of our rice products sold under the trademark "Molinos Ala" and "Apostoles" are subject to this program. Violation of the program may result in sanctions, including fines, which amount will be considered on a case by case basis at the time of issuing the relevant sanction by the enforcement authority.
The two administrations of President Fernández de Kirchner, who governed from 2007 through December 9, 2015, increased state intervention in the Argentine economy, through expropriation and nationalization measures, price controls and foreign exchange controls. Below follows an outline of the main measures taken by such administration on these aspects.
In 2008 the Fernández de Kirchner administration absorbed and replaced the former private pension funds for a fully public pension system. In April 2012, the Fernandez de Kirchner administration decreed the removal of directors and senior officers of YPF S.A., the country's largest oil and gas company which was controlled by the Spanish group Repsol, and with the approval of the Argentine Congress expropriated shares held by Repsol representing 51% of the shares of YPF, and in 2015, the Argentine Congress passed a law approving the government takeover of the passenger and cargo railways, which became owned by a State-owned company called Ferrocarriles Argentinos Sociedad del Estado. In 2014 the Argentine Tax Authority ("Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos - AFIP") established a "Systematic Registration of Movements and Grains
Stocks Regime" (Régimen de Registración Sistemática de Movimientos y Existencias de Granos) pursuant to which all persons involved in the commercialization and manufacturing of grains and dairy products registered with the Registry of Operators of the Agro-industrial Chain (Registro Único de Operadores de la Cadena Agroindustrial or "RUCA" after its acronym in Spanish) must report the stock and stock variations (including locations, transport between the producer´s facilities, etc.) of all grains and other agricultural products (other than those to be applied to sowing) held in inventory or through third parties. In 2014 the Argentine Congress enacted the "Supply Law", that covers the economic process related to goods, facilities and services that directly or indirectly satisfy the basic or essential needs of the population, granting broad delegations of powers on its enforcement authority and provides that in a situation of shortage or scarcity of goods or services which satisfy basic or essential needs destined to the general welfare of the population, the governmental authorities may order their sale, production, distribution and delivery throughout the Argentine territory.
Since taking office in December 2019, the Fernández Administration implemented several measures that increased the government intervention, for example: i) the Solidarity Law published on December 23, 2019; ii) the Price Control Program announced on January 7, 2020; iii) the Law of Sustainability of Public Debt under Foreign Law, published on February 13, 2020; iv) the Supermarkets' Shelves Law published on March 17, 2020; and v) Decree No. 690/2020, published on August 22, 2020, which regulated information and telecommunications services and their tariffs. As of the date of this report it is not possible to predict whether the current administration will promote actions related to price controls of products elaborated by us. In case it does, we cannot predict how these measures will affect our results of operations (see "- The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain").
Among other provisions, the Solidarity Law froze the electricity and natural gas tariff rates until December 31, 2020 and instructed the relevant regulatory agencies to pursue a mandatory renegotiation of those rates. Currently, a tariff renegotiation is in process. Any increase in tariff will result in an increase of costs.
As of the date of this report it is not possible to predict whether the current administration will promote additional actions related to price controls of products elaborated by us. In case it does, we cannot predict how these measures will affect our results of operations. Please bear in mind that due to the COVID-19 pandemic the Argentine Government intervention on economic, trade and regulatory matters has increased substantially.
Expropriations and other interventions by the Argentine government such as the one relating to YPF can have an adverse impact on the level of foreign investment in Argentina, the access of Argentine companies to the international capital markets and Argentina's commercial and diplomatic relations with other countries. In the future, the level of governmental intervention in the economy may continue, which may have adverse effects on Argentina's economy and, in turn, our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Although many of the above measures were adopted or announced by the former Argentine government's administrations of Fernández de Kirchner, we cannot assure you that the Fernández Administration will not interfere or increase its intervention by setting prices or regulating other market conditions. Accordingly, we cannot assure you that we will be able to freely negotiate the prices of all our Argentine products in the future or that the prices or other market conditions that the Fernández Administration might impose will allow us to freely negotiate the prices of our products, which could have a material and adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 11
The credibility of several Argentine economic indices has been called into question, which may lead to a lack of confidence in the Argentine economy and may in turn limit our ability to access the credit and capital markets.
Between 2007 and 2014, the inflation index determined by INDEC has been the subject of widespread criticism and extensive discussions in connection with analysis of the Argentine economy, including data on inflation, GDP and unemployment. The intervention of the former Argentine government in the INDEC in 2007 and the change in the way the inflation index was measured have resulted in disagreements between the former Argentine government and private consultants as to the actual annual inflation rate. The former Argentine government of the Fernández de Kirchner administration imposed fines on private consultants reporting inflation rates higher than the INDEC data. As a result, private consultants typically shared their data with Argentine lawmakers who opposed the previous government, and who released such data from time to time. The widespread disagreements had the negative effect of eroding public confidence in Argentina's economy.
Since June 2016, after implementing certain methodological reforms, the CPI was corrected and on November 9, 2016, the Executive Board of the IMF lifted its censure on Argentina, noting that Argentina had resumed the publication of data in a manner consistent with its obligations under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, recovering credibility. As of the date of this annual report, the impact of any future measures taken by the Fernández administration with respect to the INDEC will have on the Argentine economy and investors' perception of the country cannot be predicted. Concern regarding lack of accuracy in the INDEC´s indices could adversely affect investor confidence in the Argentine economy and our ability to access international credit markets to finance our operations and growth.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 12
Failure to adequately address actual and perceived risks of institutional corruption may adversely affect Argentina's economy and financial condition.
A lack of a solid and transparent institutional framework for contracts with the Argentine government and its agencies and corruption allegations have affected and continue to affect Argentina. Argentina ranked 66 of 180 in the Transparency International's 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index and 126 of 190 in the World Bank's Doing Business 2020 report.
As of the date of this annual report, there are various ongoing investigations into allegations of money laundering and corruption being conducted by the Office of the Argentine Federal Prosecutor, including the largest such investigation, known as the "Notebooks Investigation" ("Los Cuadernos de las Coimas") which have negatively impacted the Argentine economy and political environment. This investigation relates to notebooks kept by a driver who worked for public officials during the Kirchner Administration. The notebooks allegedly document a widespread corruption scheme involving illegal cash payments by businessmen to government officials in order to win government contracts. As a result of these investigations, several businessmen (including construction company executives) and former public officials have been detained and prosecuted, including the former president and current vice-president of Argentina, Mrs. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was prosecuted for illicit association.
Depending on how long it takes to close these investigations and their results, companies involved in the investigations may be subject to, among other things, a decrease in their credit ratings, claims filed by their investors, and may further experience restrictions in their access to financing through the capital markets, together with a decrease in their income. Additionally, as the criminal cases against the companies involved in the investigations move forward, said companies may be restricted from rendering services or may face new restrictions, due to their customers' internal standards. These adverse effects could restrict these companies' ability to conduct their operating activities and to meet their financial obligations. Consequently, the number of suppliers available for our operations may be reduced and, as such, we may experience an adverse effect on our commercial activities and results of operations.
The Argentine government's ability to implement initiatives aimed at strengthening Argentina's institutions and reducing corruption is uncertain as it would be subject to independent review by the judicial branch, as well as legislative support from opposition parties. We cannot give any assurance that the implementation of these measures by the Argentine government will be successful in stopping institutional deterioration and corruption. Furthermore, we cannot predict what impact these investigations might have or what other measures may be adopted by the courts, the current administration or any future administration, each of which could adversely affect our business, financial condition and the results of our operations.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 13
Uncertainty surrounding future inflation rates may have an adverse impact for Argentina in the long-term credit market.
The Argentine economy has experienced significant volatility in past decades, including numerous periods of low or negative growth and high and variable levels of inflation and currency devaluation. Inflation remains a challenge for Argentina given its persistent nature in recent years and also considering its high levels during 2019. No assurances can be given that the rate of growth experienced over past years will be achieved in future years or that the national economy will not suffer recession. If economic conditions in Argentina were to continue slowing down, or contract, if inflation were to accelerate further, or if the Argentine government's measures to attract or retain foreign investment and international financing in the future to incentivize domestic economy activity are unsuccessful, such developments could adversely affect Argentina's economic growth and in turn affect our financial health and results of operations.
Inflation can also lead to an increase in Argentina's debt and have an adverse effect on Argentina's ability to service its debt, mainly in the medium and long term when most inflation-indexed debt matures. In addition, weaker fiscal results could have a material adverse effect on the Government's ability to access long term financing, which, in turn, could adversely affect Argentina's economy and financial condition and access to international or domestic capital markets. If the measures adopted by the Argentine government are not able to resolve the structural inflationary disruptions of Argentina, the current inflationary levels could rise and have a negative impact on the economic and financial conditions of Argentina, and as such adversely affect our operations and financial condition (see "- Our results of operations may be adversely affected by high and possibly increasing inflation in Argentina").
High inflation rates affect Argentina's foreign competitiveness, increase social and economic inequality, negatively impacts employment, consumption and the level of economic activity, and undermines confidence in Argentina's banking system, which could further limit the availability of and access by local companies to domestic and international credit.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 14
Our results of operations may be adversely affected by high and possibly increasing inflation in Argentina.
Historically, inflation has materially undermined the Argentine economy and the government's ability to create conditions that would permit long term and stable growth. In recent years, Argentina has experienced high inflation rates. High inflation may also undermine Argentina's foreign competitiveness in international markets and adversely affect economic activity and employment, as well as our business and results of operation. In particular, the profit margin on our services is impacted by the increase in our costs in providing those services, which is influenced by wage inflation in Argentina, as well as other factors.
Since 2008, the Argentine economy has been subject to strong inflationary pressures that, according to private sector analysts, reached an average annual rate of 28.2% between 2010 and 2015. In 2007 INDEC was subject to a process of institutional and methodological reforms that led to controversies regarding the credibility of the information published by it, including CPI. Reports published by the IMF between 2007 and 2015, using alternative measures to estimate price developments, showed considerably higher variations than those published by INDEC (see " - The credibility of several Argentine economic indices have been called into question, which may lead to a lack of confidence in the Argentine economy and may in turn limit our ability to access the credit and capital markets" and "- Risks Related to Our Business and Industries-Inflation in some of the countries in which we operate, along with governmental measures to curb inflation, may have a significant negative effect on the economies of those countries and, as a result, on our financial condition and results of operations"). In December 2015, the Macri Administration suspended the publication of indexes and statistics and, after implementing certain methodological reforms and adjusting certain macroeconomic statistics, resumed its publication of the CPI in June 2016. Based on the new and revised information provided by INDEC, inflation reached an annual rate of 40.9% in 2016, 24.8% in 2017, 47.6% in 2018, 53.8% in 2019, and 36.1% in 2020.
Due to several internal and external factors, during the first half of 2018 the peso suffered a new sharp depreciation, which, as of December 31, 2018 accumulated 103.83% and that fostered the inflation levels again to 47.6% in 2018. In April 2019 the Argentine government adopted a series of economic measures attempting to control the foreign exchange rate and inflation, including retail prices monitoring and freezing programs (see "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations - Maximum Prices and Supply Obligations"), the limitation of tariffs increases and the fixing of intervention zones by the Argentine Central Bank in the U.S. Dollar exchange market. However, these measures caused a deepening of the recession, while foreign exchange instability and high inflation continued.
In the past, the Argentine government implemented programs to control inflation and monitor prices for essential goods and services, including attempts to freeze the price of certain supermarket products by means of price support arrangements between the government and the private sector. These programs, however, did not address the structural causes for Argentina's inflation and, consequently, failed to reduce inflation. Nevertheless, in January 2020, the Fernández Administration adopted these type of programs (see " - Government intervention in Argentina may have a direct impact on our prices and sales" and "-Risks Related to Argentina- The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain").
Controlling inflation remains to be a challenge for Argentina. If the Argentine government continues failing to address Argentina's structural inflationary imbalance, the current levels of inflation may continue to rise, which may have an adverse effect on Argentina's economy.
Inflation in Argentina has contributed to a material increase in our costs of operation, in particular labor costs; it also enables a reduction in the purchasing power of the population, thus increasing the risk of a lower level of consumption from our customers in Argentina, which could negatively impact our financial condition and results of operations. Inflation rates could continue to grow in the future, and there is uncertainty regarding the effects that any measures adopted by the government could have to control inflation.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 15
If current levels of fiscal deficits are not reduced, the Argentine economy could be adversely affected, negatively impacting our business and results of operations.
Between 2007 and 2015, Fernández de Kirchner's administration significantly increased public spending. In the eleven-month period ended on November 30, 2015, the fiscal deficit increased by 363% annualized. During that period, the Fernández de Kirchner administration turned to the Argentine Central Bank and the National Social Security Administration (Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social or "ANSES" after its Spanish acronym), to finance part of the public spending. Inflation continues to be a challenge for Argentina given its persistent nature in recent years. The Macri administration had announced its intention to reduce the primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP over time and reduce the government's dependence on Argentine Central Bank financing. Given the difficulties of the Argentine public finances, the administration of former President Macri adopted several measures to finance public spending, for example, the revision of subsidy policies (in particular those related to tariffs on energy, electricity and gas, water and public transport) and the implementation of an expansive monetary policy. These measures resulted in a further increase in prices and, therefore, adversely affected, consumer purchasing power and the overall economic activity. In addition, measures taken by the administration of President Alberto Fernández, the implementation of the Solidarity Law (See "- The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain") as well as the measures related to the outbreak of COVID-19 will have an impact on the Argentine economy (See "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may cause adverse effect on our business and operations").
Accordingly, Argentina has had severe macroeconomic imbalances, including frequent and extreme fiscal deficits. Since 1961, the Argentine government has had yearly fiscal deficits in approximately 90% of the time (47 years out of 53), resulting in highly vulnerable macroeconomic conditions. The Argentine government has financed its fiscal deficit mainly in two ways: (i) by relying on external debt issuances, which has historically led to rapid increases in public debt levels; and (ii) by having the Argentine Central Bank issue new currency notes, which has led to high inflation periods and, in certain cases, hyperinflation. The fiscal deficit reached 5.2% of GDP in 2015, 5.8% of GDP in 2016, 6.0% of GDP in 2017, 5.2% of GDP in 2018, 4.9% of GDP in 2019 and 8.5% of GDP in 2020. (See "-Argentina's current account and balance of payment imbalances could lead to a depreciation of the Argentine peso, and as a result, affect our results of operations, our capital expenditure program and our ability to service our foreign currency liabilities").
The failure to reduce fiscal deficits could lead to growing levels of uncertainty regarding Argentina's macroeconomic conditions. In particular, it could lead to growing inflation rates and unanticipated foreign exchange depreciation and balance of payments crisis, higher local vulnerability to international credit crisis or geopolitical shocks, higher interest rates and erratic monetary policies, a reduction in real salaries and as a consequence, in private consumption, and a reduction in growth rates. This level of uncertainty, over which we have no control, may adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 16
Allegations of political corruption against the Brazilian government and the Brazilian legislative branch could create economic and political instability.
In the past, members of the Brazilian government and of the Brazilian legislative branch have faced allegations of political corruption. As a result, a number of politicians, including senior federal officials and congressmen, resigned and/or have been arrested. Several members of the Brazilian executive and legislative branches of government were investigated as a result of allegations of unethical and illegal conduct identified by the Car Wash Operation (Operação Lava-Jato) being conducted by the Office of the Brazilian Federal Prosecutor. Any political crisis could worsen the economic conditions in Brazil, which may adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition
Moreover, the economic and political crisis have resulted in a further downgrading of the country's long-term credit rating from two of the three major rating companies, placing Brazil 3 notches below the limit of the speculative investment grade level ("junk"). Standard & Poor's downgraded Brazil to BB with a stable outlook in January 2018, Fitch Ratings downgraded to BB- with a stable outlook in February 2018, while Moody's maintained its Ba2 rating, with a negative outlook since May 2017. Brazil's sovereign rating is currently rated by the three major risk rating agencies as follows: BB- by S&P and Fitch Ratings and Ba2 by Moody's. Various major Brazilian companies were also downgraded. Such downgrades have further worsened the conditions of the Brazilian economy and the condition of Brazilian companies, especially those relying on foreign investments.
More recently, in March, 2021, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) set up a permanent monitoring group to check if the combat against corruption has been regressing in Brazil.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 17
Brazilian economic and political conditions and perceptions of these conditions in international markets have a direct impact on our business and our access to international capital and debt markets, which could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition.
A significant portion of our operations, properties and customers are located in Brazil. Accordingly, our financial condition and results of operations are substantially dependent on economic conditions in Brazil. The Brazilian economy has experienced significant volatility in recent decades, characterized by periods of low or negative growth, high and variable levels of inflation and currency devaluation. Brazil's GDP decreased 3.3% in 2016, increased 1.3% in 2017, increased 1.3% in 2018, increased 1.1% in 2019 and decreased 4.1% in 2020. We cannot assure you that GDP will increase or remain stable in the future. Future developments in the Brazilian economy may affect Brazil's growth rates and, consequently, the consumption of sugar, ethanol, and our other products. As a result, these developments could impair our business strategies, results of operations and financial condition. Furthermore, due to the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak, it is expected that Brazil's GDP for 2021 fiscal year will again be negatively impacted, but may show positive figures at year-end. See "- We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and operating results".
Historically, Brazil's political situation has influenced the performance of the Brazilian economy, and political crisis have affected the confidence of investors and the general public, which has resulted in economic deceleration and heightened volatility in the securities issued abroad by Brazilian companies. Future developments in policies of the Brazilian government and/or the uncertainty of whether and when such policies and regulations may be implemented.
Economy & Political Environment - Risk 18
The Brazilian government has exercised, and continues to exercise, significant influence over the Brazilian economy, which, combined with Brazilian political and economic conditions, may adversely affect us.
We may be adversely affected by the following factors, as well as the Brazilian government's response to these factors:
- economic and social instability;- increase in interest rates;- exchange controls and restrictions on remittances abroad;- restrictions and taxes on agricultural exports;- exchange rate fluctuations;- inflation;- volatility and liquidity in domestic capital and credit markets;- expansion or contraction of the Brazilian economy, as measured by GDP growth rates;- allegations of corruption against political parties, elected officials or other public officials, including allegations made in relation to the "Car Wash Operation" (Operação Lava-Jato) investigation;- government measures aimed at controlling the COVID-19 outbreak;- government policies related to our sector;- fiscal or monetary policy and amendments to tax legislation; and - other political, diplomatic, social or economic developments in or affecting Brazil.
Historically, the Brazilian government has frequently intervened in the Brazilian economy and has occasionally made significant changes in economic policies and regulations, including, among others, the imposition of a tax on foreign capital entering Brazil (IOF tax), changes in monetary, fiscal and tax policies, currency devaluations, capital controls and limits on imports. The administration is currently facing domestic pressure to retreat from the current macroeconomic policies in an attempt to achieve higher rates of economic growth. In addition, the Brazilian government has discussed the creation of a tax on financial transactions, including wire transfers, (the so-called "CPMF") in order to improve the fiscal situation of the country or to increase the IOF taxation. We cannot predict which policies will be adopted by the Brazilian government and whether these policies will negatively affect the economy or our business or financial performance.
The Brazilian economy has been experiencing a slowdown over the past years and the Brazil's GDP growth has fluctuated over the past few years, with a growth of 3.0% in 2013, an increase of 0.5% in 2014, and a contraction of 3.5% in 2015 and 3.3% in 2016. In 2017, 2018 and 2019 Brazilian economy increased 1.3%, 1.3% and 1.1%, respectively. In 2020, there was a decrease of 4.1%. Inflation and unemployment have increased more recently and the Brazilian Real has weakened significantly in comparison to the U.S. dollar. Although the scenario still uncertain, particularly due to the COVID-19 outbreak, the market expectations for 2021 are that the Brazilian economy will experience a growth in GDP. Our results of operations and financial condition may be adversely affected by the economic conditions in Brazil.
Natural and Human Disruptions3 | 4.1%
Natural and Human Disruptions - Risk 1
We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and results of operations.
The global impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and measures taken to reduce the spread of the virus have had an adverse effect on the global macroeconomic environment and may continue to create continued economic uncertainty and reduced economic activity. The outbreak has resulted in authorities implementing numerous measures to try to contain the virus, such as travel bans and restrictions, quarantines, shelter-in-place or total lock-down orders and business limitations and shutdowns.
Governments around the globe have taken steps to mitigate some of the more severe economic effects of the virus, but there can be no assurance that such steps will be effective or achieve their desired results in a timely fashion or at all. The speed and extent of the spread of COVID-19, and the duration and intensity of resulting business disruption and related financial and social impact, are still uncertain, and such adverse effects on our business and financial position may still be material.
In the first six months of 2020, our Sugar, Ethanol and Energy business, experienced a decrease in prices of ethanol due to the decrease in international oil prices, and a decrease in demand as a consequence of the reduced circulation of people in response to the pandemic. In light of these factors, we slowed down our crushing pace, implemented a cost reduction plan and maintained the workforce sized to our operational needs. As signs of a partial recovery started to emerge, we revamped our operations and accelerated our crushing pace during the second semester, more than offsetting the lower initial crushing.
The Company could be negatively affected if a significant number of personnel including management and personnel at its farming and industrial operations are infected with the COVID-19 virus and/or its variants or are quarantined as the result of, or in order to avoid, exposure to the virus. During 2020, a select number of our personnel at one of our peanut production plants were infected with the COVID-19 virus but our operations were not affected. Similarly a limited number of other personnel throughout the organization were infected with the COVID-19 virus without materially impacting our operations. While governmental agencies and private sector participants are seeking to mitigate the adverse effects of this coronavirus, including measures such as heightened sanitary practices, telecommuting, quarantine, curtailment or cessation of travel, and other restrictions, and the medical community is developing and administering vaccines and other treatment options, the timing and efficacy of such measures is uncertain. These and other responses could impact the ability to harvest, produce and market our products, the availability of those who make the decision to purchase our products and the ultimate demand for our products.
Commodity markets have been and may also be disrupted with attendant effects on demand for some of our products. For example, the Chinese market is a significant source of global demand for the commodities we sell, including soy and corn, and a reduction in demand from China may have a significant effect on commodity prices and demand and potentially broader impacts on our supply chain or the global economy.
Further, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including the spread of virus variants, and any possible future outbreaks of viruses may have a significant adverse effect on us. Firstly, a spread of such diseases amongst our employees, as well as any quarantines affecting them or our facilities could adversely impact the productivity of our personnel and thereby affect our operations, which can impact the quality and continuity of our activities and our reputation. Secondly, the current COVID-19 pandemic and any possible future outbreaks of viruses may have an adverse effect on our suppliers and/or transportation companies used to distribute our products. Thirdly, any quarantines or spread of viruses may adversely affect the demand of our products from end-consumers.
Additionally, our operations may be adversely affected by the wider macroeconomic effect of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, the prospects for diminished economic growth may continue resulting in a recession or diminishing growth in several countries, including Argentina and Brazil, due to the reduction of the economic activities. The final effects of the COVID-19 pandemic could have substantial negative impact on the countries where we operate. Any negative effect on the economy, particularly in the countries that we operate, may decrease incomes and the demand for our products. Lastly, in case of an economic downturn, the price of our common shares may be adversely affected.
We are not now able to determine fully the extent to which COVID-19 will impact our business activity or financial results, which will depend on future developments that are highly uncertain and cannot be predicted fully (see "-Risks Related to Argentina-The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may cause adverse effect on our business and operations" and "- Risks Related to Brazil - The measures taken or to be implemented by the Brazilian government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may cause adverse effect on our business and operations-").
Natural and Human Disruptions - Risk 2
Unpredictable weather conditions, including as a result of climate change, pest infestations and diseases may have an adverse impact on agricultural production.
The occurrence of severe adverse weather conditions, especially droughts, hail, floods or frost or diseases are unpredictable and may have a potentially devastating impact on agricultural production and may otherwise adversely affect the supply and price of the agricultural commodities that we sell and use in our business. Adverse weather conditions may be exacerbated by the effects of climate change which impacts the entirety of our business and policies.
The effects of severe adverse weather conditions may reduce yields of our agricultural activities. Additionally, higher than average temperatures and rainfall can contribute to an increased presence of pest and insects that may adversely impact our agricultural production. Furthermore, the potential physical impacts of climate change are uncertain and may vary by region, which includes changes in rainfall patterns, water shortages, changing sea levels and changing temperature levels that could adversely impact our business operations, the location, costs and competitiveness of global agricultural production and related storage and processing facilities. During April and November 2019 we suffered from a drought in Mato Grosso do Sul, which led to a significant decrease in sugarcane yields for the year and reduced profit from operations by about $49.5 million. In 2020,from March to October, we suffered a drought in Minas Gerais (Usina Monte Alegre – "UMA"), which led to a significant decrease in sugarcane yields, that reduced UMA's milling by approximately 120 thousand tons of sugar cane and decreased the operating profit by about $5.1 million. This drought will also have a negative impact on 2021 sugarcane yields in UMA. Yields may also be affected by plagues, diseases or weed infections and related operational problems. See "Item 5.Operating and Financial Review and Prospects - Trends and Factors Affecting Our Results of Operations - (i) Effects of Yield Fluctuations".
The occurrence and effects of disease and plagues can be unpredictable and devastating to agricultural products, potentially rendering all or a substantial portion of the affected harvest unsuitable for sale. Our agricultural products are also susceptible to fungus and bacteria that are associated with excessively moist conditions. Our results of operations could be adversely affected in such cases where our production is materially affected and all or a substantial portion of the production costs have been incurred. We cannot assure you that such events in the future will not adversely affect our operating results and financial condition. Furthermore, if we fail to control a given plague or disease and our production is threatened, we may be unable to supply our main customers, which could affect our results of operations and financial condition.
Our sugar production depends on the volume and sucrose content of the sugarcane that we cultivate or that is supplied to us by growers located in the vicinity of our mills. Both sugarcane yields and sucrose content depend primarily on weather conditions such as rainfall and temperature, which vary. Weather conditions have historically caused volatility in the ethanol and sugar industries. Future weather patterns may reduce the amount of sugarcane that we can harvest or purchase, or the sucrose content in such sugarcane, and, consequently, the amount of sugar and ethanol we can produce in any given harvest. Any reduction in production volumes could have a material adverse effect on our operating results and financial condition.
As a result, we cannot assure you that future severe adverse weather conditions, including as a result of climate change, or pest infestations will not adversely affect our operating results and financial condition.
Natural and Human Disruptions - Risk 3
Our dairy cattle are vulnerable to diseases.
Diseases among our dairy cattle herd, such as mastitis, tuberculosis, brucellosis and foot-and-mouth disease, can have an adverse effect on productivity. Outbreaks of cattle diseases may also result in the closure of certain important markets to our cattle-derived products. We cannot assure that future outbreaks will not occur. A future outbreak of diseases among our cattle herds could adversely affect our milk sales and operating results and financial condition.
Furthermore, outbreaks, or fears of outbreaks, of any of these or other animal diseases may lead to cancellation of orders by our customers and, particularly if the disease has the potential to affect humans, or create adverse publicity that may have a material adverse effect on consumer demand for our products. Moreover, outbreaks of animal disease may result in foreign governmental action to close export markets to some or all of our products, which may result in the destruction of some or all of these animals.
Capital Markets5 | 6.8%
Capital Markets - Risk 1
We depend on stable international trade and economic and other conditions in key export markets for our products.
Our operating results depend largely on economic conditions and regulatory policies for our products in major export markets. The ability of our products to compete effectively in these export markets may be adversely affected by a number of factors that are beyond our control, including the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions, volatility of exchange rates, the imposition of greater tariffs or protectionist policies or other trade barriers or other factors in those markets, such as regulations relating to chemical content of products and safety requirements. The European Union, for example, limits the import of genetically modified organisms, or "GMOs." See " - Some of the agricultural commodities and food products that we produce contain genetically modified organisms."
Due to the growing participation in the worldwide agricultural commodities markets by commodities produced in South America, South American growers, including us, are increasingly affected by the measures taken by importing countries in order to protect their local producers. Measures such as the limitation on imports adopted in a particular country or region may affect the sector's export volume significantly and, consequently, our operating results. Additionally, due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, governments and other authorities have established certain restrictions on the freedom of movement and business operations, including travel bans, supply chain disruptions and border closures. Other measures such as the restriction on imports or business closures of ports, airports or any locations of entry, or border closings may have a material adverse impact on our operations and financial results. See "- We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and operating results".
If the sale of our products into a particular importing country is adversely affected by trade barriers or by any of the factors mentioned above, the relocation of our products to other consumers on terms equally favorable could be impaired, and our business, financial condition and operating results may be adversely affected.
Capital Markets - Risk 2
Fluctuations in market prices for our products could adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.
Prices for agricultural products and by-products, including, among other things, sugar, ethanol, and grains, like those of other commodities, have historically been cyclical and sensitive to domestic and international changes in supply and demand and can be expected to fluctuate significantly. In addition, the agricultural products and by-products we produce are traded on commodities and futures exchanges and thus are subject to speculative trading, which may adversely affect us. The prices that we are able to obtain for our agricultural products and by-products depend on many factors beyond our control including:
- prevailing world commodity prices, which historically have been subject to significant fluctuations over relatively short periods of time, depending on worldwide demand and supply;- changes in the agricultural subsidy levels of certain important producers (mainly the U.S. and the European Union ("E.U.") and the adoption of other government policies affecting industry market conditions and prices;- changes to trade barriers of certain important consumer markets (including China, India, the U.S. and the E.U.) and the adoption of other governmental policies affecting industry market conditions and prices;- changes in government policies for biofuels;- disruptions in commodity markets caused by global events, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic;- world inventory levels, i.e., the supply of commodities carried over from year to year;- climatic conditions and natural disasters in areas where agricultural products are cultivated;- the production capacity of our competitors; and - demand for and supply of competing commodities and substitutes.
Further, because we may not hedge 100% of the price risk of our agricultural products, we may be unable to have minimum price guarantees for all of our production and are, therefore, exposed to risks associated with the prices of agricultural products and their volatility. We are subject to fluctuations in prices of agricultural products that could result in our receiving lower prices for our agricultural products than our production costs.
The rapid and widening spread of the COVID-19 is impacting the price of the products we sell (i.e., ethanol, corn, powder milk among others) due to the lower demand and economic activity worldwide. As an example, during the month of March 2021, sugar prices in USD decreased by 8.8% according to ICE-NY, anhydrous and hydrous ethanol prices ins BRL decreased by 25% and 26%, respectively, according to ESALQ and corn prices in USD decreased by 4.6% based on CBOT. Given the uncertainty around the extent and timing of the COVID-19 pandemic we cannot predict or asses the final impact of the pandemic. (See "- We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and operating results").
In addition, there is a strong relationship between the value of our land holdings and market prices of the commodities we produce, which are affected by global economic conditions. A decline in the prices of grains, sugar, ethanol, or related by-products below their current levels for a sustained period of time could significantly reduce the value of our land holdings and materially and adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.
Capital Markets - Risk 3
Exchange controls restrict the inflow and outflow of funds in Argentina and may substantially limit the ability of companies to retain or obtain foreign currency or make payments abroad.
Between 2011 and 2015 until President Macri took office, the Argentine government increased controls and restrictions on the sale of foreign currencies and the acquisition of foreign assets by Argentine residents, limiting the possibility of transferring funds abroad. Through a combination of foreign exchange and tax regulations, the Fernández de Kirchner administration significantly curtailed access to the FX Market by individuals and private-sector entities. In addition, during the last few years under the Fernández de Kirchner administration, the Argentine Central Bank exercised a de facto prior approval for certain foreign exchange transactions otherwise authorized to be carried out under the applicable regulations, such as dividend payments or repayment of principal of intercompany loans as well as the payments related to import of goods, by means of regulating the amount of foreign currency available to companies to conduct such transactions. The number of exchange controls introduced in the past and in particular after between 2011 and 2015 during the Fernández de Kirchner administration gave rise to an unofficial U.S. dollar trading market, and the unofficial Argentine peso to U.S. dollar exchange rate in such market differed substantially from the official Argentine peso to U.S. dollar exchange rate. Due to the foreign exchange crisis generated in August 2019 and the continued reduction of the Argentine Central Bank's foreign currency reserves, since September 1, 2019 the Argentine government has reinstated rigid exchange controls and transfer restrictions, substantially limiting the ability to obtain foreign currency or make certain payments or distributions out of Argentina (see "Item 10 - Additional Information-Exchange Controls").
In response to the re-imposed foreign exchange restrictions, an unofficial U.S. dollar trading market developed again in which the Argentine peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate differed substantially from the official Argentine peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate in the FX Market.
In addition, access to foreign currency and its transfer outside of Argentina can also be obtained and carried out through capital markets transactions denominated Blue-Chip Swap, subject to certain restrictions, which is significantly more expensive than acquiring foreign currency in the FX Market.
Notwithstanding the measures adopted by the Argentine government recently, it may impose additional exchange controls, transfer restrictions, restrictions on the free movement of capital, and may implement other measures in response to capital flight or a significant depreciation of the Argentine peso, which would adversely affect our financial condition and the results of our operations. In addition, other exchange controls could in the future further impair or prevent the conversion of anticipated dividends, distributions, or the proceeds from any sale of equity holdings in Argentina from Argentine pesos into U.S. dollars and the remittance of the U.S. dollars abroad. These restrictions and controls could further interfere with the ability of our Argentine subsidiaries to make distributions in U.S. dollars to us and thus our ability to pay dividends in the future. Such measures could lead to renewed political and social tensions, and could undermine the Argentine government's public finances, which could adversely affect Argentina's economy and prospects for economic growth and, consequently, adversely affect our business and results of operations, and could impair our ability to make dividend payments.
Capital Markets - Risk 4
Argentina's current account and balance of payment imbalances could lead to a depreciation of the Argentine peso, and as a result, affect our results of operations, our capital expenditure program and our ability to service our foreign currency liabilities.
According to INDEC, Argentina had a structural current account deficit that reached US$3.5 billion in 2019, US$27.3 billion in 2018, US$31.2 billion in 2017, US$15.1 billion in 2016, and US$17.6 billion in 2015. The account deficit between 2015 and 2017 originates in the stagnation of exports of goods, which have only increased by 1.4%, taking into account the compounded average growth rate or CAGR, between 2015 and 2017; in contrast, imports of goods have been increasing at a much faster speed, reaching a CAGR of 5.8% in the same period. Nonetheless, by the end of 2020, that structural current account deficit was turned around, reaching a US$3.0 billion surplus.
During the Macri administration, the account deficit was financed mainly with external debt issuances in the international debt markets. In addition, the settlement of the disputes over the 2001 defaulted debt crisis has allowed several provinces of Argentina and certain Argentine private companies to issue new debt securities in foreign markets. However, both the Argentine Government and certain provincial governments have implemented debt restructuring procedures of their sovereign debt and sub-sovereign debt bonds, respectively, some of which procedures are still ongoing (see " - The economy of Argentina may be affected by its government's limited access to financing from international markets and the result of failure to pay its debt obligations and the current debt restructuring process").
Because foreign direct investment remains stagnant in Argentina, it may become impossible for Argentina and its provinces to meet their debts obligations in the future, since Argentina's foreign currency needs would severely overcome its foreign currency sources. If this level of uncertainty prevails on international investors, Argentina may suffer a "sudden stop" event, where investors stop lending money to Argentinean institutions. This, in turn, may result in large capital outflows that could not only force the Argentine government to default on its debt, but also generate a rapid and unanticipated depreciation of the argentine peso, a hike in local interest rates and a probable banking system crisis if bank deposits are largely withdrawn following social unrest.
The events described above have already taken place in recent decades in Argentina, and although the current administration intends to address the situation, as of the date of this annual report, the impact that the measures taken by the present administration will have on the Argentine economy as a whole cannot be predicted. As of the date of this report, the results of the measures already implemented and the Argentine government's measures related to the outbreak of COVID-19, impacted the primary fiscal and financial deficit in 2020, that reached 6.5% and 8.5% of GDP, respectively, as a result of the income and expenditures measures that the Argentine government implemented to face the pandemic. Alberto Fernández's government measures aim to stabilize state accounts, but in principle they intend to maintain expansive policies that would mean initially even more increases in public spending, financed through the expansion of currency issuance.
The failure to reduce fiscal deficits could increase the level of uncertainty regarding the macroeconomic conditions in Argentina. In particular, it could lead to an increase in the inflation index, devaluation of the Argentine peso with respect to foreign currencies and a subsequent crisis in the balance of payments, greater local vulnerability to the international credit crisis or geopolitical shocks, rising rates of interest, erratic monetary policies, reduction in real wages and, as a consequence, in private consumption and reduction in growth rates. This level of uncertainty, over which we have no control, can affect our financial condition or the results of operations.
If a balance of payments crisis were to occur, a large depreciation of the Argentine peso against the U.S. dollar could adversely affect our ability to meet our foreign currency obligations. Furthermore, the negative effect such a crisis could have on the growth rates of the Argentine economy and its consumption patterns could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and result of operations.
Capital Markets - Risk 5
Currency exchange rate fluctuations relative to the U.S. dollar in the countries in which we operate our businesses may adversely impact our results of operations and financial condition.
We operate exclusively outside the United States, and our businesses may be impacted by significant fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. Our exposure to currency exchange rate fluctuations results from the currency translation adjustments required in connection with the preparation of our Consolidated Financial Statements. The currency exchange exposure stems from the generation of revenues and incurrence of expenses in different currencies and the devaluation of local currency revenues impairing the value of investments in U.S. Dollars. While the Consolidated Financial Statements presented herein are, and our future Consolidated Financial Statements will be, presented in U.S. dollars, the financial statements of our subsidiaries are prepared using the local currency as the functional currency and translated into U.S. dollars by applying: (i) a year-end exchange rate for assets and liabilities; and (ii) an average exchange rate for the year for income and expenses. Resulting exchange differences arising from the translation to our presentation currency are recognized as a separate component of equity. Currencies in Argentina and Brazil have fluctuated significantly against the U.S. dollar in the past. Accordingly, fluctuations in exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar could impair the comparability of our results from period to period and have a material adverse effect on our results of operations and financial condition.
The Argentine Peso depreciated 21.86% against the U.S. dollar in 2016, 17.36% in 2017, 102.16% in 2018, 58.86% in 2019 and 40.51% in 2020, based on the official exchange rates published by the Argentine Central Bank (Banco Central de la República Argentina - BCRA). In the past years, the Argentine government imposed restrictions on the purchase of foreign currency (see "-Risks Related to Argentina-Exchange controls could restrict the inflow and outflow of funds in Argentina and may substantially limit the ability of companies to retain or obtain foreign currency or make payments abroad.") which measures gave rise to an unofficial market where the U.S. dollar traded at a different market value than reflected in the official Argentine Peso – U.S. Dollar exchange rate. Due to the foreign exchange crisis generated in August 2019 and the continued reduction of the Argentine Central Bank's foreign currency reserves, since September 1, 2019 the Argentine government reinstated rigid exchange controls and transfer restrictions, substantially limiting the ability to obtain foreign currency or make certain payments or distributions out of Argentina (see "- Risks Related to Argentina - Exchange controls restrict the inflow and outflow of funds in Argentina and may substantially limit the ability of companies to retain or obtain foreign currency or make payments abroad").
The Brazilian currency has historically suffered frequent fluctuations. As a consequence of inflationary pressures, in the past, the Brazilian government has implemented various economic plans and adopted a number of exchange rate policies, including sudden devaluations, periodic mini-devaluations during which the frequency of adjustments has ranged from daily to monthly, floating exchange rate systems, exchange controls and dual exchange rate markets. Formally the value of the Real against foreign currencies is determined under a free-floating exchange rate regime, but in fact the Brazilian government is currently intervening in the market, through currency swaps and trading in the spot market, among other measures, every time the currency exchange rate is above or below the levels that the Brazilian government considers appropriate, taking into account, inflation, growth, the performance of the Real against the U.S dollar in comparison with other currencies and other economic factors. Periodically, there are significant fluctuations in the value of the Real against the U.S. dollar. The Real depreciated 46.2% against the U.S. dollar in 2015 and appreciated 16.8% in 2016. In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the Real depreciated against the U.S. dollar 1.5%, 17.1% and 4.02%, respectively. In 2020 the Real depreciated 28.9% against the U.S. dollar.
Future fluctuations in the value of the local currencies relative to the U.S. dollar in the countries in which we operate may adversely affect our results of operations or financial condition could be adversely affected.
Legal & Regulatory
Total Risks: 19/73 (26%)Above Sector Average
Regulation11 | 15.1%
Regulation - Risk 1
Argentine law concerning foreign ownership of rural properties may adversely affect our results of operations and future investments in rural properties in Argentina.
Law No. 26,737, passed by the Argentine Congress in December 2011, and its implementing regulation Decree No. 274/2012, as amended and supplemented by Decree No. 820/2016 dated as of February 28, 2012 and of June 30, 2016, respectively, impose limits on the ownership or possession of rural land by foreign legal entities or certain foreign individuals.
Law No. 26,737 and its implementing regulation require that, "foreign ownership" of rural land may not exceed 15% of the total amount of rural land in the Argentine territory calculated also in relation to the territory of the Province, Department or Municipality where the relevant lands are located. For purposes of the law, "foreign ownership" means the ownership (whether by acquisition, transfer, assignment of rights or otherwise) over rural land by: (i) foreign individuals, regardless of whether they are Argentine residents or not; (ii) legal entities where foreign individuals or entities own, whether directly or indirectly, a number of votes sufficient to prevail in the local entity's decision-making process. It is presumed that foreign legal entities in which more than 51% of the stock is directly or indirectly owned by foreign individuals or entities are subject to Law No. 26,737; (iii) companies that issue bonds (a) convertible in stock representing 51% or more of the company's stock upon conversion and (b) whose holders are foreign individuals or entities; (iv) trusts whose beneficiaries are foreign individuals or entities, as defined pursuant to (i) and (ii) above; (v) joint ventures in which foreign entities or individuals hold a participating interest higher than those set forth by the law; (vi) foreign public law-governed legal entities; and (vii) simple associations or de facto corporations in which foreigners hold shares in the percentage set forth by the new law in relation to corporations or which are controlled by foreigners.
Law No. 26,737 created a National Registry of Rural Land (Registro Nacional de Tierras Rurales) in charge of the enforcement of the provisions of the law and registry of rural land.
Any modification to the capital stock of companies that own or possess rural land, by public or private instrument, that implies a direct or indirect change of control, must be reported to the National Registry of Rural Land within 30 days from the date of such modification.
In addition, foreign entities or individuals of the same nationality may not own more than 4.5% of rural land in Argentina and a single foreign entity or individual may not own more than 1,000 hectares in the "core area", or the "equivalent surface", as determined by the Interministerial Council of Rural Land (Consejo Interministerial de Tierras Rurales) in accordance with the provinces' proposal, specifying districts, sub-regions or areas and taking into consideration the location of the land, the proportion of the land area in respect of the total territory of the relevant Province, Department or Municipality and, the quality of the land for use and exploitation. The "equivalent surface" regime may be modified by the Interministerial Council of Rural Lands considering possible changes in the quality of the land or the growth of urban populations. Pursuant to Decree No. 274/2012, as amended and supplemented by Decree No. 820/2016, the departments that comprise the "core area" are: Marcos Juarez and Unión in the Province of Córdoba; Belgrano, San Martín, San Jerónimo, Iriondo, San Lorenzo, Rosario, Constitución, Caseros and General López in the Province of Santa Fe; and the districts of Leandro N. Alem, General Viamonte, Bragado, General Arenales, Junin, Alberti, Rojas, Chivilcoy, Chacabuco, Colón, Salto, San Nicolás, Ramallo, San Pedro, Baradero, San Antonio de Areco, Exaltación de La Cruz, Capitán Sarmiento, San Andrés de Giles, Pergamino, Arrecifes and Carmen de Areco in the Province of Buenos Aires.
Foreign legal entities or individuals may not own rural land that contain or are located next to permanent and significant bodies of water to be determined by the Federal Hydrological Council (Consejo Hídrico Federal) and may also include hydrological works and projects considered strategic and involving the public interest.
Acquisition of rural land will not be deemed as an "investment" under bilateral investment treaties signed by the Argentine Republic, since rural land is deemed as "a non-renewable natural resource".
The regulatory decrees of Law No. 26,737 provide that no previous authorization certificate is required for certain operations such as: (i) the transfer of the property or possession rights over real estate properties that were located in an "Industrial Area" or an "Industrial Park", independently from the acquirer's nationality, (ii) any modification to the capital stock of companies that own or possess rural land, by public or private instrument, when such modification implies a direct or indirect change of control, provided that such change of control is not made in favor of a new foreign legal entity or individual; and (iii) creation of certain real property rights over the rural land, such as easements.
Upon the issue of Decree No. 820/2016, the effects of Law No. 26,737 have been somewhat mitigated, by setting forth a term of 90 days during which the foreign legal entity or individual that has exceeded the allowed limit of ownership of rural land must reduce their current ownership to the legal limit by (i) transferring or causing any of its controlled legal entities to transfer the amount of rural land that exceeds the legal limit, or (ii) modifying or causing any of its controlled legal entities to modify the type of exploitation awarded to rural lands owned by such foreign legal entity, or (iii) transferring its participation to legal entities that are considered compliant pursuant to the terms of Law No. 26,737.
Law No. 26,737 initially stated that, even though no vested rights could be affected as a result of the application of such law, any act in violation of its provisions would be considered null and void. Decree No. 820/2016 clarified this situation and established that the foreign entities or individuals who owned rural land in excess to the allowed limit of ownership when the Law No. 26,737 came into effect (i) are not obliged to transfer such rural land in excess, and (ii) in the event of transfer of rural lands acquired before Law No. 26,737 came into force, they can acquire the equivalent to such transferred rural land, provided the legal limits established to the type of exploitation and location. Hence, the application of laws regarding foreign ownership of rural lands does not have an adverse effect on the current rural land owned by our Argentine subsidiaries. However, our Argentine subsidiaries may be prevented from acquiring additional rural land in Argentina, which may adversely affect our financial condition and results of our operations.
Regulation - Risk 2
Brazilian rules concerning foreign investment in rural properties may adversely affect our investments.
Brazilian Federal Law No. 5,709, effective October 7, 1971 ("Law 5709") established certain restrictions on the acquisition of rural property by foreigners, including that (i) foreign investors may only acquire rural properties in which agricultural, cattle-raising, industrial or colonization projects are going to be developed as approved by the relevant authorities; (ii) the total rural area to be acquired by a foreign investor cannot exceed one quarter of the surface of the municipality where it is located, and foreigners with the same nationality may not own, cumulatively, more than 10% of the surface of the municipality in which it is located; and (iii) the acquisition or possession (or any in rem right) by a foreigner of rural property situated in an area considered important to national security (i.e. land located at or near the Brazilian border) must be previously approved by the General Office of the National Security Council (Secretaria-Geral do Conselho de Segurança Nacional). Pursuant to Article 23 of Law No. 8,629, of February 25, 1993 ("Law 8629"), the restrictions mentioned in items (i) and (ii) above established by Law 5709 are also applicable for rural lease agreements executed by foreigners. "Parcerias Agrícolas" (agriculture partnerships agreements) have not been subject to these restrictions. The Federal General Attorney's Office ("AGU") on October 8, 2012 issued a legal opinion 005/2012, pursuant to which the AGU confirmed the understanding that the "Parcerias Rurais" are not subject to the restrictions or limitations of Law 5709. In addition, pursuant to Law 8629, the acquisition or lease by a foreigner of a rural property exceeding 100 módulos de exploração indefinida – "MEI," a measurement unit defined by the Regional Superintendence of the National Institute of Colonization and Land Reform (Superintendência Regional do Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária – "INCRA") must be previously approved by the Brazilian National Congress. Law 5709 also establishes that the same restrictions apply to Brazilian companies that are directly or indirectly controlled by foreign investors. Any acquisition or lease of rural property by foreigners in violation of the terms of Law 5709 would be considered null and void under Brazilian law.
Since the enactment of the Brazilian Constitution in 1988, the consensus view was that the restrictions imposed by Federal Law 5709 on the acquisition or lease of rural property above-mentioned did not apply to Brazilian companies controlled by foreigners, pursuant to legal opinion No. GQ-22, issued by the AGU in 1994, which was ratified by legal opinion No. GQ-181, also issued by the AGU in 1998. The Brazilian Constitution and its amendments, in particular Constitutional Amendment No. 6, of August 15, 1995, provides that (i) no restrictions on the acquisition of rural land in Brazil should apply to Brazilian companies; and (ii) any company incorporated and headquartered in Brazil and controlled by foreign investors must receive the same treatment as any other company incorporated and headquartered in Brazil and controlled by Brazilian investors. However, the Brazilian Justice National Council issued an Official Letter on July 13, 2010 addressed to all the Brazilian local State Internal Affairs Bureaus in order for them to adopt procedures within sixty (60) days and instruct the local State Notary and Real Estate Registry Offices to observe the restrictions of the Brazilian law on the acquisitions of rural land by Brazilian companies with foreign equity holders. Thereafter, on August 19, 2010, the AGU revised its prior opinion, and published a new legal opinion which: (i) revoked the AGU's legal opinions No. GQ-22 and GQ-181; and (ii) confirmed that Brazilian entities controlled by foreigners should be subject to the restrictions described above, and transactions entered into by foreigners in connection with the acquisition of rural properties would be subject to approval from INCRA, the Ministry of Agrarian Development and the Brazilian National Congress, when applicable. This revised opinion was ratified by the President of Brazil and published in the Official Gazette of the Federal Executive on August 23, 2010, becoming effective as of such date. We believe that the acquisitions of rural properties by Brazilian companies directly or indirectly controlled by foreigners registered in the appropriate real estate registry prior to August 23, 2010 are not affected by the AGU's legal opinion. As a confirmation of such understanding, pursuant to the Joint Normative Ruling N. 1 issued on September 27, 2012 by the Ministries of: (i) Agricultural Development; (ii) Agriculture, Cattle-raising and Supply; (iii) Industry Development and Foreign Commerce; and (iv) Tourism (the "Joint Normative Ruling N. 1"); and the Normative Ruling/IN INCRA No.76, issued on August 23, 2013, a Brazilian company controlled by foreign individuals or companies which acquired or leased rural properties, by means of an act or agreement entered into from June 7, 1994 and August 22, 2010, may register such property before the National System of Rural Registry (Sistema Nacional de Cadastro Rural-SNCR), without any administrative sanction. However, as of said date, the acquisition and leasing of rural land in Brazil, including through corporate transactions, will be subject to the above-mentioned restrictions, and will require several additional layers of review and approvals, which may be discretionary (including the approvals from INCRA, Ministry of Agrarian Development and the Brazilian National Congress, when applicable), burdensome and time consuming. Additionally, the Joint Normative Ruling N. 1 sets forth the administrative procedures applicable to requests for authorization for the acquisition or lease of rural properties by foreign investors pursuant to Law 5709. Under the Joint Normative Ruling, in order to obtain the authorization for the acquisition or lease of rural properties, foreign investors must present a project proposal to the INCRA, containing: (i) the rationale for the relationship between the property to be acquired or leased and the project size; (ii) physical and financial schedule of the investment and implementation of the project; (iii) use of official credit (governmental funds) for the total or partial finance of the project; (iv) logistic viability of the execution of the project and, in case of an industrial project, proof of compatibility between the local industrial sites and the geographic location of the lands; and (v) proof of compatibility with the criteria established by the Brazilian Ecological and Economical Zoning (Zoneamento Ecológico Econômico do Brasil – ZEE), relating to the location of the property.
While we conduct our operations in Brazil through local subsidiaries, we would be considered a foreign controlled entity within the meaning of the restrictions described above. Therefore, if we are not able to comply with these restrictions and obtain the required approvals in connection with future acquisitions or lease transactions, our business plan, contemplated expansion in Brazil and results of operations will be adversely affected.
Furthermore, there is currently proposed legislation under review in the Brazilian National Congress regarding the acquisition of rural land by Brazilian companies controlled by foreign holders, which if approved may further limit and restrict the investments of companies with foreign equity capital in rural land in Brazil. Such further restrictions, if adopted, may place more strain on our ability to expand our operations in Brazil.
Regulation - Risk 3
The measures taken or to be implemented by the Brazilian government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may cause adverse effect on our business and operations.
In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic. This pandemic, as well as the reality or fear of any other adverse public health developments, could adversely and materially affect, among other things, our manufacturing and supply chain operations, including due to the reduction or closure of our production units and the interruption of the supply of raw materials (see "- Risks Related to Our Business and Industries-The COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operating results").
In this regard, the Brazilian federal, state and municipal governments and other authorities have enacted a number of rules to address the potential impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak. Considering the possible outcomes thereof, we may be exposed to additional risks, which include:
(i) to contain or delay the spread of COVID-19, the Brazilian Ministry of Health, as well as several state and municipal authorities have adopted or recommended social distancing measures, which may ultimately result in severe fines/penalties;(ii) in March 2020, the Brazilian government created a Crisis Committee to Monitor the Impacts of COVID-19 in Brazil. Since then, it has announced several measures (tax or otherwise) to address the effects of COVID-19 in Brazil. Likewise, the Brazilian Congress is currently discussing several measures to increase the Brazilian government's revenues, such as imposing new taxes, revoking tax benefits and increasing the rates of current taxes; and (iii) States and municipalities may also revoke tax benefits and/or increase the rates of current taxes to increase its revenues. See "- We receive certain tax benefits from Brazilian Tax Authorities which we cannot assure will be maintained or renewed;".
These new rules, if approved, may have a material adverse impact on our results of operations.
Further, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and any possible future outbreaks of viruses may have a significant adverse effect on us. Firstly, a spread of such diseases amongst our employees, as well as any quarantines affecting them or our facilities could adversely impact the productivity of our personnel and thereby affect our operations, which can impact the quality and continuity of our activities and, ultimately, our reputation. Secondly, the current COVID-19 pandemic and any possible future outbreaks of viruses may have an adverse effect on our suppliers and/or transportation companies used to distribute our products. Thirdly, any quarantines or spread of viruses may adversely affect the demand of our products from end-consumers.
It is also possible that our commercial contracts, including power supply agreements, could be affected by adverse impacts derived from the COVID-19 pandemic, since the parties thereto may not comply with their contractual obligations. As the COVID-19 pandemic will most likely be considered as an act of God or force majeure event by Brazilian courts, parties may justify their nonperformance and request (i) termination without penalties; (ii) adjustment and/or release of contractual obligations; (iii) adjustment and/or release of the effects of arrears; and/or (iv) adjustment and/or release of penalties for breach of contract, which, in any case, may cause a negative impact on our results of operations.
Additionally, our operations may be adversely affected by the wider macroeconomic effect of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Currently, it is expected there be a recession or diminishing growth in several countries, including Brazil, due to the freeze of the economic activities. Although the economic scenario is still uncertain, the updated forecast for the 2021 Brazilian GDP points out to a growth, following a 4.1% recession in 2020. The final effects of the COVID-19 pandemic could have substantial negative impact on the countries where we operate. Any negative effect on the economy, particularly in the countries that we operate, may decrease incomes and the demand for our products. Lastly, in case of an economic downturn, the price of our common shares may be adversely affected.
Moreover, Brazil is experiencing political disagreements among governments and other authorities in connection with the measures that have been adopted and the ones that might be implemented.
In March 2021, after a second wave of the pandemic, Brazil has become the country with the current highest daily death toll in the world. The Brazilian government cannot affirm confirm if the vaccination will be concluded in 2021 and when and the pandemic will be under control. Therefore, these institutional conflicts since the beginning of COVID-19 as well as the potential adoption of measures against WHO's recommendations may lead to political turmoil and, ultimately, civil riots and impeachment process, which all may potentially negatively impact our businesses and operations in Brazil .
Lastly, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the possible outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic and we cannot assure that other measures will be implemented to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 and whether they will mean tougher restrictions or limitations that could affect our operations. In addition, the deterioration of global economic conditions as a result of the pandemic may ultimately decrease customer demand for our products and have a material adverse effect on our financial condition and results of operations.
Regulation - Risk 4
Luxembourg and European Union insolvency and bankruptcy laws and regulations are substantially different from U.S. insolvency laws and may offer our shareholders less protection than they would have under U.S. insolvency and bankruptcy laws.
As a company organized under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and with its registered office in Luxembourg, we are subject to Luxembourg and European Union insolvency and bankruptcy laws and regulations in the event any insolvency proceedings are initiated against us including, among other things, Council and European Parliament Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast). Should courts in another European Union Member State determine that the insolvency and bankruptcy laws of that Member State apply to us (or to certain of our assets) in accordance with and subject to such European Union regulations, the courts in that Member State could have jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings initiated against us. Insolvency and bankruptcy laws in Luxembourg or the relevant other European Union Member State, if any, may offer our shareholders less protection than they would have under U.S. insolvency and bankruptcy laws and make it more difficult for them to recover the amount they could expect to recover in a liquidation under U.S. insolvency and bankruptcy laws.
Regulation - Risk 5
Restrictions on the movement of capital out of Brazil may impair our ability to receive payments from our Brazilian Subsidiaries and restrict their ability to make payments in U.S. dollars.
In the past, the Brazilian economy has experienced balance of payment deficits and shortages in foreign exchange reserves, and the Brazilian government has responded by restricting the ability of Brazilian or foreign persons or entities to convert reais into foreign currencies. The Brazilian government may institute a restrictive exchange control policy in the future. Any restrictive exchange control policy could prevent or restrict our Brazilian Subsidiaries' access to U.S. dollars, and consequently their ability to meet their U.S. dollar obligations and may adversely affect our financial condition and results of operations.
Regulation - Risk 6
Our business in Brazil is subject to governmental regulation.
Our Brazilian operations are subject to a variety of national, state, and local laws and regulations, including environmental, agricultural, health and safety and labor laws. We invest financial and managerial resources to comply with these laws and related permit requirements. Our failure to do so could subject us to fines or penalties, enforcement actions, claims for personal injury or property damages, or obligations to investigate and/or remediate damage or injury. Moreover, if applicable laws and regulations, or the interpretation or enforcement thereof, become more stringent in the future, our capital or operating costs could increase beyond what we currently anticipate, and the process of obtaining or renewing licenses for our activities could be hindered or even opposed by the competent authorities.
The Brazilian government has been constantly implementing new legal provisions through Provisional Presidential Decrees, which expire and loose effect if not converted into law by the Brazilian National Congress after 120 days. This legislative practice causes uncertainties and may adversely affect our business and operations.
We are also subject to laws and regulations imposed in Brazil and its agencies, including (i) the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustível) and by the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica) on account of our production of sugarcane, ethanol and electricity (ii) the Ministry of Agriculture, Breeding Cattle and Supply (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento), on account of our agricultural, sugarcane and ethanol production activities. If an adverse final decision is issued in an administrative process, we could be exposed to penalties and sanctions derived from the violation of any of these laws and regulations, including the payment of fines, and, depending on the level of severity applied to the infraction, the closure of facilities and/or stoppage of activities and the cancellation or suspension of the registrations, authorizations and licenses, which may also result in temporary interruption or discontinuity of activities in our plants, and adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Regulation - Risk 7
Government laws and regulations in Brazil governing the burning of sugarcane could have a material adverse impact on our business or financial performance.
In Brazil, a relevant percentage of sugarcane is currently harvested by burning the crop, which removes leaves in addition to eliminating insects and other pests. The states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Mato Grosso do Sul, among others, have established laws and regulations that limit and/or entirely prohibit the burning of sugarcane and there is a likelihood that increasingly stringent regulations will be imposed by those states and other governmental agencies in the near future.
Such limitations arise from a Brazilian Federal Decree that set forth the complete elimination of the harvest by burning the crop until 2018 in areas where it is possible to carry out mechanized harvest. In the state of Minas Gerais, the deadline imposed by the State Government for the elimination of the harvest by burning the crop is 2014, for areas with declivity lower than 12%, and for areas with declivity higher than 12%, they are subject to an additional term at the discretion of the State Environmental Agency, on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, the current deadline is 2018 for the elimination of harvest by burning the crop for areas where mechanized harvest can be carried out, as per the Brazilian Federal Decree.
The strengthening of the laws and regulations or the total prohibition of sugarcane burning would require us to increase our planned investment in harvesting equipment, which, in turn, would limit our ability to fund other investments. In addition, the state of São Paulo has imposed an obligation on growers to dedicate a certain percentage of land used for sugarcane cultivation for native or reclaimed forest area. The cost of setting aside this land is difficult to predict and may increase costs for us or our sugarcane suppliers. As a result, the costs to comply with existing or new laws or regulations are likely to increase, and, in turn, our ability to operate our plants and harvest our sugarcane crops may be adversely affected.
Regulation - Risk 8
The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations
In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic. This pandemic, as well as the reality or fear of any other adverse public health developments, could adversely and materially affect, among other things, our manufacturing and supply chain operations, including due to the reduction or closure of our production units and the interruption of the supply of raw materials. The local, national and international response to the pandemic continues to rapidly evolve. Responses have included voluntary and, in some cases, mandatory quarantines as well as shutdowns and other restrictions on travel and commercial, social and other activities.
The Argentine government has taken several measures regarding the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak to date. On March 18, 2020, through Decree No. 287/2020 and Administrative Decision No. 409/2020, the Argentine Executive Branch extended the public health emergency following the increasing spread in Argentina. On March 20, 2020, the Decree No. 297/2020 ("Decree 297") was published in the Official Gazette by which the Argentine Executive Branch implemented a social, preventive and mandatory isolation regime ("Mandatory Isolation Regime"), beginning on March 20, 2020, which was extended until November 8, 2020. As of the date of this report, the activities pursued by our Argentine subsidiaries, related to agricultural production, distribution and commercialization, were exempted from the Mandatory Isolation Regime. The new regulations did require our Argentine subsidiaries to guarantee the hygiene and safety conditions established by the Ministry of Health to preserve the health of their employees.
On March 31, 2020, the Argentine Executive Branch prohibited: (i) employment terminations without cause; (ii) employment terminations and/or suspensions for lack of workload; (iii) employment terminations and/or suspensions due to reduced workload; and/or (iv) employment terminations and/or suspensions for force majeure events. Suspensions pursuant to Section 223 bis of the Employment Contract Law, regarding suspensions due to lack of work and/or force majeure, were exempted from this prohibition. In addition, Decree No. 39/2021 further extended the prohibition on terminations without cause, terminations based on the lack or reduction of work, and suspensions for force majeure events until May 31, 2021. It is likely that these restrictions are further extended if the scenario remains the same or substantially similar to the current one.
Since November 9, 2020, pursuant to Decree No. 875/2020 the Mandatory Isolation Regime was replaced with a mandatory distance regime ("Mandatory Distance Regime") in many Argentine provinces and areas. During the Mandatory Distance Regime, individuals must maintain a minimum social distance of two meters, use face masks in shared spaces, sanitize their hands, and strictly comply with the protocols for activities, recommendations, and instructions implemented by the provincial and federal health authorities. In case of detecting situations of risk of spread of the COVID-19, the provincial governors are empowered to reinstate the Mandatory Isolation Regime for individuals entering the Province or the City of Buenos Aires from other jurisdictions, with prior intervention of the provincial health authority and for a maximum period of fourteen days. The Mandatory Distance Regime implemented in April 9, 2021 new restrictions to means of transport, circulation of individuals, remote work, and a curfew limiting circulation in high sanitary-epidemiological risk. This Mandatory Distance Regime has been extended until April 30, 2021. The extension of the Mandatory Isolation Regime in several Argentine provinces as well as other actions taken by the government have resulted in hurdles for the commercialization, distribution and administrative aspects of our Argentine subsidiaries' businesses.
Under the new regulations, the economic, industrial, commercial, and service activities by business entities, including Adecoagro, may be carried out, provided businesses have an operating protocol approved by the provincial health authority that includes all the recommendations and instructions of the federal health authority and restrict the use of closed surfaces allowing a maximum of 50% of their capacity (subject to certain exceptions). For more information on how the Company complies with these protocols see "Information of the Company-Business Overview-COVID-19-Government measures in Argentina and Brazil".
The measures to control the COVID-19 pandemic have negatively impacted global economy, disrupted financial markets and international trade, resulted in increased unemployment levels and significantly impacted global supply chains, all of which has had and may continue to have an adverse impact in Argentina's economy and may negatively impact our industry and our business.
Maximum Prices and Supply Obligations
In connection with the declaration of the COVID-19 sanitary emergency, in order to guarantee the regular supply of essential products, on March 20, 2020, the Argentine Government issued general regulations (applicable to most producers) particularly, Resolution No. 100/2020 of the Secretary of Domestic Commerce, imposing the obligation to those who participate in the production, distribution and commercialization chain of certain products, to (i) sell products to their maximum prices set as of March 6, 2020; and (ii) increase production up to their facilities' full capacity and provide the proper measures to guarantee their transport and supply. Originally, these obligations were supposed to be effective for a 30-day term. However, the Argentine Government successively extended these obligations, in principle, until May 15, 2021. It is likely that these obligations would be extended again. Since this regime has been in place, only certain and limited price increases had been authorized. Considering the inflationary context in the Argentine economy, since many of the product prices were capped to their prices as of March 20, 2020, with some few limited authorized increments, these measures have negatively impacted our Argentine subsidiaries' businesses.
Additionally, the Argentine Government created (i) an informative regime for the purpose of publishing standard maximum prices of a basic listing of consumer products for each province (which will be available on the website www.preciosmaximos.produccion.gob.ar); and (ii) a public and free mechanism that allows the filing of claims and complaints by consumers and those included in the production, distribution and commercialization chain of the products included in the obligation to sell at maximum prices. This regulation impacted our processed rice and fluid milk products. The facilities of the Company have been inspected to control compliance of the abovementioned regulation. As long as this regulation is in place, the Company would face restrictions to freely implement price increases on the processed rice and fluid milk products.
Those measures (jointly with other announcements that up to the present have not being turned into regulations) suggest that the Argentine Government would be planning to enforce the Supply Act broadly to avoid potential shortage on the supply or increase in the prices of products deemed essential. Since, the Secretary of Domestic Commerce has notified several companies within the Argentine subsidiaries' industries, urging them to work at full capacity. Some of them have even been formally accused of not complying with the Supply Act. Recently, by means of Resolution No. 330/2021, the Secretary of Domestic Commerce has officially urged all industrial and commercial "big business" to manufacture, distribute and market their goods and services to the maximum of their installed capacity, while the health emergency persists in Argentina.
On April 4, 2020 the Argentine Government issued Decree No. 351/2020, which authorized the intervention of local authorities (both at Provincial and Municipal level) to control maximum prices under the recently adopted regulations and adopted rules to coordinate the enforcement of regulations. This has resulted in the need to allocate additional economic and human resources for the Argentine subsidiaries to comply with governmental requirements and filings pursuant to the regulations in place.
In accordance with Resolution No. 552/2020 (as amended), published on November 12, 2020, the Secretary of Domestic Commerce suspended the effects of Resolution No. 100/2020 for a list of products included in Annex I (among others, brown rice, prepared rice, condensed milks, soy milks, vegetable milks; and brie, camembert, blue and provolone cheeses) that due to their characteristics and purpose are not relevant for the satisfaction of the basic needs of consumers and users, until May 15, 2021.
The Supermarkets' Shelves Law published on March 17, 2020 (as implemented by Decree No. 991/2020 published in the Official Gazette on December 15, 2020), is applicable to the products marketed by the Company. The main objectives of this law are: (i) to ensure that the price of certain products remains clear and competitive for the benefit of consumers, (ii) to maintain harmony and balance between economic operators, (iii) to expand the supply of artisanal, regional and national products produced by micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, and (iv) to promote the offer of products manufactured by small producers. Although the law is focused on supermarkets, it might have an impact on the Company's commercialization strategies. The Supermarkets' Shelves Law resulted in the Argentine government imposing increasing regulations affecting the Argentine subsidiaries' businesses, often generating further marketing and distribution costs for the purposes of complying with these regulations.
On March 17, 2021, the Secretary of Domestic Commerce published in the Official Gazette Resolution No. 237/2021 which created a new information regime (Sistema Informativo para la Implementación de Políticas de Reactivación Económica) ("SIPRE"; after its acronym in Spanish), according to which the Company might have to submit extensive monthly reports on prices, production and sales. This regime has also increased compliance costs and forced the Argentine subsidiaries to allocate resources to comply with these information regimes.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 283/2021, published in the Official Gazette on March 31, 2021, the Secretary of Domestic Commerce created the Product Labeling Inspection and Compliance Monitoring System to ensure that certain product labels do not contain inaccurate information that deceives consumers (Sistema de Fiscalización de Rótulos y Etiquetas) ("SiFiRE"; after its acronym in Spanish). As provided in this regulation, this information regime is aimed at the defense of fair trade and the protection of consumer rights. The SiFiRE established a new set of rules applicable to the following product labels: (i) foods; (ii) beverages; (iii) drinkable foods; (iv) toiletries; (v) personal hygiene products and; (vi) personal care and household cleaning products suitable for human use and handling. Any misleading labels must be amended. If infringing products have already been launched to the market, suppliers and importers must place a correction sticker on them at their own expense. The sanctions provided in Consumer Protection Law No. 24,240 and Executive Order No. 274/2019 on Fair Trade may apply to corporations, including us.
Through Resolution No. 330/2021, published in the Official Gazette on April 9, 2021, the Secretary of Domestic Commerce ordered all companies from the commerce and industry sectors, that during 2019 have recorded total sales in the domestic market in excess of the amounts established by Resolution No. 220/2019 (i.e., companies which are not considered small or medium, pursuant to the parameters included therein), to increase their production up to the maximum of their installed capacity and to arbitrate appropriate measures to guarantee the transportation, distribution and supply of inputs and final goods produced throughout the Argentine Republic, until the sanitary emergency declared by the Social Solidarity and Productive Reactivation Law No. 27,541 remains in force (in principle, until December 21, 2021). This Resolution included a similar provision to the one already provided under Resolution No. 100/2020 referred to above.
Since Resolution No. 330/2021 does not include any specific requirements, it is difficult to determine at this time both its scope and how compliance with this regulation is going to be monitored by the Argentine Government. However, the Argentine subsidiaries expect to incur further compliance costs due to these regulations.
Any application of these measures could potentially affect costs, expenses and/or margins.
Remote Work
COVID-19 pandemic pressured most companies which were not excluded from the Argentine Isolation Regime to implement measures to guarantee remote work for their employees. Consequently, several liabilities such as cybersecurity, privacy policies, adequate computing devices and professional use of personal computing devices have to be implemented by such companies.
Although as of the date of this report the activities carried out by our Argentines subsidiaries have been excluded from the Argentine Isolation Regime, because it provides as "essential" activities and services related to production, distribution and agricultural commercialization, we cannot assure that this exception will continue to apply to our operations.
The foregoing measures taken by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 virus and any future actions that may implemented are material intrusions and limits on the ability of the Company to operate its businesses and which will adversely impact the price of our products and our operating results.
On August 14th, 2020, the Legal Regime of Teleworking Contract under Law No. 27,555 (the "Teleworking Law") was published in the Official Gazette. This Law regulates dependent work provided from the employee's own home or from a place other than the employer's establishment and introduces modifications to the Labor Contract Law establishing the concept of teleworking. In addition, the Teleworking Law provides the minimum legal requirements for regulating teleworking, it delegates specific aspects to collective bargaining, recognizes rights and duties for those who work under this modality (e.g., right of reversibility, right to digital disconnection, trade union rights, right to privacy) and also provides regulations referring to working hours, provision of work tools and reimbursement of expenses.
On January 20, Executive Decree No. 27/2021 approving the regulation of the Teleworking Law was published in the Official Gazette, including provisions regulating certain aspects of the Teleworking Law: the right to digital disconnection; conditions under which caretaking tasks may be performed by teleworking individuals; limits and conditions for reversal; how work tools are to be provided and expenses reimbursed; union representation of teleworking individuals; health and safety conditions; employer oversight systems; and the right to privacy of teleworking individuals.
On February 5, Resolution 54/2021 of the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security was published ordering that Teleworking Law will enter into force on April 1, 2021. As long as the restrictions to circulate due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the application of this law is in suspense.
Regulation - Risk 9
We are subject to anti-corruption, anti-bribery, anti-money laundering and other international trade laws and regulations.
We are subject to anti-corruption, anti-bribery, anti-money laundering and other international trade laws and regulations. We are required to comply with the laws and regulations of Brazil and other jurisdictions where we conduct operations. In particular, we are subject to the Brazilian Anti-corruption Law No 12,846, to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, or the "FCPA," to the United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010, as well as economic sanction programs, including those administered by the United Nations, the European Union and the United States, including the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, or "OFAC."
The FCPA prohibits providing anything of value to foreign officials for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business or securing any improper business advantage. As part of our business, we may deal with entities and employees which are considered foreign officials for purposes of the FCPA. In addition, economic sanctions programs restrict our dealings with certain sanctioned countries, individuals and entities. When issues arise, we attempt to act promptly to learn relevant facts, conduct appropriate due diligence, and take any appropriate remedial action to address the risk. There can be no assurance that our internal policies and procedures will be sufficient to prevent or detect all inappropriate practices, fraud or violations of law by our employees, directors, officers, partners, agents and service providers or that such persons will not take actions in violation of our policies and procedures (or otherwise in violation of the relevant anticorruption laws and sanctions regulations) for which we or they may be ultimately held responsible.
Violations of anti-bribery and anticorruption laws and sanctions regulations could have a material adverse effect on our business, reputation, results of operations and financial condition. In addition, we may be subject to one or more enforcement actions, investigations and proceedings by authorities for alleged infringements of these laws. These proceedings may result in penalties, fines, sanctions or other forms of liability and could have a material adverse effect on our reputation, business, financial condition and results of operations.
Regulation - Risk 10
Increased regulation of food safety could increase our costs and adversely affect our results of operations.
Our manufacturing facilities and products are subject to regular local, as well as foreign, governmental inspections and extensive regulation in the food safety area, including governmental food processing controls. We incur significant costs in connection with the compliance of food and safety requirements and changes in government regulations relating to food safety could require us to make additional investments or incur additional costs to meet the necessary specifications for our products. Our products are often inspected by foreign food safety officials, and any failure to pass those inspections can result in our being required to return all or part of a shipment, destroy all or part of a shipment or incur costs because of delays in delivering products to our customers. Any tightening of food safety regulations could result in increased costs and could have an adverse effect on our business and results of operations.
Regulation - Risk 11
We may not possess all of the permits and licenses required to operate our business, or we may fail to renew or maintain the licenses and permits we currently hold. This could subject us to fines and other penalties, which could materially adversely affect our results of operations.
We are required to hold a variety of permits and licenses to conduct our farming and industrial operations, including but not limited to permits and licenses concerning land development, agricultural and harvesting activities, seed production, labor standards, occupational health and safety, land use, water use and other matters. We may not possess all of the permits and licenses required for each of our business segments. In addition, the approvals, permits or licenses or renewals there of required by governmental agencies may change without substantial advance notice, and we could fail to obtain the approvals, permits or licenses required to expand our business. If we fail to obtain or to maintain such permits or licenses, or if renewals are granted with onerous conditions, we could be subject to fines and other penalties and be limited in the number or the quality of the products that we could offer. As a result, our business, results of operations and financial condition could be adversely affected.
Litigation & Legal Liabilities1 | 1.4%
Litigation & Legal Liabilities - Risk 1
Widespread corruption and fraud relating to ownership of real estate may adversely affect our business, especially our land transformation business.
Under Brazilian Legislation, real property ownership is normally transferred by means of a transfer deed, and subsequently registered at the appropriate Real Estate Registry Office under the corresponding real property record. There are uncertainties, corruption and fraud relating to title ownership of real estate in Brazil, mostly in rural areas. In certain cases, the Real Estate Registry Office may register deeds with errors, including duplicate and/or fraudulent entries, and, therefore, deed challenges frequently occur, leading to judicial actions and police investigations. Property disputes over title ownership are frequent in Brazil, and, as a result, there is a risk that errors, fraud or challenges could adversely affect us.
Taxation & Government Incentives5 | 6.8%
Taxation & Government Incentives - Risk 1
We receive certain tax benefits from Brazilian Tax Authorities which we cannot assure will be maintained or renewed.
We receive certain tax benefits by virtue of our production facilities and investment projects in underdeveloped regions in Brazil. Our main tax benefit of the ICMS (circulation tax for goods and services) from the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (Ivinhema and Angélica Mill) was renewed until 2032.
We cannot assure you that the tax incentives we currently benefit from will be maintained, renewed or that we will obtain new tax incentives on favorable terms. In the event we fail to comply with specific obligations to which we are subject in connection with the tax benefits described above, such benefits may be suspended or cancelled, or we may be required to pay the taxes due in full, plus penalties, which may adversely affect us. Additionally, we cannot assure you that we will be able to renew these tax benefits when they expire, or to obtain additional tax benefits under favorable conditions. State and federal governments frequently implement changes to the tax regimes, such as changes in tax rates, that may adversely affect us or our customers. If our current tax benefits are cancelled or not renewed, we may be materially adversely affected.
Taxation & Government Incentives - Risk 2
Changes in Brazilian tax laws may have a material adverse impact on the taxes applicable to our business and may increase our tax burden.
The Brazilian government frequently implements changes to the Brazilian tax regime that may affect us and our clients. These changes include changes in prevailing tax rates and, occasionally, imposition of temporary taxes, the proceeds of which are earmarked for designated Brazilian government purposes. Some of these changes may result in increases in our tax payments, which could adversely affect industry profitability and increase the prices of our products, restrict our ability to do business in our existing and target markets and cause our financial results to suffer.
Over the past years Brazil has faced an economic recession and the Government is adopting fiscal adjustment measures. Any fiscal adjustment is complex and involves radical and unpopular measures. The Minister of Finance has also been raising the possibility of increasing or creating new taxes. For example, the Brazilian government may reduce or increase at any time through a presidential decree the rates of the tax levied on financial operations, such as credit transactions ("IOF/Credit"), foreign exchange transactions ("IOF/Exchange"), derivative securities transactions ("IOF/Securities"), among other taxable events. On March, 30, 2017, a presidential decree was published in order to introduce a 0.38% rate of the IOF/Credit on some loan transactions, such as credits provided by cooperatives, which were previously subject to a zero percent rate.
It is also common for taxpayers to file suits for the declaration that a certain tax is illegal or unconstitutional. Such cases where the final decision is favorable to taxpayers, a situation that occurs very frequently. Accordingly, the Brazilian Government may propose changes in the tax legislation in order to increase rates, tax basis and/or to create new taxes.
The effects of these changes and any other change that could result from the enactment of additional legislation cannot be quantified. We cannot assure you that we will be able to maintain our projected cash flow and profitability following any increases in Brazilian taxes applicable to us and our operations.
Taxation & Government Incentives - Risk 3
Changes in the Argentine tax laws may adversely affect the results of our operations, financial condition and cash flows.
On December 29, 2017, the Argentine Government enacted Law No. 27,430 (the "Tax Reform Law"), a comprehensive tax reform which became effective on January 1, 2018. Specifically, Law No. 27,430 introduced amendments to income tax (both at corporate and individual levels), value added tax, tax procedural law, criminal tax law, social security contributions, excise tax, tax on fuels and tax on the transfer of real estate. In addition, the Solidarity Law, introduced important tax modifications -among other provisions- which modified the Tax Reform Law, provided measures regarding employer contributions, applicable rates for foreign goods and created, in regards to the Tax for an Inclusive and Solidary Argentina, an 8% rate for the acquisition of digital services and a 30% rate for the acquisition services abroad and passenger transport services destined outside the country (see "-The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain").
The Tax Reform Law introduced several amendments in connection with federal income tax, such as the progressive reduction of the tax rate on corporate level from 35% to a 30% applicable to the fiscal periods starting on January 1, 2018 until December 31, 2019; and to 25% applicable to the fiscal periods starting on January 1, 2020, and established that dividends or other profits distributed to Argentine resident individuals and foreign beneficiaries would be subject to taxation. Therefore, as of January 1, 2018, income tax on Argentine resident companies and branches of non-Argentine entities applies in two stages: (i) a first stage is charged at the corporate level (at a tax rate of 30% or 25%, depending on the fiscal period involved, as explained above); and (ii) a second stage is charged at the shareholder or owner level - in respect of an Argentine resident individual or a foreign beneficiary- (at a tax rate of 7% or 13%, according to the fiscal period from which the distributed profit derived). Such tax treatment was amended by the Solidarity Law, which established: (i) the suspension up to fiscal years to be initiated as of January 1, 2021 inclusive, of the 25% corporate income tax rate and of the 13% tax rate applicable on dividends; and that (ii) on such periods of suspension, the applicable rate on corporate income tax will be of 30% and the applicable rate on dividends will be of 7%. The Argentine Congress is currently discussing a draft bill to modify the following aspects: (i) amend the corporate tax rate for Argentine entities, by applying a sliding scale from 25% to 35%, depending on the accumulated net income obtained during the given year; and (ii) regardless of the applicable corporate tax rate, in all cases, dividends or profits will be levied at a 7% tax rate. If the bill is approved by the Argentine Congress, such tax treatment would be applicable for fiscal years starting as of January 1, 2021.
The Tax Reform Law eliminated the equalization tax, which levied distributions made out of previously untaxed income, was eliminated. The sale, exchange or disposition of shares and other securities not trading in, or listed on, capital markets and securities exchanges by resident individuals and foreign beneficiaries in general is subject to tax at a rate of 15%. Non-residents can opt to be taxed at a rate of 15% on the net gain or 13.5% on the gross amount of the transaction, at the option of the seller.
These and other changes in the Argentine tax laws could adversely affect our operations, financial condition and cash flows.
Taxation & Government Incentives - Risk 4
We may be classified by the IRS as a "passive foreign investment company" (a "PFIC"), which may result in adverse tax consequences for U.S. investors.
Whether the Company will be a PFIC for the current or future tax year will depend on the Company's assets and income over the course of each such tax year and, as a result, cannot be predicted with certainty as of the date of this Form 20-F. Under circumstances where the cash is not deployed for active purposes, our risk of becoming a PFIC may increase. If we were treated as a PFIC for any taxable year during which a U.S. investor held common shares, certain adverse tax consequences could apply to such U.S. investor. A U.S. taxpayer who holds stock in a foreign corporation during any year in which such corporation qualifies as a PFIC may mitigate such negative tax consequences by making certain U.S. federal income tax elections, which are subject to numerous restrictions and limitations. Holders of the Company's common shares are urged to consult their own tax advisors regarding the acquisition, ownership, and disposition of the Company's common shares. See "Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Considerations for U.S. Holders-Passive Foreign Investment Company ("PFIC") Rules".
Taxation & Government Incentives - Risk 5
There is a risk that we could be treated as a U.S. domestic corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes, which could materially increase our U.S. federal income tax liability and subject any dividends we pay to U.S. federal withholding tax.
We acquired approximately 98% of IFH, a holding company, which was a partnership for U.S. federal income tax purposes organized under the laws of Delaware, immediately prior to our IPO, in exchange for our common shares. Under U.S. Internal Revenue Code section 7874(b), we would be treated as a U.S. domestic corporation if we were deemed to have acquired substantially all of the assets constituting the trade or business of a U.S. domestic partnership and former members of IFH were deemed to own at least 80% of our common shares by reason of the transfer of those trade or business assets (ignoring common shares issued in our IPO for purposes of the 80% threshold). The rules mentioned above are unclear in certain respects and there is limited guidance on the application of the rules to partnership acquisitions. Accordingly, we cannot assure you that the U.S. Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") will not seek to assert that we are a U.S. domestic corporation, which assertion if successful could materially increase our U.S. federal income tax liability and require us to withhold tax from any dividends we pay to holders of our common shares who are not United States persons within the meaning of U.S. Internal Revenue Code section 7701(a) (30). See "Item 10. Additional Information-E. Taxation".
Environmental / Social2 | 2.7%
Environmental / Social - Risk 1
Changed
Non-compliance with data protection laws could adversely affect our business.
We operate in a complex regulatory and legal environment that exposes us to compliance and litigation risks that could materially affect our business, financial condition and results of operations. These laws may change, sometimes significantly, as a result of political, economic or social events.
In addition, on August 14, 2018, the Brazilian Federal Law No. 13,709/2018 was enacted, which sets out comprehensive data protection procedures and general principles and obligations that apply across multiple economic sectors and contractual relationships (Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, or the "LGPD"). The LGPD establishes detailed rules for the collection, use, processing and storage of personal data and will affect all economic sectors, including the relationship between customers and suppliers of goods and services, employees and employers and other relationships in which personal data is collected, whether in a digital or physical environment. The obligations established by LGPD are already in effect, and all legal entities are required to adapt their data processing activities to these new rules. The data protection regime imposes more stringent data protection standards on Brazilian residents.
We are currently evaluating the impact that the LGPD will have on our business practices and associate compliance costs.
Until adaptation in completed, any breaches of the LGPD may subject us to penalties and/or fines and a requirement to notify Governmental Authorities and parties whose data has been affected.
The prolonged home office period may increase our exposure to security breaches which can adversely affect us.
Effective August, 2021, failure to comply with LGPD can give rise to an administrative fine, per infraction, of up to 2% of group or conglomerate revenues in Brazil, up to a total maximum of fifty million reais (R$ 50,000,000.00) per infraction.
Until August 2021, however, even if no administrative sanctions may be imposed, the obligations arising from the LGPD are already enforceable and we may be subject to claims, indemnification and/or fines from data subjects, and/or other governmental authorities in general.
Environmental / Social - Risk 2
We are subject to extensive environmental regulation, and concerns regarding climate change may subject us to even stricter environmental regulations.
Our activities are subject to a broad set of laws and regulations relating to the protection of the environment. Such laws include compulsory maintenance of certain preserved areas within our properties, management of pesticides and associated hazardous waste and the acquisition and renewals of permits for water use and effluents disposal. In addition, the storage and processing of our products may create hazardous conditions. We could be exposed to civil, criminal and administrative penalties in addition to the obligation to remedy the adverse effects of our operations on the environment and to indemnify third parties for damages.
In addition, pursuant to Brazilian environmental legislation, the corporate entity of a company will be disregarded (such that the owners of the company will be liable for its debts) if necessary to guarantee the payment of costs related to the recovery of environmental damages, whenever the legal entity is deemed by a court to be an obstacle to reimbursement of damages caused to the quality of the environment. Moreover, the relevant public authority may prevent us from using the property as long as environmental damages persist, which can directly affect the rent revenue stream of the agriculture partnership agreements. Because of the possibility of unanticipated regulatory measures or other developments, particularly as environmental laws become more stringent, the amount and timing of future expenditures required to maintain compliance could increase from current levels and could adversely affect the availability of funds for capital expenditures and other purposes. Compliance with existing or new environmental laws and regulations, as well as obligations in agreements with public entities, could result in increased costs and expenses.
Environmental laws and their enforcement are becoming more stringent in Argentina and Brazil increasing the risk of and penalties associated with violations, which could impair or suspend our operations or projects and our operations expose us to potentially adverse environmental legislation and regulation. Failure to comply with past, present or future laws could result in the imposition of fines, third party claims, and investigation by environmental and police authorities and the relevant public attorney office. For example, the perceived effects of climate change may result in additional legal and regulatory requirements to reduce or mitigate the effects of our industrial facilities' emissions. Such requirements, if enacted, could increase our capital expenditures and expenses for environmental compliance in the future, which may have a material and adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition. Moreover, the denial of any permit that we have requested, or the revocation of any of the permits that we have already obtained, may have an adverse effect on our results of operations.
Finance & Corporate
Total Risks: 11/73 (15%)Below Sector Average
Share Price & Shareholder Rights3 | 4.1%
Share Price & Shareholder Rights - Risk 1
We are a Luxembourg corporation ("société anonyme") and it may be difficult for you to obtain or enforce judgments against us or our executive officers and directors in the United States.
We are organized under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Most of our assets are located outside the United States. Furthermore, most of our directors and officers and experts reside outside the United States, and most of their assets are located outside the United States. As a result, you may find it difficult to effect service of process within the United States upon these persons or to enforce judgments outside the United States obtained against us or these persons in U.S. courts, including judgments in actions predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws. Likewise, it may also be difficult for you to enforce in U.S. courts judgments obtained against us or these persons in courts located in jurisdictions outside the United States, including actions predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws. It may also be difficult for an investor to bring an action in a Luxembourg court predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws against us or these persons. Luxembourg law provides shareholders the right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the Company only in limited circumstances and subject to conditions only admit, shareholders' right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company.
Service of process within Luxembourg upon the Company may be possible, provided that The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of November 15, 1965 is complied with. As there is no treaty in force on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters between the United States and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, courts in Luxembourg will not automatically recognize and enforce a final judgment rendered by a U.S. court. The enforceability in Luxembourg courts of judgments entered by U.S. courts will be subject prior any enforcement in Luxembourg to the procedure and the conditions set forth in particular in the Luxembourg civil procedure code and/or established by court interpretation, which conditions may include the following and which may evolve:
- the judgment of the U.S. court is final and duly enforceable (exécutoire) in the United States and has not been fully enforced in the United States and/or any other jurisdiction;- the U.S. court had jurisdiction over the subject matter leading to the judgment (based on the verification of a characterized link of connection of the litigation to the judge of origin);- the U.S. court has applied to the dispute the substantive law which would have been applied by Luxembourg courts;- the judgment was granted following proceedings where the counterparty had the opportunity to appear, and if it appeared, to present a defense and other conditions for a fair trial have been complied with taking into account all facts and circumstances whether occurring before, during or after trial or issue and delivery of the judgment, and the judgment has not been obtained by reason of fraud;- the U.S. court has acted in accordance with its own procedural laws;- the judgment of the U.S. court does not contravene Luxembourg international public policy both substantive and procedural (as such term is interpreted under the laws of Luxembourg); and - the absence of contradiction between such judgment and an already issued judgment of a Luxembourg court.
Under our articles of incorporation, we indemnify and hold our directors harmless against all claims and suits brought against them, subject to limited exceptions. Under our articles of incorporation, to the extent allowed or required by law, the rights and obligations among or between us, any of our current or former directors, officers and company employees and any current or former shareholder will be governed exclusively by the laws of Luxembourg and subject to the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg courts, unless such rights or obligations do not relate to or arise out of their capacities as such. Although there is doubt as to whether U.S. courts would enforce such provision in an action brought in the United States under U.S. securities laws, such provision could make the enforcement of judgments obtained outside Luxembourg more difficult as to the enforcement against our assets in Luxembourg or jurisdictions that would apply Luxembourg law.
Share Price & Shareholder Rights - Risk 2
You may have more difficulty protecting your interests than you would as a shareholder of a U.S. corporation.
Our corporate affairs are governed by our articles of incorporation and by the laws governing joint stock companies organized under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg as well as such other applicable local law, rules and regulations. The rights of our shareholders and the responsibilities of our directors and officers under Luxembourg law are different from those applicable to a corporation incorporated in the United States. As a foreign private issuer, we are exempt from certain rules under the Exchange Act, and consequently, there may be less publicly available information about us than is regularly published by or about U.S. issuers. Also, Luxembourg regulations governing the securities of Luxembourg companies may not be as extensive as those in effect in the United States, and Luxembourg law and regulations in respect of corporate governance matters may not be as protective of minority shareholders as state corporation laws in the United States. Therefore, you may have more difficulty protecting your interests in connection with actions taken by our directors and officers or our principal shareholders than you would as a shareholder of a corporation incorporated in the United States.
Share Price & Shareholder Rights - Risk 3
Social movements and the possibility of expropriation and constitution of public easement may affect the normal use of, damage, or deprive us of the use of or fair value of, our properties.
Social movements, such as Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra and Comissão Pastoral da Terra, are active in Brazil and advocate land reform and mandatory property redistribution by the Brazilian government. Land invasions and occupations of rural areas by a large number of individuals is common practice for these movements, and, in certain areas, including those in which we have invested or are likely to invest, police protection and effective eviction proceedings are not available to land owners. As a result, we cannot assure you that our properties will not be subject to invasion or occupation by these groups. A land invasion or occupation could materially impair the normal use of our lands or have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition or the value of our common shares. In addition, our land may be subject to expropriation by the Brazilian government. Under Article 184 of the Brazilian Constitution, the Brazilian government may expropriate land that is not in compliance with mandated local "social functions". A "social function" is defined in Article 186 of the Brazilian Constitution as (i) rational and adequate exploitation of land; (ii) adequate use of natural resources available and preservation of the environment; (iii) compliance with labor laws; and (iv) exploitation of land to promote welfare of owners and employees. If the Brazilian government decides to expropriate any of our properties, our results of operations may be adversely affected, to the extent that potential compensation to be paid by the Brazilian government may be less than the profit we could make from the sale or use of such land. Disputing the Brazilian government's expropriation of land is usually time-consuming and the outcomes of such challenges are uncertain. In addition, we may be forced to accept public debt bonds, which have limited liquidity, as compensation for expropriated land instead of cash.
Moreover, along with the expropriation rights, the Brazilian legislation also confers to the Government (or the Concessionary of public services) the power to constitute public easements over third-parties real estate properties. Public easements are commonly used in those situations which the infrastructure project requires the use of a portion of several real estate properties, mostly in rural areas, such as the installation of transmission lines or oil and gas pipelines.
Public easement also requires the payment of a fair and prior indemnification, which authorizes the government (or concessionary of public services) to use such property for public interest. The institution of public easement shall observe the same procedure for expropriation of real estate property. However, unlike expropriation, the public easement does not remove the property from the owner's estate, but only creates the right of using the property or part of it. The constitution of a public easement will prevent the use of the part of the property and our results of operations may be adversely affected if such easement is constituted in into the liquidity area of our farmland holdings.
Accounting & Financial Operations1 | 1.4%
Accounting & Financial Operations - Risk 1
IFRS accounting standards related to biological assets require us to make numerous estimates in the preparation of our financial statements and therefore limit the comparability of our financial statements to similar issuers using U.S. GAAP.
IAS 41 "Biological Assets" requires that we measure our biological assets and agriculture produce at the point of harvest at fair value less costs to sell. Therefore, we are required to make assumptions and estimates relating to, among other things, future agricultural commodity yields, prices, and production costs extrapolated through a discounted cash flow method. For example, the value of our biological assets generated initial recognition and changes in fair value of biological assets amounting to a $122.7 million gain in 2020; $68.6 million gain in 2019 and a $16.2 million gain in 2018. The assumptions and estimates used to determine the fair value of biological assets, and any changes to such prior estimates, directly affect our reported results of operations. If actual market conditions differ from our estimates and assumptions, there could be material adjustments to our results of operations. In addition, the use of such discounted cash flow method utilizing these future estimated metrics differs from generally accepted accounting principles in the United States ("U.S. GAAP"). As a result, our financial statements and reported earnings are not directly comparable to those of similar companies in the United States.
Debt & Financing5 | 6.8%
Debt & Financing - Risk 1
We may not be able to renew our credit lines when they mature, depriving us of needed liquidity.
Certain of our subsidiaries rely substantially on existing uncommitted credit lines to support their operations and business needs through the agricultural harvest cycle. If we are unable to renew these credit lines, or if we cannot replace such credit lines with other borrowing facilities, our financial condition and results of operations may be adversely affected.
Debt & Financing - Risk 2
Fluctuations in interest rates could have a significant impact on our results of operations, indebtedness and cash flow.
As of December 31, 2020, approximately $717.6 million of our total debt on a consolidated basis was subject to fixed interest rates and $253.4 million was subject to variable interest rates. As of December 31, 2020, borrowings incurred by the Company's subsidiaries in Brazil were repayable at various dates between January 2021 and November 2027 and bear either fixed interest rates ranging from 2.5% to 7.95% per annum or variable rates based on Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo (TJLP), Índice de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA) and CDI plus spreads ranging from 1.62% to 4.24% per annum. Borrowings incurred by the Company´s subsidiaries in Argentina are repayable at various dates between January 2021 and June 2028 and bear either fixed interest rates ranging from 2.8% to 7.0% per annum. Significant interest rate increases can have an adverse effect on our profitability, liquidity and financial position. Currently, our variable interest rate exposure is mainly linked to the London Interbank Offer Rate ("LIBOR") rate plus specified spreads. If interest rates increase, whether because of an increase in market interest rates or an increase in our own cost of borrowing, our debt service obligations for our variable rate indebtedness would increase, and our net income could be adversely affected. At December 31, 2020, LIBOR (six months) was 0.26%.
Volatility in LIBOR or other reference rates could increase our periodic interest payments and have an adverse effect on our total financing costs. We may be unable to adequately adjust our prices to offset any increased financing costs, which would have an adverse effect on our results of operations.
On July 27, 2017, the Financial Conduct Authority (the authority that regulates LIBOR) announced that it intends to stop compelling banks to submit rates for the calculation of LIBOR after 2021. Further, on November 30, 2020, ICE Benchmark Administration ("IBA") announced that it planned to consult on its intention to cease the publication of one-week and two-month LIBOR on December 31, 2021, and the overnight, one-month, three-month, six-month and 12-month LIBOR tenors on June 30, 2023. That same day, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency jointly responded to IBA's announcement by encouraging banks to stop writing contracts referencing LIBOR as soon as possible (and in any event by the end of 2021, subject to certain limited exceptions), stating that entering into new contracts that use LIBOR as a reference rate after December 31, 2021, and failing to prepare for disruptions to LIBOR (including operating without robust fallback language that includes a clearly defined alternative reference rate), could cause significant issues if not addressed. These announcements indicate that the continuation of LIBOR on the current basis cannot and will likely not be guaranteed after June 2023 and may be subject to significant disruption after December 2021.It is not possible to predict the effect of these changes, other reforms or the establishment of alternative reference rates in the United Kingdom, the United States or elsewhere. See also the discussion of interest rate risk in "Item 11. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk-"Risk of Fluctuations in Interest Rates."
The transition process may involve, among other things, increased volatility or illiquidity in markets for instruments that currently rely on LIBOR. The transition may also result in reductions in the value of certain instruments or the effectiveness of related transactions such as hedges, increased borrowing costs, uncertainty under applicable documentation, or difficult and costly consent processes. Any such effects of the transition away from LIBOR, as well as other unforeseen effects, may result in losses or increases in financing costs with respect to our indebtedness, expenses, difficulties, complications, or delays in connection with future financing efforts, all of which could have a material adverse impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
Also, changes in the fair value of the derivative instruments can result in a non-cash charge or gain being recognized in our financial results for a period preceding the period or periods in which settlement occurs under the derivative instruments and interest payments are made. Changes or shifts in interest rates can significantly impact the valuation of our derivatives and therefore could expose us to substantial mark-to-market losses or gains if interest rates fluctuate materially from the time when the derivatives were entered into. Accordingly, fluctuations in interest rates may impact our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. See "Note 2 to our Consolidated Financial Statements".
Debt & Financing - Risk 3
The terms of our indebtedness and that of certain of our subsidiaries impose significant restrictions on our operating and financial flexibility.
The terms of our Senior Notes due 2027 and the debt instruments of some of our subsidiaries contain customary covenants including limitations on our ability to, among other things, incur or guarantee additional indebtedness; make restricted payments, including dividends and prepaying indebtedness; create or permit liens; enter into business combinations and asset sale transactions; make investments, including capital expenditures; and enter into new businesses. Some of these debt instruments are also secured by various collateral including mortgages on farms, pledges of subsidiary stock and liens on certain facilities, equipment and accounts. Some of these debt instruments also contain cross-default provisions, where a default on one loan by one subsidiary could result in lenders of otherwise performing loans declaring a default. These restrictions could limit our ability to obtain future financing, withstand a future downturn in business or the economy in general, conduct operations or otherwise take advantage of business opportunities that may arise. Moreover, by reducing the level of dividends we may receive, the terms of our subsidiaries' indebtedness places limits on our ability to make acquisitions or needed capital expenditures or to pay dividends to our shareholders.
The financial ratio covenants we are currently required to meet, some of which are measured on a combined basis aggregating results of the borrowing subsidiaries and others which are measured on an individual debtor basis, include, among others, debt service coverage, minimum liquidity and leverage ratios.
The failure to maintain applicable financial ratios, in certain circumstances, would prevent us from borrowing additional amounts and could result in a default under such indebtedness. If we or our subsidiaries are unable to repay those amounts, the affected lenders could initiate bankruptcy-related proceedings or enforce their rights to the collateral securing such indebtedness, which would have a material and adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Debt & Financing - Risk 4
We have substantial indebtedness which could impair their financial condition and decrease the amount of dividends we receive.
As of December 31, 2020, we had $634.8 million of net debt outstanding on a consolidated basis, including $500 million of Notes 2027, incurred by Adecoagro S.A. Certain of our subsidiaries in Argentina and Brazil have a substantial amount of debt, which requires significant principal and interest payments. Such indebtedness could affect our subsidiaries' future operations, for example, by requiring a substantial portion of their cash flows from operations to be dedicated to the payment of principal and interest on indebtedness instead of funding working capital and capital improvements and other investments. The substantial amount of debt incurred by us and our subsidiaries also imposes significant debt obligations, increasing our cost of borrowing to satisfy business needs and limiting our ability to obtain additional financing.
The substantial level of indebtedness borne by certain of our subsidiaries also affects the amount of cash available to them to pay as dividends, increasing our vulnerability to economic downturns or other adverse developments relative to competitors with less leverage, and limiting our ability to obtain additional financing for working capital, capital expenditures, acquisitions or other corporate purposes in the future. Moreover, our indebtedness places limits on our ability to make acquisitions or needed capital expenditures or to pay dividends to our shareholders.
Debt & Financing - Risk 5
Devaluation of the peso may adversely affect our results of operations, our capital expenditure program and the ability to service our liabilities and transfers of funds abroad.
Argentina has a history of high volatility in its foreign exchange markets, including sharp and unanticipated devaluations, tight foreign exchange controls and severe restrictions on foreign trade. The devaluation of the peso may have a negative impact on the ability of certain Argentine businesses to service their foreign currency denominated debt. It could also lead to higher inflation rates, significantly reduce real wages and jeopardize our business.
The devaluation of the Argentine peso has been continuous during recent history. After several years of moderate variations in the nominal exchange rate, the Argentine peso depreciated 32.6% and 31.1% in 2013 and 2014, respectively, with respect to the U.S. dollar. In 2015, the Argentine peso lost 52.5% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar, in 2016 depreciated 21.9% and in 2017, depreciated approximately 17.4% of its value with respect to the U.S. dollar. In 2018 the Argentine peso suffered a sharp depreciation which accumulated 102.2% (See "- Our results of operations may be adversely affected by high and possibly increasing inflation in Argentina" and "- The Argentine economy could be adversely affected by economic developments in other markets and by other general "contagion" effects").
After the results of the primary elections were announced on August 11, 2019, the markets reacted negatively, and the U.S. dollar price jumped from $43.9 pesos to $60.4 at the exchange rate published by the Argentine Central Bank as of August 14, 2019. Consequently, the shares of Argentine companies in the New York stock exchanges and the value of national bonds dropped. Given the political and economic landscape, the Government of former President Macri re-instated rigid restrictions and foreign exchange controls in September 1, 2019, which among other things, significantly curtailed access to the official foreign exchange market by individuals and entities (See "Item 10 - Additional Information-Exchange Controls"). During 2019 the Argentine peso depreciated 58.9% against the U.S. dollar. Furthermore, an unofficial U.S. dollar trading market developed in which the Argentine peso/U.S. dollar exchange rate is significantly higher than the one in the official one. We cannot predict future fluctuations in the Argentine peso/U.S. dollar exchange rate or further foreign exchange restrictions.
Despite the positive effects the depreciation of the Argentine peso may have on the competitiveness of certain sectors of the Argentine economy, including our business, it also had a negative impact on the financial condition of many Argentine businesses and individuals. The devaluation of the Argentine peso affected or may affect the ability of certain Argentine businesses to honor their foreign currency-denominated debt, generates high levels of inflation, reduces real wages significantly, and has a negative impact on companies oriented to the domestic market, such as public services and the financial industry.
Given the political and economic landscape, the Government of former President Macri re-instated rigid restrictions and foreign exchange controls in September 1, 2019, which among other things, significantly curtailed access to the official foreign exchange market by individuals and entities (See "Item 10 - Additional Information-Exchange Controls"). Notwithstanding the strengthening of the foreign exchange controls, the Peso accumulated a depreciation of 59.02% and 40.49% against the U.S. dollar in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Furthermore, an unofficial U.S. dollar trading market developed again in which the Argentine peso/U.S. dollar exchange rate is significantly higher than the one in the official one. We cannot predict future fluctuations in the Argentine peso/U.S. dollar exchange rate or further foreign exchange restrictions.
Additional volatility, appreciation or depreciation of the peso, or reduction in the Argentine Central Bank's international reserves due to currency interventions could adversely affect the Argentine economy, which in turn may have an adverse effect on our financial conditions and results of operations.
Corporate Activity and Growth2 | 2.7%
Corporate Activity and Growth - Risk 1
The expansion of our business through acquisitions poses risks that may reduce the benefits we anticipate from these transactions.
As part of our business strategy, we have grown through acquisitions. We plan to continue growing by acquiring other farms and production facilities throughout South America. We believe that the agricultural industry and agricultural activity in the region are highly fragmented and that our future consolidation opportunities will continue to be significant to our growth. However, our management is unable to predict whether or when any prospective acquisitions or strategic alliances will occur, or if such acquisitions or strategic alliances will be agreed upon on favorable terms and conditions. Our ability to continue to expand our business successfully through acquisitions and strategic alliances depends on many factors, including our ability to identify potential acquisitions, access financing sources, including through capital markets, at acceptable conditions, negotiate favorable transaction terms and successfully consummate and integrate any businesses we acquire.
To support the acquisitions we pursue, we may need to implement new or upgraded strategies, systems, procedures and controls for our operations and will face risks, including diversion of management time and focus and challenges associated with integrating new managers and employees. We may be unable to realize synergies and efficiency gains from acquisitions or to identify, negotiate or finance future acquisitions, particularly as part of our international growth strategy, successfully or at favorable valuations, or to effectively integrate these acquisitions or strategic alliances with our current businesses. Our failure to integrate new businesses or manage any new alliances successfully could adversely affect our business and financial performance.
Any future strategic alliances or acquisitions of businesses, technologies, services or products might require us to obtain additional equity or debt financing, which may not be available on favorable terms, or at all, and may result in unforeseen operating difficulties and expenditures, as well as strain on our organizational culture, especially if an acquisition is followed by a period of lower than projected prices for our products. Future acquisitions and joint ventures may be subject to antitrust and other regulatory approvals, which may not be obtained on a timely basis or at all.
Acquisitions also expose us to the risk of successor liability relating to actions involving an acquired company, its management or contingent liabilities incurred before the acquisition. The due diligence we conduct in connection with an acquisition, and any contractual guarantees or indemnities that we receive from the sellers of acquired companies, may not be sufficient to protect us from, or compensate us for, actual liabilities. Any material liability associated with an acquisition could adversely affect our reputation and results of operations and reduce the benefits of the acquisition.
In addition, we are unable to predict the effect that changes in Argentine or Brazilian legislation regarding foreign ownership of rural properties could have in our business. (See " - Risks Related to Argentina-Argentine law concerning foreign ownership of rural properties may adversely affect our results of operations and future investments in rural properties in Argentina" and "-Risks Related to Brazil-Changes in Brazilian rules concerning foreign investment in rural properties may adversely affect our investments.")
Corporate Activity and Growth - Risk 2
We have entered into agriculture partnership agreements in respect of a significant portion of our sugarcane plantations.
As of December 31, 2020, approximately 93.81% of our sugarcane plantations were leased through agriculture partnership agreements, for periods of an average of six to twelve years. We cannot guarantee that these agriculture partnerships will be renewed after their respective terms end. We cannot guarantee that we will be able to renew these agreements and whether such renewals will be on terms and conditions satisfactory to us. Any failure to renew the agriculture partnerships or obtain land suitable for sugarcane planting in sufficient quantity and at reasonable prices to develop our activities could adversely affect our results of operations, increase our costs or force us to seek alternative properties, which may not be available or be available only at higher prices.
Production
Total Risks: 10/73 (14%)Below Sector Average
Manufacturing1 | 1.4%
Manufacturing - Risk 1
If our products become contaminated, we may be subject to product liability claims, product recalls and restrictions on exports that would adversely affect our business.
The sale of food products for human consumption involves the risk of injury to consumers. These injuries may result from tampering by third parties, bioterrorism, product contamination or spoilage, including the presence of bacteria, pathogens, foreign objects, substances, chemicals, other agents, or residues introduced during the growing, storage, handling or transportation phases.
We cannot be sure that consumption of our products will not cause a health-related illness in the future or that we will not be subject to claims or lawsuits relating to such matters. The negative publicity surrounding any assertion that our products caused illness or injury could adversely affect our reputation with existing and potential customers and our corporate and brand image, and we could also incur significant indemnification liabilities legal expenses. Moreover, claims or liabilities of this nature might not be covered by any rights of indemnity or contribution that we may have against others, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations or financial condition.
Employment / Personnel2 | 2.7%
Employment / Personnel - Risk 1
We may be subject to labor disputes from time to time that may adversely affect us.
Approximately 18% of our employees are represented by unions or equivalent bodies and are covered by collective bargaining or similar agreements which are subject to periodic renegotiation. We may not successfully conclude our labor negotiations on satisfactory terms, which may result in a significant increase in the cost of labor or may result in work stoppages or labor disturbances that disrupt our operations. Cost increases, work stoppages or disturbances that result in substantial amounts of raw product not being processed could have a material and adverse effect on our business, results of operations and financial condition.
Furthermore, all benefits and obligations provided under collective agreements negotiated are binding upon all parties, and have legal and practical effects on employment agreements.
If we do not observe legal and conventional binding provisions, it may be susceptible to labor disputes filed by employees, Public Civil Action filed by the Labor Public Prosecution and inspections by Labor Protection Agencies, resulting in the payment of legal and/or administrative sanctions.
Employment / Personnel - Risk 2
The Argentine government may order salary increases to be paid to employees in the private sector, or imposed additional charges, which would increase our operating costs.
In the past, the Argentine government has passed laws, regulations and decrees requiring companies in the private sector to increase wages and provide specified benefits to employees and may do so again in the future. Argentine employers, both in the public and private sectors, have experienced significant pressure from their employees and labor organizations to increase wages and to provide additional employee benefits.
Due to the high levels of inflation, employees and labor organizations are demanding significant wage increases. Since June 2017, the minimum salary was raised from Ps.10,000 to Ps.21,600, as of the date of this report (in nominal terms without adjustment for inflation).
Since 2015, the INDEC has published the Salary Variation Index (Coeficiente de Variación Salarial), an index that shows the evolution of salaries. The Salary Variation Index showed an increase in registered private sector salaries of approximately 33.0% in 2016, 27.3% in 2017, 30.4% in 2018, 67.0% in 2019 and 34.4% in 2020. These increases were mainly in line with the inflation prevailing in Argentina.
Also, by means of Decree No. 34/2019 issued on December 13, 2019, as amended, the Argentine Executive Branch duplicated the amount of the statutory severance payments payable to employees hired before December 13, 2019 and fired between December 13, 2019 and January 25, 2021. After several extensions of this measure, on January 22, 2021, the Argentine government issued Decree No. 39/2021, which further extended the obligation to pay double severance amounts for employee terminations until April 25, 2021, but limited the amount of the additional severance payment to Ps. 500,000. It is likely that this provision would be further extended by the Government if the economic condition continues.
Furthermore, under the Solidarity Law (See "- The impact of the Argentine congressional and presidential elections on the future economic and political environment of Argentina remains uncertain") the Fernández Administration is empowered to, in its sole discretion, provide mandatory salary increases for employees of the private sector, which occurred on January 2020, imposing the payment of an extraordinary non-remunerative bonus of AR$ 4,000 to all workers in the private sector, payable in two installments in January 2020 and February 2020. This bonus and similar salary increases and additional payments could also have an effect on inflation.
On March 31, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Argentine government issued Decree No. 329/2020, which prohibits layoffs and dismissals due to force majeure or lack or decrease work during the next 60 days from the date of publication of the decree. In addition, Decree No. 39/2021 further extended the prohibition on terminations without cause, terminations based on the lack or reduction of work, and suspensions for force majeure events until April 25, 2021 (see "- The measures taken or to be implemented by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic may have an adverse effect on our business and operations").
On August 14, 2020 the Argentine Executive Branch enacted the Law 27,555 that regulates dependent work provided from the employee's own home or from a place other than the employer's establishment and introduces the concept of teleworking. In addition, Law 27,555 establishes the minimum legal requirements for regulating teleworking, delegates specific aspects to collective bargaining, recognizes rights and duties for those who work under this modality (e.g., right of reversibility, right to digital disconnection, trade union rights, right to privacy) and contains regulations referring to working hours, provision of work tools and reimbursement of expenses. The Law 27,555 entered into force on April 1, 2021.
Due to the high levels of inflation, employers in both the public and private sectors have historically experienced, and currently are experiencing significant pressure from organized labor and their employees to provide further increases in salaries. If, as a result of such measures, future salary increases in Argentine peso exceed the pace of the devaluation of the Argentine pesos, they could have a material and adverse effect on our expenses and business, results of operations and financial condition.
Supply Chain1 | 1.4%
Supply Chain - Risk 1
Disruption of transportation and logistics services, insufficient investment in public infrastructure or disruption to any aspect of the supply chain could adversely affect our operating results.
One of the main disadvantages of the agricultural sector in the countries in which we operate is that key growing regions lie far from major ports. As a result, efficient access to transportation infrastructure and ports is critical to the growth of agriculture as a whole in the countries in which we operate and of our operations in particular. Improvements in transportation infrastructure are likely to be required to make more agricultural production accessible to export terminals at competitive prices. A substantial portion of agricultural production in the countries in which we operate is currently transported by truck, a means of transportation significantly more expensive than the rail transportation available to U.S. and other international producers. Our dependence on truck transportation may affect our position as a low-cost producer so that our ability to compete in the world markets may be impaired.
Substantial investments are required for road and rail improvement projects, which may not be completed on a timely basis, if at all. Any delay or failure in developing infrastructure systems could reduce the demand for our products, impede our products' delivery or impose additional costs on us. We currently outsource the transportation and logistics services necessary to operate our business. Any disruption in these services could result in supply problems at our farms and processing facilities and impair our ability to deliver our products to our customers in a timely manner.
In Brazil, a strike held by truckers in May 2018 resulted in a complete stop of road transportation throughout the country. As a consequence, the Brazilian government, issued Provisional Measure No. 832 and Law No. 13,703/2018, which established a Minimum Price for Road Freight Transport Policy and created the "Freight Table", in which minimum and mandatory transportation cost values are set each six months by the Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres - ANTT (National Land Transport Agency). With the creation of the Freight Table, many companies in the agribusiness sector were adversely affected by the increase in transportation costs.
We are exposed to the risk of disruption to any aspect of the supply chain, to suppliers' operations or to distribution channels, and the deterioration in the financial condition of a trading partner. These may be caused by a cyber-event, global health crisis, major fire, violent weather conditions or other natural disasters that affect manufacturing or other facilities of our operating subsidiaries or those of their suppliers and distributors. In certain geographic areas where we operate, insurance coverage may not be obtainable on commercially reasonable terms, if at all. Coverage may be subject to limitations or we may be unable to recover damages from its insurers.
Disruption may also be caused by spread of infectious disease (such as COVID-19) or by a deterioration in labor or union relations, disputes or work stoppages or other labor-related developments affecting Adecoagro or its suppliers and distributors (See "- We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and operating results").
Costs6 | 8.2%
Costs - Risk 1
An increase in export and import duties and controls may have an adverse impact on our sales.
The Argentine government has historically imposed duties on the exports of various primary and manufactured products, including some of our products. Since then, such export taxes have undergone significant increases, reaching a maximum of 35% in the case of soybean. Currently, soybean are levied at a 33% export duty rate, soybean flour and oil are levied at a 31% duty rate. Most of other agricultural products -such as fresh fruit and vegetables usually grown in specific regions were set a 0% export duty rate on January 2021.
The Solidarity Law (passed in 2019) established new caps for the Fernandez Administration to determine the export duty rate of all goods included in the tariff positions of the Common Mercosur Nomenclature until December 31, 2021. Even though most goods are capped to a maximum 15% ad valorem export duty rate, there are special lower caps for some agricultural products from specific regions and industrial goods. The Fernandez Administration also implemented on November 2020 a compensation program for small-scale soybean producers. Additionally, duties on the exportation of services were set to a 5% ad valorem export duty rate.
Argentina has also imposed the Import Monitoring System (Sistema Integral de Monitoreo de Importaciones or "SIMI"). Under this new system, importers are required to submit certain information electronically through the SIMI application which, once approved, will be valid for 90 calendar days.
In addition, the Macri Administration had enacted an import licensing regime that includes automatic and non-automatic licensing for imports. Automatic import licensing provides that the importer is only required to submit information through the SIMI as well as provide other certification related to the imported goods. Non-automatic licensing provides that the authorities have a 10-day period to either approve or reasonably reject the import license requested based on its effect on local businesses, in addition to the other import requirements that the goods be subject to (SIMI, certifications, etc.).
The current Fernández Administration has determined many more tariff codes to undergo non-automatic import licensing procedures to control the flow of imports of final goods. Most raw materials, input for industries and machinery are mainly subject to automatic licensing. In late 2020, many importers have suffered either a delay or blockage on their non-automatic import license applications and started seeking judicial relief to lift the blockages of their prospective imports.
Notwithstanding the above, we cannot assure you that there will not be further increases in the export taxes or that other new export taxes or quotas will not be imposed. The imposition of new export taxes or quotas or a significant increase in existing export taxes or the application of export quotas or the imposition of regimes that aim to restrict or control imports and exports could adversely affect our financial condition or results of operations.
Costs - Risk 2
Ethanol prices are correlated to the price of sugar and are also closely correlated to the price of oil, so that a decline in the price of sugar or a decline in the price of oil will adversely affect our sugar and ethanol businesses.
A vast majority of ethanol in Brazil is produced at sugarcane mills that produce both ethanol and sugar. Because sugarcane millers are able to alter their product mix in response to the relative prices of ethanol and sugar, the prices of both products are directly correlated, and the correlation between ethanol and sugar may increase over time. Sugar prices in Brazil are determined by prices in the world market, resulting in a correlation between Brazilian ethanol prices and world sugar prices. Accordingly, a decline in sugar prices would have an adverse effect on the financial performance of our ethanol and sugar businesses.
In addition, gasoline prices in Brazil are set by the Brazilian government through Petrobras. Because flex-fuel vehicles, which have become popular in Brazil, allow consumers to choose between gasoline and ethanol at the pump rather than in the showroom, ethanol prices are correlated to gasoline prices and, consequently, oil prices. The COVID-19 pandemic had an impact at the inception . See "We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and results of operations."
While we are not now able to fully determine the impact of fluctuation. A decline in oil prices to our operations, we believe that a decline in oil prices or a decision by Petrobras to lower fuel prices and its attendant effects on the price of ethanol and sugar will have an adverse effect on the financial performance of our ethanol and sugar business.
Costs - Risk 3
Increased energy prices and frequent interruptions of energy supply could adversely affect our business.
We require substantial amounts of fuel oil and other resources for our harvest activities and transport of our agricultural products. During the 2019/20 harvest year, fuel represented 3.2% of the cost of production (including manufacturing and administrative expenses) of our Farming business. In our Sugar, Ethanol and Energy business, fuel represented 9.3% of our cost of production (including manufacturing and administrative expenses) for the 2020/21 harvest year and 10.2% for the 2019/2020 harvest year. We rely upon third parties for our supply of energy resources used in our operations. The prices for and availability of energy resources may be subject to change or curtailment, respectively, due to, among other things, new laws or regulations, imposition of new taxes or tariffs, interruptions in production by suppliers, imposition of restrictions on energy supply by government, worldwide price levels and market conditions. Over the last few years, the Argentine government has taken certain measures in order to reduce the use of energy during peak months of the year by frequently cutting energy supply to industrial facilities and large consumers to ensure adequate supply for residential buildings. For example, certain of our industrial facilities have been subject to a quota system whereby electricity cuts occur on a work shift basis, resulting in our facilities being shut down during certain work shifts. We cannot assure you that we will be able to procure the required energy inputs at acceptable prices. If energy supply is cut for an extended period of time and we are unable to find replacement sources at comparable prices, or at all, our business and results of operations could be adversely affected.
Costs - Risk 4
A significant increase in the price of raw materials we use in our operations, or the shortage of such raw materials, could adversely affect our results of operations.
Our production process requires various raw materials, including primarily fertilizer, pesticides and seeds, which we acquire from local and international suppliers. We do not have long-term supply contracts for most of these raw materials. A significant increase in the cost of these raw materials, especially fertilizer and agrochemicals, a shortage of raw materials or the unavailability of these raw materials entirely could reduce our profit margin, reduce our production and/or interrupt the production of some of our products, in all cases adversely affecting the results of our operations and our financial condition.
For example, we rely on fertilizers and agrochemicals, many of which are petrochemical based. In our Farming business, fertilizers and agrochemicals represented approximately 17% of our total cost of production (including manufacturing and administrative expenses) for the 2019/2020 harvest year. In our Sugar, Ethanol and Energy business, fertilizers and agrochemicals represented 16.7% of our cost of production (including manufacturing and administrative expenses) for 2019 and 17.1% for 2020. Worldwide production of agricultural products has increased significantly in recent years, increasing the demand for agrochemicals and fertilizers. This has resulted, among other things, in increased prices for agrochemicals and fertilizers.
Costs - Risk 5
A substantial portion of our assets is farmland that is highly illiquid.
Ownership of a significant portion of the land we operate is a key part of our business model. However, agricultural real estate is generally an illiquid asset. Moreover, the adoption of laws and regulations that impose limitations on ownership of rural land by foreigners in the jurisdictions in which we operate may also limit the liquidity of our farmland holdings. See "-Risks Related to Argentina-Argentine law concerning foreign ownership of rural properties may adversely affect our results of operations and future investments in rural properties in Argentina" and "-Risks Related to Brazil-Changes in Brazilian rules concerning foreign investment in rural properties may adversely affect our investments." As a result, it is unlikely that we will be able to adjust our owned agricultural real estate portfolio promptly in response to changes in economic, business or regulatory conditions. Illiquidity in local market conditions may adversely affect our ability to complete dispositions, to receive proceeds generated from any such sales or to repatriate any such proceeds.
Costs - Risk 6
Our current insurance coverage may not be sufficient to cover our potential losses.
Our production is, in general, subject to different risks and hazards, including adverse weather conditions, fires, diseases and pest infestations, other natural phenomena, industrial accidents, labor disputes, changes in the legal and regulatory framework applicable to us, environmental contingencies and other natural phenomena. Our insurance currently covers only part of the losses we may incur and does not cover losses on crops due to hail storms, fires or similar risks. Furthermore, certain types of risks may not be covered by the policies we have for our industrial facilities. Additionally, we cannot guarantee that the indemnification paid by the insurer due to the occurrence of a casualty covered by our policies will be sufficient to entirely compensate us for the loss or damages suffered. Moreover, we may not be able to maintain or obtain insurance of the type and amount desired at reasonable costs. If we were to incur significant liability for which we were not fully insured, it could have a materially adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
We may incur additional expenses to mitigate the loss, such as shifting production to another facility. These costs may not be fully covered by our insurance.
Ability to Sell
Total Risks: 6/73 (8%)Below Sector Average
Competition2 | 2.7%
Competition - Risk 1
We face significant competition from Brazilian and foreign producers, which could adversely affect our financial performance.
We face strong competition from other producers in our domestic market and from foreign producers in our export markets. The market for commodities is highly fragmented. Small producers can also be important competitors, some of which operate in the informal economy and are able to offer lower prices by meeting lower quality standards. Competition from other producers is a barrier to expanding our sales in the domestic/foreign market. With respect to exports, we compete with other large, vertically integrated producers that have the ability to produce quality products at low cost, as well as with foreign producers.
The Brazilian markets, in particular, are highly price-competitive and sensitive to product substitution. Customers may seek to diversify their sources of supply by purchasing a portion of the products they need from producers in other countries, as some of our customers in key export markets have begun to do. We expect that we will continue to face strong competition in all of our markets and anticipate that existing or new competitors may broaden their product lines and extend their geographic scope. Any failure by us to respond to product, pricing and other moves by competitors may negatively affect our financial performance.
Competition - Risk 2
We may be harmed by competition from alternative fuels, products and production methods.
Ethanol competes in the biofuel market with other, established fuels such as biodiesel, as well as fuels that are still in the development phase, including methanol and butanol from biomass. Alternative fuels could become more successful than ethanol in the biofuels market over the medium or long term due to, for example, lower production costs, greater environmental benefits or other more favorable product characteristics. In addition, alternative fuels may also benefit from tax incentives or other more favorable governmental policies than those that apply to ethanol. Furthermore, our success depends on early identification of new developments relating to products and production methods and continuous improvement of existing expertise in order to ensure that our product range keeps pace with technological change. Competitors may gain an advantage over us by, for example, developing or using new products and production methods, introducing new products to the market sooner than we do, or securing exclusive rights to new technologies, thereby significantly harming our competitive position.
Demand4 | 5.5%
Demand - Risk 1
Growth in the sale and distribution of ethanol depends in part on infrastructure improvements, which may not occur on a timely basis, if at all.
In contrast to the well-established logistical operations and infrastructure supporting sugar exports, ethanol exports inherently demand much more complex preparation and means of distribution, including outlets from our facilities to ports and shipping to other countries. Substantial infrastructure development by persons and entities outside our control is required for our operations, and the ethanol industry generally, to grow. Areas requiring expansion include, but are not limited to, additional rail capacity, additional storage facilities for ethanol, increases in truck fleets capable of transporting ethanol within localized markets, expansion of refining and blending facilities to handle ethanol, growth in service stations equipped to handle ethanol fuels, and growth in the fleet of flex-fuel vehicles. Specifically, with respect to ethanol exports, improvements in consumer markets abroad are needed in the number and capacity of ethanol blending industrial plants, the distribution channels of gasoline-ethanol blends and the chains of distribution stations capable of handling fuel ethanol as an additive to gasoline. Substantial investments required for these infrastructure changes and expansions may not be made or they may not be made on a timely basis. Any delay or failure in making the changes in or expansion of infrastructure may hurt the demand for or prices of our products, prevent our products' delivery, impose additional costs on us or otherwise have a serious adverse effect on our business, operating results or financial status. Our business relies on the continuing availability of infrastructure for ethanol production, storage and distribution, and any infrastructure disruptions may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and operating results.
Demand - Risk 2
A reduction in market demand for ethanol or a change in governmental policies reducing the amount of ethanol required to be added to gasoline may adversely affect our business.
Government authorities of several countries, including Brazil and certain states of the United States, currently require the use of ethanol as an additive to gasoline.
Approximately 31% of all fuel ethanol in Brazil is consumed in the form of anhydrous ethanol blended with gasoline; the remaining 69% of fuel ethanol is consumed in the form of hydrous ethanol, which is mostly used to power flex-fuel vehicles. Flex-fuel vehicles have the flexibility to run either on gasoline (blended with anhydrous ethanol) or hydrous ethanol. In The United States, which currently requires the addition of 10% of ethanol into gasoline, is considering increasing this requirement to 15% in 2021 The European Union aims for 10% of the energy used in the transport sector to derive from renewable energy sources by 2020, without specific targets for certain renewable energy sources and without intermediate targets, to be determined by each Member State. Other countries such as Colombia and Canada have a 10% and 5% biofuel blending mandate, respectively, while Argentina currently has a 12% ethanol blending. In March 2021, the British government announced that that next September it will require an increase from 5% to 10% in biofuel additives to petroleum products. Also, India has established a target of achieving 20% ethanol-blending with petroleum by 2025. In addition, flex-fuel and ethanol powered vehicles in Brazil are entitled to a tax benefit in the form of a lower tax rate on manufactured products (Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados) and therefore are currently taxed at lower levels than gasoline-only vehicles, which has contributed to the increase in production and sale of flex-fuel vehicles. Many of these policies and incentives aim to mitigate the effects of climate change. If climate change policies were to change, the legal framework and incentive structure promoting the use of ethanol may also change, leading to a reduction in the demand for ethanol. In addition, any reduction in the percentage of ethanol required in fuel blended with gasoline or increase in the rates at which flex-fuel vehicles are taxed in Brazil, or any growth in the demand for natural gas and other fuels as an alternative to ethanol, lower gasoline prices or an increase in gasoline consumption (versus ethanol), may cause demand for ethanol to decline and affect our business.
Additionally, the COVID-19 outbreak and other market factors have resulted in a reduction in the demand for oil and related fuels, causing significant volatility in the price of, and a reduction in the demand for, ethanol. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on global markets, we cannot fully determine the extent of the reduction in the demand for ethanol, which, if sustained, may have a material adverse impact on our operations and financial condition. See "- Ethanol prices are correlated to the price of sugar and are also closely correlated to the price of oil, so that a decline in the price of sugar or a decline in the price of oil will adversely affect our sugar and ethanol businesses and (See "- We may be exposed to risks related to health epidemics, and the COVID-19 in particular, that could adversely impact our ability to operate our business and operating results."
Demand - Risk 3
Our business is seasonal, and our results may fluctuate significantly depending on the growing cycle of our crops.
As with any agricultural business enterprise, our business operations are predominantly seasonal in nature. The harvest of corn, soybean and rice generally occurs from January to May. Wheat is harvested from December to January. Cotton is harvested from June to August, but requires processing which takes approximately two to three months. Our operations and sales are affected by the growing cycle of our crops process and the timing of our harvest sales. In addition, our sugar and ethanol business is subject to seasonal trends based on the sugarcane growing cycle in the center-south region of Brazil. The annual sugarcane harvesting period in the center-south region of Brazil begins in March/April and ends in November/December. This creates price fluctuations which result in fluctuations in our sugar and ethanol inventories, usually peaking in December to take advantage of higher prices during the traditional off-season (i.e., January through April), and a degree of seasonality in our gross profit. Seasonality could have a material adverse effect on our business and financial performance. In addition, our quarterly results may vary as a result of the effects of fluctuations in commodities prices, production yields and costs. Therefore, our results of operations have varied significantly from period to period and are likely to continue to vary, due to seasonal factors.
Demand - Risk 4
Some of the agricultural commodities and food products that we produce contain genetically modified organisms ("GMO").
Our soybean, corn and cotton products contain GMOs in varying proportions depending on the year and the country of production. The use of GMOs in food has been met with varying degrees of acceptance in the markets in which we operate. In certain countries, adverse publicity about genetically modified food has led to governmental regulation limiting sales of GMO products in some of the markets in which our customers sell our products, including the European Union. It is possible that new restrictions on GMO products will be imposed in major markets for some of our products or that our customers will decide to purchase fewer GMO products or not buy GMO products at all, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, results of operations, financial condition or prospects.
Tech & Innovation
Total Risks: 1/73 (1%)Below Sector Average
Cyber Security1 | 1.4%
Cyber Security - Risk 1
Security breaches and other disruptions could compromise our technology infrastructure and information and expose us to processes disruption and liability, which would cause our business and reputation to suffer.
In the ordinary course of our business, we depend on technology to carry out our business. We also collect and store sensitive data, including intellectual property, our proprietary business information and that of our customers and suppliers, and personally identifiable information of our employees, in our data centers and on our networks. The secure processing, maintenance and transmission of this information is critical to our operations. In addition, these systems may require modifications or upgrades as a result of technological changes or growth in our business. Although we take actions to secure our systems and electronic information and have disaster recovery plans in case of incidents that could cause major disruptions to our business, these measures may not be enough. In January 2020, we experienced an invasion by a computer virus that temporarily compromised our network, and a significant number of our servers and personal computers at our corporate offices. Although the cyberattack did not impact our production operations systems or financial and accounting systems, we were required to execute a contingency plan to restore the affected services, and return to a safe and normal network conditions.
Despite our security measures, our information technology and infrastructure may be vulnerable to attacks by hackers or breached due to employee error, malfeasance or other disruptions. Any such breach could compromise our networks, our systems, and eventually suffer from systems disruption and/or having the information stored there accessed, publicly disclosed, lost or stolen. Any such access, disclosure or other loss of information could result in legal claims or proceedings, fines from governmental authorities, disrupt our operations, damage our reputation, and cause over costs to remedy the harm suffered, which could adversely affect our business/operating margins, revenues and competitive position.
See a full breakdown of risk according to category and subcategory. The list starts with the category with the most risk. Click on subcategories to read relevant extracts from the most recent report.
FAQ
What are “Risk Factors”?
Risk factors are any situations or occurrences that could make investing in a company risky.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that publicly traded companies disclose their most significant risk factors. This is so that potential investors can consider any risks before they make an investment.
They also offer companies protection, as a company can use risk factors as liability protection. This could happen if a company underperforms and investors take legal action as a result.
It is worth noting that smaller companies, that is those with a public float of under $75 million on the last business day, do not have to include risk factors in their 10-K and 10-Q forms, although some may choose to do so.
How do companies disclose their risk factors?
Publicly traded companies initially disclose their risk factors to the SEC through their S-1 filings as part of the IPO process.
Additionally, companies must provide a complete list of risk factors in their Annual Reports (Form 10-K) or (Form 20-F) for “foreign private issuers”.
Quarterly Reports also include a section on risk factors (Form 10-Q) where companies are only required to update any changes since the previous report.
According to the SEC, risk factors should be reported concisely, logically and in “plain English” so investors can understand them.
How can I use TipRanks risk factors in my stock research?
Use the Risk Factors tab to get data about the risk factors of any company in which you are considering investing.
You can easily see the most significant risks a company is facing. Additionally, you can find out which risk factors a company has added, removed or adjusted since its previous disclosure. You can also see how a company’s risk factors compare to others in its sector.
Without reading company reports or participating in conference calls, you would most likely not have access to this sort of information, which is usually not included in press releases or other public announcements.
A simplified analysis of risk factors is unique to TipRanks.
What are all the risk factor categories?
TipRanks has identified 6 major categories of risk factors and a number of subcategories for each. You can see how these categories are broken down in the list below.
1. Financial & Corporate
Accounting & Financial Operations - risks related to accounting loss, value of intangible assets, financial statements, value of intangible assets, financial reporting, estimates, guidance, company profitability, dividends, fluctuating results.
Share Price & Shareholder Rights – risks related to things that impact share prices and the rights of shareholders, including analyst ratings, major shareholder activity, trade volatility, liquidity of shares, anti-takeover provisions, international listing, dual listing.
Debt & Financing – risks related to debt, funding, financing and interest rates, financial investments.
Corporate Activity and Growth – risks related to restructuring, M&As, joint ventures, execution of corporate strategy, strategic alliances.
2. Legal & Regulatory
Litigation and Legal Liabilities – risks related to litigation/ lawsuits against the company.
Regulation – risks related to compliance, GDPR, and new legislation.
Environmental / Social – risks related to environmental regulation and to data privacy.
Taxation & Government Incentives – risks related to taxation and changes in government incentives.
3. Production
Costs – risks related to costs of production including commodity prices, future contracts, inventory.
Supply Chain – risks related to the company’s suppliers.
Manufacturing – risks related to the company’s manufacturing process including product quality and product recalls.
Human Capital – risks related to recruitment, training and retention of key employees, employee relationships & unions labor disputes, pension, and post retirement benefits, medical, health and welfare benefits, employee misconduct, employee litigation.
4. Technology & Innovation
Innovation / R&D – risks related to innovation and new product development.
Technology – risks related to the company’s reliance on technology.
Cyber Security – risks related to securing the company’s digital assets and from cyber attacks.
Trade Secrets & Patents – risks related to the company’s ability to protect its intellectual property and to infringement claims against the company as well as piracy and unlicensed copying.
5. Ability to Sell
Demand – risks related to the demand of the company’s goods and services including seasonality, reliance on key customers.
Competition – risks related to the company’s competition including substitutes.
Sales & Marketing – risks related to sales, marketing, and distribution channels, pricing, and market penetration.
Brand & Reputation – risks related to the company’s brand and reputation.
6. Macro & Political
Economy & Political Environment – risks related to changes in economic and political conditions.
Natural and Human Disruptions – risks related to catastrophes, floods, storms, terror, earthquakes, coronavirus pandemic/COVID-19.
International Operations – risks related to the global nature of the company.
Capital Markets – risks related to exchange rates and trade, cryptocurrency.